At least 21 killed in bus crash in southern Iran
The accident occurred near Kavar, a town about 1,000 km (600 miles) from the capital, Tehran.
The official Iranian news agency quoted Masoud Abed, head of the emergency organisation in Fars province, as saying that 11 ambulances were dispatched to the scene.
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Middle East Eye
2 days ago
- Middle East Eye
'Eli Cohens inside Iran': How Israel's war exposed deep infiltration and intelligence gaps
When Israel launched a surprise 12-day assault on Iran in June, Tehran and the world were caught off guard. Few anticipated such a move, particularly while Iran was engaged in sensitive nuclear negotiations with the United States. Sources told Middle East Eye that a handful of countries had warned Iranian authorities about suspicious Israeli movements. Yet despite heightened alert levels, Tehran was ultimately blindsided when the attack materialised. The nature of the attack and the ease with which it was executed sent shockwaves through Iran's political and security establishment. Behind the scenes, covert Mossad agents, paid informants, and a network of operatives - many allegedly embedded among Afghan migrants - are believed to have facilitated the strikes. An Iranian source in the conservatives' camp told MEE that Israel had long stationed agents inside Iran, observing the movements of officials. The source added that a series of cyber intrusions into Iranian banks and government institutions may have compromised personal data - including phone numbers and addresses of high-level figures and their families - paving the way for deeper penetration. "There have been some Eli Cohens inside the Islamic Republic too," the source remarked, referencing the infamous Israeli spy executed in Syria. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters The Cohens In 2021, former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publicly revealed that the head of the Israeli desk at Iran's Ministry of Intelligence had, in fact, been a Mossad agent - and was later arrested. 'How could the top official responsible for tracking Israeli spies turn out to be one himself?' Ahmadinejad asked at the time. 'Is it even conceivable that a single person was solely running Israeli operations inside Iran, without any oversight or team?' Just four days into the war, on 17 June, Israel killed Iran's highest-ranking military officer, Ali Shadmani, who was leading the Khatam al-Anbiya headquarters - effectively the country's war command centre. Iranians backed the state against Israel. Will it now reward them? Read More » Shadmani's daughter told Iranian media: 'My father was martyred in a direct confrontation with the Zionist regime.' 'Many assume he died in a random air strike, but he was assassinated in a targeted operation.' She added that after his death, Hebrew-language media celebrated the killing of the Islamic Republic's 'war commander' and 'closest military figure to the Supreme Leader.' Further revelations came from Fayaz Zahed, a member of the Government Media Council, during a televised interview. Zahed cited three separate incidents to highlight what he described as deep Israeli infiltration into Iran's security establishment. In the first, he said IRGC commander Hossein Salami warned the head of Iran's state broadcaster, Peyman Jebelli, at 1:30 am on 13 June, the first day of the war, that Israel was planning an attack that night. Salami was killed in an Israeli strike just 90 minutes later, suggesting that senior Iranian officials may have been aware of the impending attack but were unable - or failed - to prevent it. Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi mourns next to the coffin of IRGC commander Hossein Salami, during a state funeral procession at Enghelab (Revolution) Square in Tehran on 28 June 2025 (AFP) In another case, Zahed questioned who had directed IRGC intelligence chief Mohammad Kazemi to the building that was struck by Israel two days later, implying that Mossad agents had deliberately led him into the trap. Zahed also referred to a third incident, in which nine Revolutionary Guard generals were reportedly gathered at the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said Israel appeared to have known about the meeting in advance and waited until a tenth general arrived before launching the strike. 'The claim that nine people were gathered in a meeting at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and that the operation began only after one person's delayed arrival, is no trivial matter,' he said. 'The Ministry of Intelligence and IRGC intelligence must conduct a serious and thorough investigation. Without addressing the root of the problem, there's no guarantee it won't happen again. The culprits may still be in place, ready to finish what they started.' After ceasefire, Iran is preparing for the long war with Israel Read More » A key vulnerability, according to insiders, has been the influx of undocumented Afghan migrants into Iran. 