Asean must act for peace in Thai-Cambodian clash or risk irrelevance
direct challenge to the credibility of Asean.
For decades, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has prided itself on preserving peace among its members. Since its founding in 1967, no full-scale war has broken out between member states. The current escalation threatens to undo that singular achievement. If Asean fails to step up now, it risks becoming irrelevant – an organisation that talks about peace but cannot prevent war.
Asean's principle of non-interference, intended to preserve harmony among diverse regimes, must not become an excuse for paralysis. This conflict is not a domestic affair – it is an interstate clash that violates Asean's
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation , which binds members to peaceful dispute resolution and the renunciation of force.
A silent and passive Asean is not being neutral – it is being complicit. Recent images and
reports of fatalities along the Thai-Cambodian border underscore the urgency of the situation. This is not the time to hide behind protocol. It is time to act.
For years, critics have described Asean as a
talk shop – long on declarations, short on action. Yet defenders have pointed to one critical achievement: it has kept the peace among its members. If bullets and missiles continue to fly along the Thai-Cambodian frontier, however, that last pillar of legitimacy will crumble. What then does Asean exist for?
If the organisation cannot even convene its members to prevent war between neighbours, how can it claim to lead regional cooperation in more complex matters like economic integration, cybersecurity, trafficking or climate change?
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