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Japan's Daikin acquires US AI data center cooling startup

Japan's Daikin acquires US AI data center cooling startup

Nikkei Asia06-08-2025
The global data center cooling market is estimated to grow to $42.4 billion by 2032, more than 2.5 times its size in 2024, according to Indian research firm Fortune Business Insights. © Reuters
NARUSHI NAKAI
OSAKA -- Daikin Industries announced Wednesday that it will buy Dynamic Data Center Solutions, a U.S.-based startup specializing in data center cooling systems, by the end of August.
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Elon Musk must face lawsuit claiming he ran illegal $1 million election lottery
Elon Musk must face lawsuit claiming he ran illegal $1 million election lottery

Japan Today

timea few seconds ago

  • Japan Today

Elon Musk must face lawsuit claiming he ran illegal $1 million election lottery

FILE PHOTO: Elon Musk attends the opening ceremony of the new Tesla Gigafactory for electric cars in Gruenheide, Germany, March 22, 2022. Patrick Pleul/Pool via REUTERS/File Photo By Jonathan Stempel Elon Musk was ordered on Wednesday by a federal judge to face a lawsuit by voters accusing the world's richest person of defrauding them into signing a petition to support the U.S. Constitution for a chance to win his $1 million-a-day giveaway. U.S. District Judge Robert Pitman in Austin, Texas said Jacqueline McAferty plausibly alleged in her proposed class action that Musk and his political action committee America PAC wrongly induced her to provide personal identifying information as part of the giveaway, late in the 2024 election campaign. Lawyers for Musk and America PAC did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Musk founded America PAC to support Republican Donald Trump's successful 2024 presidential run. McAferty, an Arizona resident, said Musk and America PAC induced voters in seven battleground states to sign his petition by promising that $1 million recipients would be chosen randomly, as in a lottery, though the voters had no real chance to collect. She said voters who signed were also required to provide names, addresses, email addresses and phone numbers. In seeking a dismissal, Musk listed several "red flags" as proof he had not run an illegal lottery. He said these included statements that the $1 million recipients were "selected to earn" the money and expected to become America PAC spokespeople, defeating the idea that the payment was a "prize." But the judge cited other statements suggesting the defendants were "awarding" the $1 million, and the money could be "won." "It is plausible that plaintiff justifiably relied on those statements to believe that defendants were objectively offering her the chance to enter a random lottery--even if that is not what they subjectively intended to do," Pitman wrote. The judge was appointed to the bench by President Barack Obama in 2014. Musk had also rejected the suggestion that petition signers suffered harm by providing contact information. Pitman said an expert in political data brokerage could testify what that information was worth for voters in battleground states. The lawsuit was filed on Election Day, Nov. 5, 2024. A day earlier, a Philadelphia judge refused to end Musk's giveaway, saying that city's top prosecutor failed to show it was an illegal lottery. Musk is a Texas resident, and his electric car company Tesla is based in Austin. © Thomson Reuters 2025.

China Considering Yuan-Backed Stablecoins to Boost Global Currency Usage, Sources Say
China Considering Yuan-Backed Stablecoins to Boost Global Currency Usage, Sources Say

Yomiuri Shimbun

timea few seconds ago

  • Yomiuri Shimbun

China Considering Yuan-Backed Stablecoins to Boost Global Currency Usage, Sources Say