'Afghans in Iran are not Israeli spies,' one source in government said, 'but the large number of undocumented individuals who crossed illegally, particularly after the Taliban took power, created a major opportunity for Israeli intelligence.' Former president Ebrahim Raisi's decision to open Iran's borders at the time is now being viewed in retrospect as a major security miscalculation. The source added that some Afghan migrants were unknowingly paid by Israeli operatives to assemble parts later used in drone attacks from within Iranian territory. 'They didn't know who they were working for - they were just following instructions,' he said. Infiltration from within One former security official described to MEE how Israel began penetrating Iran's intelligence infrastructure nearly two decades ago by exploiting 'ideological vulnerabilities' within the system. He pointed to the election of Ahmadinejad in 2005 as a turning point. 'That period saw a rupture in the intelligence apparatus. Many of the seasoned experts who had gained experience during the 1980s were pushed aside. A new generation - lacking field experience - took over. That significantly weakened us,' he said. He added that the early 2000s also saw the expansion of Israeli intelligence bases in neighbouring countries. Following the 2009 Green Movement protests - labelled 'sedition' by hardliners - many individuals advanced rapidly through the security ranks by demonstrating loyalty to the supreme leader and hostility toward the protests. 'That environment likely allowed foreign assets to rise through the system unnoticed,' the source said. He also criticised the ideological shift in Iran's security focus: 'The more ideological the system became, the more it prioritised cracking down on unveiled women and dissidents instead of foreign spies.' The source noted that, "The emergence of overlapping and competing security bodies further fragmented the intelligence landscape, leading to internal confusion and jurisdictional conflicts." Fallout and suspicion In the weeks following the war, the Ministry of Intelligence issued a statement declaring that it had thwarted assassination plots against 23 senior officials and arrested 20 Mossad agents. Meanwhile, one name has surfaced in the public's mind: Ali Shamkhani, the former head of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and an adviser to the supreme leader, who was initially thought to have been killed in an Israeli strike. He later appeared on state television unharmed, claiming he had been trapped under rubble for hours - a statement that fuelled rumours and suspicion. 'The more ideological the system became, the more it prioritised cracking down on unveiled women and dissidents instead of foreign spies' - Former security official 'I looked closely at his face on TV,' said former MP Gholamali Jafarzadeh Imenabadi. 'There was no sign that he'd been trapped under rubble for three hours.' MP Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani further fuelled speculation, saying: 'There are serious ambiguities about Mr. Shamkhani's case. Some claim his son warned him to leave the building before the attack even began.' Notably, two of Shamkhani's aides have been arrested in the past decade on charges of spying for Israel. As the dust settles from Israel's most controversial operation in years, Iran's intelligence and political leaders face growing pressure to account for what many now believe was a deep and long-running infiltration - one that may not yet be over.
Arabian Post
6 days ago
- Arabian Post
Shamkhani Oil Empire Slapped With Record US Sanctions
Arabian Post Staff -Dubai The U. S. Treasury has placed sweeping sanctions on a sprawling oil‑trading and shipping network linked to Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, whose father, Ali Shamkhani, serves as adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The action, imposed on 30 July 2025, marks the most extensive Iran‑related sanctions package since 2018, covering more than 115 individuals, entities and vessels. At the heart of the measures is Shamkhani's maritime empire, comprising 15 shipping firms, 52 vessels and 53 entities operating across 17 countries from Panama to Hong Kong. Officials contend the network funnels tens of billions of dollars in revenue from Iranian and Russian oil sales, largely to buyers in China, using aliases, front companies and falsified documentation to conceal ownership and origin. ADVERTISEMENT Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the network as a prime example of elite Iranian circles using state influence for private gain while empowering Tehran's destabilising agenda, asserting that this is 'the largest to‑date since the Trump Administration implemented our campaign of maximum pressure on Iran'. Hossein—known