How Artillery And Air Power Shaped Thailand-Cambodia Border Conflict

Forbes

a day ago

F16 military flight landing at Donmeung Airport getty
On July 24 a long simmering border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand erupted as both sides unleashed heavy weaponry as they vied for control of culturally important temples and their environs along disputed sectors of the border: Preah Vihear to the east, and Prah Muen Thom and Ta Kwai to the west.
As in a preceding eruption of hostilities in 2011, infantry on the ground armed with small arms and support weapons seized and defended contested terrain which was also bombarded by rocket and howitzer artillery (including cluster munitions). But for the first time, drones and jet fighters armed with precision-guided weapons also joined the fray.
By the time a ceasefire was declared on July 29, there were at a minimum several dozen dead, including many civilians. Artillery and air power caused the most destruction, though the threat of weapons not used in the war also loomed.
The conflict also involved a curious mix of western and eastern weaponry, both old and new. While Cambodia is supported by China (and Vietnam prior), while Thailand has bought arms from the United States, Israel, Ukraine, France, Sweden and others. But Bangok too had increasingly turned towards China in recent years, including weapons and joint military exercises.
Note: Confirming actions in military conflicts (especially recent/ongoing ones) is difficult due to prevailing confusion, optimism bias regarding own-side performance, and propaganda aimed at influencing public perceptions. Thus this account stresses the claims and allegations made by the parties, and what credible photos or videos of the conflict.
Both Thailand and Cambodia have large and diverse arsenals of artillery, with Cambodia particularly invested in rocket artillery. Thai accounts mark a bombardment by Cambodian BM-21 Grad rockets on the morning of July 24 near Ta Muen Thom temple, which reportedly killed 11 Thai civilians and a soldier, led to larger-scale hostilities and retaliatory strikes (see below).
Cambodian soldiers tride a truck equipped with a Russian-made BM-21 rocket launcher in Cambodia's northern Oddar Meanchey province, which borders Thailand, on July 27, 2025. Thailand and Cambodia clashed for a fourth day on July 27, despite both sides saying they were ready to discuss a ceasefire after a late-night intervention by US President Donald Trump. (Photo by TANG CHHIN Sothy / AFP) (Photo by TANG CHHIN SOTHY/AFP via Getty Images) AFP via Getty Images
Multiple rocket launch systems (MRLSs), typically mounted on trucks, can very rapidly unleash large salvoes of rockets saturating a broad area with high explosives—imprecise, but shocking in scale and intensity.
Additionally, some 21st-century artillery rockets are incorporating satellite-guidance capability, transforming them into missiles capable of precision strikes involving much smaller salvoes.
The Soviet 122-millimeter Grad rocket, dating back to the 1960s, is perhaps the most widely used rocket artillery on the planet compatible with diverse truck-launchers. Cambodia uses the original Soviet BM-21 launchers, Czech RM-70s on 8x8 trucks, Chinese PHL-81s (reverse-engineered from a BM-21 captured from Vietnam) and succeeding PHL-90Bs launchers with improved fire control systems. Meanwhile, Thailand uses Chinese PHL-11s (or SR-4s).
All of these model have barrels sufficient to unleash 40 rockets in one salvo, with the PHL-90Bs and RM-70s also carrying a second salvo of ammunition. Typical Grad rockets have a maximum range of 12 miles, though extended-range rockets may reach twice as far or further.
Larger-caliber rockets than Grads typically have considerably greater range—enough to strike distant military bases or population centers. Cambodia disposes of six PHL-03 launcher trucks with 12 tubes each packed with 300-millimeter rockets with a range of at least 81 miles.
Meanwhile Thailand operates license built DTI-1s and DTI-1Gs (based on Chinese WS-1B and WS-32) with four 302-millimeter rockets. The DTI-1G in particular can launch satellite-guided missiles out to 87 miles using China's Beidou satellite network, allowing much more precise strikes using a lower volume of rockets.
Technically, Cambodia's PHL-03 supports a Fire Dragon-140 guided munition too, but it's not confirmed that Cambodia acquired any.
Ultimately, it doesn't appear either side attempted long-distance strikes outside the disputed areas, though Thai media claims the destruction of a Cambodian PHL-03.
Thai and Cambodian howitzer artillery also saw extensive action. Prior to the sustained fighting on May 30, Cambodia deployed a dozen Chinese-built SH-1 122-millimeter howitzer trucks (PCL-09s in Chinese service) to the border. Meanwhile, Thailand has acquired over 600 towed 105- and 155-millimeter towed howitzers from diverse countries, M109 tracked armored howitzers, and modern French Caesar and Israeli ATOMS-2000 truck-mounted howitzers with more sophisticated guidance capabilities.
ATMOS 2000s—known as M758s in Thai service—were recorded in action during the conflict--as were M101 howitzers of World War II pedigree, and Soviet D-30 122-millimeter systems by Cambodia.
Howitzers were a likely vector for cluster munitions the Thai army says it used to target Cambodian military positions (though aerial or rocket systems are possible too). The controversies surrounding cluster weapons will be discussed in greater detail in a separate article.
Air power and air defense on the Thai-Cambodia border
Thailand's military elected to employ combat aircraft for the first time to retaliate against the Cambodian rocket bombardment on July 24. As the Royal Cambodian Air Force no longer has any operational combat aircraft--other than a mix of Soviet and Chinese Z-9 transport/utility helicopters--it could not intercept such raids or retaliate in kind.