Aug 20 (Reuters) – China is considering allowing the usage of yuan-backed stablecoins for the first time to boost wider adoption of its currency globally, sources familiar with the matter said, in a major reversal of its stance towards digital assets. The State Council – China's cabinet – will review and possibly approve a roadmap later this month for the greater usage of the currency globally, including catching up with a U.S. push on stablecoins, said the sources. The plan is expected to include targets for usage of the Chinese currency in the global markets and outline the responsibilities of domestic regulators, they said, adding that the roadmap will also include guidelines for risk prevention. The country's senior leadership is also expected to meet for a study session as early as the end of this month, focusing on yuan internationalization and stablecoins, which are gaining momentum worldwide, said one of the sources. In that meeting, senior leaders are likely to deliver remarks to set the tone for stablecoins and define the boundaries of its application and development in business, said the source. China's plan for the usage of stablecoins, if approved, would mark a major shift in its approach towards digital assets. The country banned cryptocurrency trading and mining in 2021 due to concerns about the stability of the financial system. China has long aspired for the yuan to achieve global currency status, akin to the dollar or euro, reflecting its weight as the world's second-biggest economy. However, its tight capital controls and its trillion-dollar annual trade surpluses have worked against that aim. Those restrictions are likely to be a key hurdle to the development of stablecoins as well, market participants have said. Stablecoins are a type of cryptocurrency designed to maintain a constant value. They are usually pegged to a fiat currency such as the U.S. dollar and are commonly used by crypto traders to move funds between tokens. The yuan's share as a global payment currency fell to 2.88% in June, its lowest in two years, according to payment platform SWIFT. In contrast, the U.S. dollar commanded a 47.19% market share. China places strong capital controls to manage flows in and out of the border, with a few connect schemes permitting capital to be deployed in some key offshore market such as Hong Kong. In the U.S., President Donald Trump backed stablecoins days after his inauguration in January and is establishing a regulatory framework that helps legitimize dollar-pegged cryptocurrencies. Their underlying blockchain technology enables instant, borderless and round-the-clock transfer of funds at low cost, giving stablecoins the potential to disrupt traditional daily money moves and cross-border payment systems. Financial innovation, specifically stablecoins, is viewed by Beijing as a promising tool for yuan internationalization amid the growing influence of U.S. dollar-linked cryptocurrencies in global finance, said the sources. Details of the plan are expected to be unveiled in the coming weeks, with Chinese regulators, including the central bank, the People's Bank of China (PBOC), being assigned implementation duties, said the sources. The sources declined to be named as they were not authorized to speak to the media. The State Council Information Office (SCIO) did not immediately respond to Reuters requests for comment. The PBOC could not be immediately be contacted for comment outside of normal business hours. MAJOR SHIFT Stablecoins backed by the U.S. dollar currently dominate the market, accounting for over 99% of the global stablecoin supply, according to the Bank for International Settlements. In Asia, South Korea has pledged to allow companies to introduce won-based stablecoins and develop the necessary infrastructure, while similar initiatives are underway in Japan. The latest push comes amid mounting geopolitical tensions with Washington, and the growing use of dollar-backed stablecoins by Chinese exporters. Beijing's latest plans come after a Shanghai regulator last month said it had held a meeting for local government officials to consider strategic responses to stablecoins and digital currencies. In a recent interview, PBOC advisor Huang Yiping told local media that an offshore yuan stablecoin in Hong Kong is 'a possibility.' Separately, Hong Kong's long-awaited stablecoin ordinance took effect on August 1 and positions the Chinese-controlled territory as one of the first markets globally to regulate fiat-backed stablecoin issuers. China's commercial hub Shanghai is also establishing an international operation center for the digital yuan. According to the sources, Hong Kong and Shanghai will be the main cities to fast-track local implementation of the latest plan. China is expected to discuss expanding the use of yuan and possibly stablecoins for cross-border trade and payments with some countries at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit to be held Aug. 31-Sep. 1 in Tianjin, said the sources. The global stablecoin market is currently small at about $247 billion, according to crypto data provider CoinGecko. However, Standard Chartered Bank estimates it could grow to $2 trillion by 2028.

If China and India Mend Ties, Will South Asia Finally See More Stability?
If China and India Mend Ties, Will South Asia Finally See More Stability?

The Diplomat

time4 hours ago

  • The Diplomat

If China and India Mend Ties, Will South Asia Finally See More Stability?

With Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's recent visit to New Delhi from August 18 to 20, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi preparing for his first visit to China in seven years for the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, China, the South Asian region is on the brink of significant changes. Most of the analysis on the subject emphasizes the contentious history of Sino-Indian relations, but that ignores another crucial dynamic: whenever hostility between Beijing and New Delhi eases, South Asia briefly breathes a sigh of relief, as evidenced from the period from Kargil in 1999 to Pulwama in 2019. Chinese diplomacy has often acted to prevent escalation between India and Pakistan in particular. Therefore, it's worth exploring the key question of whether a potential Sino-Indian détente can bring stability to South Asia. India and China's relationship has enduringly been defined by mistrust, beginning with the 1962 war that scarred New Delhi's strategic disposition. Since then, every engagement has been marked by uncertainty, territorial disputes, and competing ambitions. Yet the mapping of this bilateral relation reveals a subtle pattern: instances of China-India engagement have historically coincided with a cooling of India-Pakistan tensions. For instance, the visit of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in 1988 resurrected India-Pakistan engagement as well. Similarly, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's visit to China in 2003 was followed by the India-Pakistan ceasefire along the Line of Control. Viewed through this lens, the China-India intermittent dialogues were not insignificant, isolated events but instead led to a substantive ripple effect across the South Asian region – very much to the benefit of India-Pakistan relations. Simply put, diplomatic engagement between New Delhi and Beijing often coincides with de-escalation in South Asia. This pattern has acquired renewed significance in the current context. India's outreach to Beijing comes at a moment of growing friction with its Western partners. Despite closer ties with Washington, New Delhi has faced repeated reminders of U.S. unreliability, such as tariffs on Indian goods, and unease in Washington over India's continued purchase of discounted Russian oil, often seen by the U.S. as an effort toward de-dollarization. This has raised questions within the Indian political circles about whether the United States can be trusted – a perennial concern for New Delhi. Apart from these factors, the major underlying trigger has been the diplomatic isolation and lukewarm response from Indian allies after the May 2025 conflict with Pakistan, which has Washington re-evaluating its strategy of relying on India as a counterweight to China. India's hyper-sensationalist media reporting and extensive use of information warfare, along with the absence of any substantial proof of Pakistan's culpability in the Pahalgam attack, has seriously damaged India's credibility on the international stage. More broadly, the recent assertive diplomatic posturing evident from statements by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, and intelligence adventurism abroad, especially in Western states such as Canada and the U.S., and the policy shift from nonalignment to multialignment in an era of conflict-enriched geopolitics, resulted in additional diplomatic mistrust. This uncertainty has now compelled India to hedge its bets. India has realized that an overreliance on Washington would narrow the already closing space of New Delhi's diplomacy, leaving India stranded. So, by moving to normalize ties with Beijing, the Modi government has not only strategically signaled that India has options beyond the U.S. This pivot also comes at an interesting time for India-Pakistan relations, with China being Pakistan's close ally and supporter. India would have noticed Chinese analysts like Victor Gao making assertive remarks in support of Pakistan on multiple international television shows. Meanwhile, during the brief conflict in early May, Chinese-made J-10C fighters armed with PL-15 missiles were successful in striking India's Rafales, thus establishing geopolitical and military leverage in favor of Pakistan – and China. Hence, the upcoming participation of Modi in the SCO summit and a possible meeting with President Xi Jinping not only showcases India's diplomatic isolation but also its ability to readjust as per the geopolitical reality. If New Delhi's strategy reflects a search for political leeway beyond the West, Beijing has its own reasons to listen. China's strategic outlook has always been shaped by its economic aspirations and the need to secure reliable markets. And India, with its huge capital and vast consumer base, is too significant to be disregarded. Even a limited economic engagement with New Delhi could provide Beijing with a strategic advantage. Moreover, even strategically, Beijing has every reason to cool tensions along its western border. The rivalry with the United States over Taiwan and the South China Sea already consumes a lot of its diplomatic and military resources. Easing friction with India would allow China to concentrate on its growth rather than risk being pulled into yet another crisis. Additionally, China's investment in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor gives it an incentive to play ballast. For China, it is imperative to safeguard its stakes in both Islamabad and New Delhi, and to do so, it must moderate the conflict between them, which can only happen in the case of a normalization of China-India relations. Under this logic, Chinese dialogue with India is a strategic and indispensable tactic of Beijing's broader regional strategy. If Beijing now sees value in moderating between India and Pakistan, it would not be the first time it has played that role. During past India-Pakistan crises, China urged restraint, such as in 1999 during the Kargil conflict, in 2001-02 after the attack on India's Parliament, and more recently after the 2019 Pulwama attack, calling for de-escalation. While Washington often gets credit for meditating in South Asia, especially given President Donald Trump's newfound interest in mediation, even in the case of recent ceasefire negotiations between India and Pakistan, China has always been a parallel stabilizer: quiet, firm, and largely under-recognized but always present. In moments of crisis, Beijing has avoided theatrics and cautiously steered both rivals toward the brakes. This underappreciated dynamic suggests that if India and China move toward a thaw, Beijing will play even more of a stabilizing role in South Asia. If a tentative thaw between Delhi and Beijing does happen, the implications for South Asia would be significant. For Pakistan, the immediate concern would be whether closer China-India coordination weakens Beijing's commitment to Islamabad. But as history has demonstrated, the 'iron brotherhood' would not be abandoned. However, India's reduced two-front anxiety would alter the balance – for the better. New Delhi might demonstrate greater restraint, thus lowering the risk of violent flare-ups. While the success of a China-India detente would not eradicate disputes, it would introduce a mitigating factor. Despite potential benefits, constraints limit the potential for a thaw between China and India, due to unresolved border disputes, water crises, and concerns over CPEC. Rising nationalism on both sides restricts compromises: New Delhi fears backlash if lenient, while Beijing views concessions as weakness. The deep mistrust rooted in competing aspirations and alliances suggests that any rapprochement is tactical, not a major shift. Even so, improving China-India relations could stabilize India-Pakistan dynamics, even if only temporarily. This potential benefit is often overlooked in policy discussions, which tend to assume that India-Pakistan tensions depend solely on Washington's mediation. However, history suggests that warming China-India relations could meaningfully reduce tensions in the region. In the end, South Asian peace might emerge from Beijing rather than Washington.

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