in industry as 'H', 'Hector' or, in travel documents, 'Hugo Hayek'—is said to travel internationally using foreign passports and operate from the UAE and beyond. The Treasury report underscores his use of a web of shell enterprises and shipping registries in jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, Singapore, the UAE, Italy and Switzerland to obscure true control of assets. The network's operations align with broader patterns observed in Iran's so‑called 'ghost fleet.' Surveillance reports have documented vessels switching flags, deactivating AIS transponders, engaging in ship‑to‑ship oil transfers, blending cargoes mid‑voyage and falsifying bills of lading to evade detection. Such tactics enable covert deliveries to Chinese 'teapot' refineries and other end‑users despite global sanctions. The sanctions also extend to six firms based in India, accused of transacting petroleum and petrochemical goods with Iran worth approximately $220 million. U. S. officials warned these sanctions could strain trade relations and signal serious repercussions for firms ignoring sanctions diplomacy ][5]). While the sanctions are intended to sever the flow of funds financing Iran's nuclear, ballistic missile and proxy capabilities, U. S. officials stopped short of declaring they will destabilise global oil markets. Still, they emphasised that the network's disruption would make it 'much more difficult' for Tehran to covertly maintain oil sales via front companies and intermediaries. Ali Shamkhani, previously sanctioned by the U. S. in 2020, remains a key figure in Iran's security establishment. Serving as a naval officer, former defence minister and head of the Supreme National Security Council until May 2023, he assumed the role of adviser to the supreme leader thereafter. His son's oil empire is widely seen as an extension of those elite institutional networks. Industry observers say the sanctions package highlights the increasing difficulty in enforcing international measures against Iran's evolving evasion networks. The complexity, scale and global reach of Shamkhani's operations underscore the challenge of identifying and intercepting entities that operate invisibly across jurisdictional lines.
The National
7 days ago
- The National
Iraqi-British hotel owner and his Iranian oil smuggling link to Yemen's Houthis
Reviews of The Gainsborough Hotel speak of its spacious rooms, friendly staff and convenient location for visiting some of London's most famous tourist sites. It is fair to say all those who have enjoyed their stay at the hotel are probably unaware of any connections the establishment has to oil smuggling and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRCG). A closer look at the ownership of the property where the hotel sits, however, reveals it to be a company whose owner has been placed under sanctions by the US for masterminding a vast oil smuggling operation. Salim Ahmed Said is an Iraqi -British citizen who runs a network of companies that have been selling Iranian oil falsely declared as Iraqi since 2020, said the US Treasury when it announced the sanctions this month. The 47-year-old owns and runs companies that have smuggled oil for the benefit of the Iranian government and the IRGC. Through bribery of Iraqi officials he has been able to pass off Iranian oil as if it originated from Iraq, through a terminal he runs just over the border. The network of which his is part has "collectively shipped tens of millions of barrels of Iranian oil and other petroleum worth billions of dollars", the Americans allege. An investigation by The National has uncovered the London-business connections of Mr Said, who the US says has two British passports and goes by several aliases. Links to a Syrian shipping magnate, who is under US sanctions for his dealings with the Houthis and Hezbollah, can also be revealed. Ships involved in the black market Iranian oil trade link Said with Houthi and Hezbollah financier Abdul Jalil Mallah. The US has described Mr Mallah as an "illicit shipping magnate", alleging he and his brother "use their shipping empire to support Iran's malign activities and those of its proxies". A join t investigation by The National and the Greek journalism organisation iMEdD revealed Mr Mallah appears to operate the business in Greece despite being under sanctions. London hotels Turn the corner on to Queensberry Place, after a short walk from South Kensington underground station, and at the end of the street the Natural History Museum's imposing towers loom into view. On the right-hand side of the road is The Gainsborough and directly opposite The Exhibitionist, its sister hotel. Both are run by the same Dublin-based company. The Gainsborough building is owned by Robinbest and was bought for £6.5 million ($8.6 million) in 2018, according to accounts. Robinbest is in turn owned by The Willett Hotel, whose owner is Mr Said, and