The initial raid involved six Thai F-16s which struck the command posts of Cambodia's 8th and 9th divisions. F-16s continued to be deployed on strikes in subsequent days, including strike package on July 26 including two F-16s and two of the RTAF's newer Gripen-C jets imported from Sweden, marking the first combat use of this aircraft type nearly three decades after it entered operational service. This attack reportedly targeted two Cambodian artillery positions with 500-pound GBU-12 Paveway II laser-guided bombs.
World Air Forces estimates Thailand retains 35 or 36 operational F16As and-two-seat F-16Bs in three squadrons based at Korat and Takhli airbases, out of 52 imported from the U.S. PEACE NASREUN or donated by Singapore. Furthermore, eighteen of those F-16s received a Mid-Life Update in the 2010s integrating more modern computers supporting longer range sensors, weapons and self-defense systems.
Thai F-16 landing at Donmeung Airport getty
Meanwhile, the RTAF also retains 11 of its original twelve single-seat Gripen-Cs and two-seat Gripen-Ds, distinguished by their additional pair of small, bendable 'canard' wings close to the cockpit. Though Gripens have lower thrust-to-weight ratio than F-16s, they also have a smaller radar-cross section, lower operating costs, and can safely operate from much shorter improvised runways. Thai Gripens reportedly outfought Chinese J-11 jets in beyond-visual-range air-to-air combat in a 2015 exercise.
SINGAPORE, SINGAPORE - FEBRUARY 20: A Saab JAS 39 Gripen of the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) is on display during the Singapore Airshow at Singapore's Changi Exhibition Centre on February 20, 2024 in Singapore. The airshow kicked off on February 20 and will last until February 25. It is attended by over 1,000 participating companies and is expected to attract 50,000 trade attendees from over 50 countries and regions. (Photo by Zhang Hui/VCG via Getty Images) VCG via Getty Images
In terms of weaponry, the RTAF is known to have acquired French ATLIS-II laser/optical targeting pods used in conjunction with Paveway II laser-guided bombs (actually upgrade kits that convert regular 500 and 2,000 lb. bombs into smart munitions.) It also has imported newer GPS-guided KGGB glide bombs from Korea with a ranges exceeding 50 miles (depending on release altitude) and shorter range AGM-65D and G Maverick missiles using imaging infrared guidance.
Such guided munitions are significant, not just because they enable more precise and effective attacks, but also allow the jets to engage targets from sufficient standoff that they may avoid short-range air defenses, such as the Cambodian's army's Chinese-built man-portable missiles and Soviet anti-aircraft guns.
While Cambodia lacks jet fighters, in 2023 the Royal Cambodian Army did acquire batteries of Chinese KS-1C medium-range surface-to-air missiles (or HQ-12s in Chinese service) integrated alongside H-200 phased array radars for targeting. If forward deployed to the border area--which has its risks--KS-1Cs could potentially threaten Thai jets with their maximum engagement range of 43.5 miles and altitude of 86,000 feet,
However, Thailand also imported KS-1Cs from China and thus may have testedthem to devise effective countermeasures. Furthermore, Thailand operates Erieye AWACS jets from Sweden that may have help its fighters avoid air defense threats. Despite rumors alleged the downing of an F-16 jet, no evidence has emerged supporting this claim.
The RTAF's old American F-5 light fighters (due for retirement in 2031) and German/French Alphajet trainer/attack aircraft do not appear to have been deployed. Bangkok is now seeking to acquire an additional squadron of more advanced Gripen-E/F jets from Sweden, though Stockholm is apparently evaluating whether Thailand's use of Gripens in the July 2025 conflict accorded with their views on international law before authorizing further sales.
Drones in the Thai-Cambodia conflict
The war in Ukraine has revealed that even small, short-range civilian-grade drones—produced in vast quantities at low prices by China—are highly as reconnaissance system and easily converted to precise lethal attacks, either gravity dropping grenades or as kamikazes with anti-tank warheads.
Despite China being the ultimate exporter of low-cost drones, and testing of Chinese drones over Cambodian airspace (judging by crashed Chinese UAVs) the border conflict did not offer much evidence that Cambodia's armed forces had integrated drones extensively.
Thailand, however, released videos of quadcopter drone attacks on Cambodian positions employing gravity-dropped munitions, reportedly 60-millimeter M261 and M472 mortar rounds. One attack falls into a position alleged to store 122-millimeter Grad rockets. Another allegedly destroyed a loaded RM-70 rocket artillery truck.
Cambodian troops recorded themselves shooting down one such quadcopter drone with small arms fire. However, electronic warfare jamming the videofeeds, navigation and control signals of drones offer broadly more effective protection.
The video feeds of remotely-piloted drones produce effective propaganda as a by product. While the Thai military may not have operated drones on a massive scale, the recording of successful attacks provided rare concrete proof of tactical successes in the conflict (ie. fires hitting targets, not just firing at targets).
While on one level, the July 2025 Thai-Cambodia border conflict involved a traditional struggle for physical control over territory, 'indirect' fires by artillery, jets and remotely-piloted aircraft likely inflicted most of the casualties and produced media that attracted media attention.