Ukraine is winning the shadow war

Mint

4 days ago

Ukraine's spectacular attacks on Russia's strategic air fleet on June 1 was a triumph of intelligence capacity. Ukraine is now winning the shadow war with Russia. If Europe and the U.S. support it by actively applying pressure to Russia, Russia may soon be forced to return to the negotiating table with serious ceasefire conditions.
Today, as in the past, the fight between Russia and the West occurs largely off the battlefield. In the 20th century, the U.S. and the Soviet Union fought each other in a roiling, decadeslong shadow war across multiple continents, as the risks of an open war compelled competition to shift into the gray zone of intelligence operations. Russia is now waging a shadow war in the same way.
It tripled its intelligence operations against the West in 2023-24 after quadrupling them in 2022-23. It has attempted to ship explosive packages to the U.S., attack Warsaw's largest shopping center, assassinate the CEO of Europe's largest ammunition manufacturer, attack Ukrainian-owned businesses in Western Europe, and cyberattack large-scale U.S. and European governmental institutions and businesses.
Since 2022, NATO countries have expelled 750 Russian spies under official diplomatic cover. There are other, unconfirmed instances of Russian intelligence activity, such as the leak of sensitive information on Sweden's incoming national security adviser and large-scale infrastructure failures in France, the U.K., and Spain. The full scope of Russia's shadow activity is thoroughly classified. But it has obviously increased since the one-off poisonings, assassinations, and sabotage attempts of the 2010s.
Intelligence operations remain a key pillar of Russian strategy because Russia doesn't have the military capacity to conquer Ukraine. It may gain more ground at a horrendous cost, throwing soldiers forward on motorbikes and scooters in the hope that Ukraine won't waste ammunition on individual targets. But the chances of a large-scale operational breakthrough akin to the massed tank battles of World War II's Eastern Front are low.
Nevertheless, the Kremlin cannot just give up. It has staked far too much blood and money to extract itself before victory. Nor can Russia 'unleash its reserve capabilities" on Ukraine. Such reserves don't exist. Russia could conduct a nuclear strike. But a limited atomic attack wouldn't appreciably change the military balance, and a large-scale nuclear strike would prompt Western intervention.
Instead, Russia hopes to disrupt Western support for Ukraine by both raising the direct sense of threat to Europe and by attacking the flow of that support through sabotage. Moscow's hope is to force a crisis that compels Europe to prioritize its own defense over aiding Ukraine.
Yet Ukraine is waging an intelligence operation of its own inside Russia at an ever-increasing scale. Ukraine has assassinated Russian pilots responsible for shooting missiles at Ukrainian civilian infrastructure. It has attacked officials' houses with precision long-range drone strikes, disrupted air traffic around Moscow, and allegedly got close to destroying Putin's private helicopter. Ukrainian drones attack Russian military and energy infrastructure nightly, doing direct damage to the Russian war machine and economy.
Against this backdrop, the Ukrainian attack on Russia's strategic bomber fleet was the most recent success in a string of increasingly effective intelligence operations. Ukrainian agents smuggled small drones into Russia in flatbed trailers, identified the Russian Aerospace Forces' most important airfields for heavy bombers, and then attacked four airfields across Russia simultaneously. Initial estimates indicate that Ukraine damaged around 40 strategic aircraft—likely a combination of long-range bombers and airborne early warning aircraft. Russia may have lost 15-30% of its long-range strike capabilities.
Ukraine could conduct this operation in part because of divisions within Russian society. Russia is a multiethnic empire masquerading as a modern Slavic ethnostate. Per census data, 30% of Russians are non-Slavic; the true proportion is likely higher. There are long-term grievances within many of these groups, most clearly in the North Caucasus. In turn, Russia beyond St. Petersburg and Moscow is extraordinarily deprived. This has created a fertile recruiting ground for the Russian military, but has also offered Ukraine opportunities.
The more pressure Ukrainian intelligence applies within Russia, the more resources Russia must divert to policing its own population and defending its high-value targets. And Ukrainian operations aren't restricted to Russian territory. Ukrainian military intelligence has deployed to Africa to fight against the Wagner Group and has assisted Syria's now-President Ahmad al-Sharaa in planning his offensive against Russia's ally, Syria's former President Bashar al-Assad.
Ukraine still needs Western support. A coherent policy from the U.S. and Europe would go well beyond 'naming and shaming" Russian attacks or holding Russian perpetrators responsible. They should instead make proportionate responses to Russian intelligence operations their explicit policy and use offensive cyber or traditional intelligence means to target military and economic infrastructure in Russia and its partner states, most obviously Belarus and Georgia.
Ukraine risks the solidification of Russian ambitions in and beyond Europe. Putin aims to divide the U.S. from Europe, harvest the remaining continental pickings, and shatter the U.S.'s global reputation as a dependable ally. As with the years before WWII, a unified, active West could avoid a greater conflagration. Ukraine continues to demonstrate how a single determined people can hold back the Russian onslaught. A purposeful and resolute West could bring about the peace and security prized by both the U.S. and Europe.
About the authors: Seth Cropsey is president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy, and he is the author of Mayday and Seablindness. Harry Halem is a senior fellow at Yorktown Institute.