the company has assets of £27 million, according to its most recently filed accounts. The Willett Hotel's correspondence address is, however, The Exhibtionist Hotel, while its registered office is The Gainsborough Hotel. The building that is home to The Exhibitionist is owned by another company, The Exhibitionist Holdings. The Exhibitionist Holdings' solicitor said his client's accountants were raising this crossover with Companies House "as a matter of urgency". The Willett Hotel's registered office was once the Exhibitionist Hotel's site but it shifted across the road to The Gainsborough before again it moved, this time to an accountancy firm in east London, which was also the registered office of Robinbest. An employee, who asked for his identity and that of the firm not to be revealed, confirmed the handsome townhouse was part of Mr Said's empire when The National visited. He said he was 'very surprised' when told both the companies have been placed under sanctions by the US. 'We were not aware that he was involved in the oil business, only hotels,' he said. 'We're not aware of any sanctions.' The employee said the firm dealt only with Mr Said's staff and never with him. They sent all the relevant paperwork needed to file accounts. 'Everything is above board and the companies pay tax,' he said. Both The Willett and Robinbest moved their registered office addresses to The Gainsborough soon after The National began its investigation. Mr Said is from the town of Ranya in Iraq's semi-autonomous Kurdish region and first came to the UK in 2002 after which he was granted asylum, The Sunday Times reported. His first business venture was a shop named Rhine in Leicester, which was dissolved in 2014. It is not known when he became involved in oil trading. Smuggling operation The complex and shadowy operation run by Salim Ahmed Said is revealed in detail by the US Treasury. At the heart of his sanctions-busting enterprise is the oil terminal at the port of Khor Al Zubayr in southern Iraq, where a company he owns, VS Oil, manages six oil storage tanks. The port sits on a waterway about 40km from Basra but Iran sits on the other side of the neighbouring Shatt Al-Arab river. As sanctions have tightened on it in recent years, Iraq has increasingly become Iran's lifeline and there have been reports that oil smuggling has increased since Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Sudani took office in 2022. The proximity of Mr Said's operation to Iran makes it convenient for the country's oil to be clandestinely shipped there clandestinely. To pay for the delivery, VS Oil employees smuggle hard currency into Iran in cars and lorries, some of which carry millions of dollars each. Once the Iranian oil is dropped off at Khor Al Zubayr it is mixed with Iraqi oil. Tankers carrying Iranian oil also conduct ship-to-ship transfers with vessels carrying Iraqi oil in nearby VS Oil's terminal facilities. Vessel tracking shows that VS Oil has been visited by a number of tankers, which transport Iranian petroleum products on behalf of US-sanctioned Iranian company Triliance Petrochemical. Ships operating for Iranian military front company Sahara Thunder have also visited VS Oil. Sahara Thunder is the main front company that oversees the IRGC's support for Russia's war in Ukraine, including the design, development, manufacture and sale of thousands of drones. This activity was founded by the widespread bribery of Iraqi officials. Mr Said has paid millions of dollars in bribes to many members of key Iraqi government bodies, including its parliament, in exchange for forged vouchers allowing him to sell Iranian oil as if it originated from Iraq. This blended oil that was authenticated by these officials was ultimately sold on the world markets. One expert told The National it was surprising that vessels had been actually sailing into an Iraqi port with Iranian oil to be blended with Iraqi. The expert explained that previously ships transporting Iranian oil had been pretending to be moored in Iraqi ports only to circumvent sanctions. This is done through what is known as spoofing – the manipulation of a ship's automatic identification system. 'So the blending part, that was something that we had not been seeing,' said the expert. While the US has stepped up its designation of vessels suspected of smuggling oil for Iran, tanker operators are 'very quick at adapting'. 'They're quick at moving things under a new name, new companies, new structures, new vessels, repurchasing vessels to fill the gap left by the ones have not been designated,' the source said. 'It's a shame because the US is doing a great job in terms of finally paying attention to this, but it's also not a comprehensive strategy. They are piecemeal designating. 'Until they really hit everyone hard, every single vessel, every single company, they just keep replacing and replacing. And so it just makes it harder.' Shadow fleet In a bid to avoid sanctions on its oil exports imposed by the US, Iran uses a network of oil tankers whose ownership is deliberately obscured. This shadow fleet, as it has come to be known, enables the regime to transport its oil to generate revenue for the struggling national economy. Iran relies on non-sanctioned ships to receive Iranian oil from sanctioned vessels using ship-to-ship transfers before carrying the cargo to buyers in Asia, mainly China. Ships in this shadow fleet have been operated by companies owned or controlled by Salim Ahmed Said. According to the US Treasury, he controls a UAE-based company called VS Tankers despite avoiding formal association with the business, which has smuggled oil for the benefit of the Iranian government and the IRGC. VS Tankers was formerly known as Al-Iraqia Shipping Services & Oil Trading. In 2020, the company reportedly brokered a deal to transport Iranian oil via Iraqi pipelines to be blended and sold as Iraqi oil. Mr Said is also the owner of Rhine Shipping, which was first implicated in blending Iranian oil to sell as Iraqi oil in 2022. Rhine Shipping was previously exposed as the manager of the oil tanker Molecule, which loaded oil in the Arabian Gulf from an Iranian tanker that had turned off its location transponder to conceal the transaction. The Molecule was subsequently sanctioned for its role in shipping Iranian oil as part of the network of Iran-backed Houthi financial official Sa'id Al Jamal. Helping the Houthis Under the direction of Mr Al Jamal, Syrian citizen Abdul Jalil Mallah facilitated transactions worth millions of dollars to Swaid and Sons, a Yemen-based exchange house associated with the Houthis. Mr Mallah is subject to an arrest warrant in the UK and has been listed as a specially designated global terrorist by the US Treasury since 2021 for his involvement with Hezbollah and the Houthis in deals it says were worth 'millions of dollars". He has worked with Mr Al Jamal to send millions of dollars' worth of Iranian crude oil to Hezbollah, the US alleges. Mr Al Jamal, financial backer of the Houthis, is based in Iran and directs a network of front companies and vessels that smuggle Iranian fuel, petroleum products and other commodities to customers throughout the Middle East, Africa and Asia. Last year, the US Treasury also sanctioned four ships belonging to Mr Mallah's brother Luay Al Mallah. Abdul Jalil was successfully sued in the UK over a deal he struck with three subsidiaries of the US firm Oaktree Capital Management (OCM) to finance the acquisition of two cargo ships – the Amethyst and the Courage. OCM sought to terminate the deal in June 2021 when Mr Mallah was placed under sanctions, and his assets and bank accounts were subject to a US freezing order. Subsequent lawsuits sought to wrest control from Mr Mallah. OCM had also sought £1 million in legal costs and in a subsequent court order in May 2024, Mr Mallah was given a prison sentence for fraud. Mr Mallah's submissions included forged documents purporting to be from the Greek authorities showing he had left the country before the notice was served, which led to a hearing for contempt of court. He was sentenced to 18 months in jail, though he is unlikely ever to serve any of it. In response, the shipping tycoon insisted he was the victim of a set-up. "I have nothing to do with Hezbollah and the Houthis. This is a big lie against me to rob me,' he said. Luxury home Mr Said lives in Dubai in the prestigious Palm Jumeirah, a big attraction for foreign buyers making high-end property purchases. When The National tried to pay a visit to his villa in Frond D, security did not allow anyone to pass unless there was permission from the owner. There was a small roundabout before the checkpoint at the Frond D entrance with a small sign on the right mentioning the letter of the Frond with a brief warning in Arabic and English: "Residents and visitors only". The security guard asked for identification and the reason for visiting. 'The host needs to alert the security so you can go inside after showing identification,' he said. Dubai is one of the world's most active markets for luxury homes and The Palm is the most desirable location for $10 million-plus properties. It has 17 fronds which extend outward from the trunk of the island, forming the distinctive palm tree shape. It is spread over an area of 560 hectares and divided into three main areas, The Crescent, Trunk and Fronds. They are primarily designed to house luxury residential villas, hotels and resorts. In June, an announcement was made for five luxurious villas to be built on land bought for Dh365 million ($99.4 million) on the island by developer 25 Degrees. Frond D is a gated sub-community on the north-east of The Palm development. The fronds are primarily residential areas, so access is often restricted to residents, guests or those with legitimate business.
