Beijing slams BBC Chinese, Nikkei Asia over ‘distorted reports' on Hong Kong nat. sec law
In a statement released on Tuesday, the spokesperson of the Commissioner's Office of the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Hong Kong said reports, commentaries and editorials published by 'certain foreign media outlets,' including BBC Chinese and Nikkei Asia, had 'discredited the successful practice of One Country, Two Systems' in the city.
Without referring to specific articles, the spokesperson called on the two media organisations to 'respect facts, not lies,' and 'uphold fairness, not double standards.'
The office said that since the national security law was implemented on June 30, 2020, Hong Kong 'has regained stability' and the city's economic development 'has returned to the right track,' adding that enacting national security legislation is a 'common international practice.'
'Yet, while being conspicuously quiet about their own national security laws, these outlets maliciously attack the Hong Kong National Security Law, which once again exposed their hypocrisy and double standards,' the statement read.
Last month, BBC Chinese published at least five reports relating to the fifth anniversary of the national security law. One article featured interviews with journalism scholar Francis Lee, as well as a journalist and a political commentator, both using pseudonyms, on their views about public opinion in the city after the national security law took effect.
Lee said some Hongkongers may avoid news because they felt 'disappointed' in the social environment.
Meanwhile, the journalist said he did not want to become the 'mouthpiece' of the government, but, at the same time, struggled to include opinion from 'appropriate interviewees' following a wave of disbandment of political parties and civil society groups.
BBC Chinese also produced a video report about national security education in the city. The UK-based news outlet spoke with local secondary school and university students, teachers responsible for coordinating national security education, and members of the public about the effectiveness of patriotic education.
Some interviewees said society became more 'harmonious' after the government stepped up national education, while others said it amounted to 'brainwashing' and did not make them more patriotic.
On June 30, Nikkei Asia published an article about the emergence of the Chinese-language publishing scene in Tokyo after the national security law was implemented in Hong Kong. The legislation has 'undermined' Hong Kong's 'uncensored book scene,' the report read.
The Japan-based outlet also published a report on July 1 – the 28th anniversary of Hong Kong's Handover to China – about the city's press freedom following the enactment of the national security law.
The report featured an interview with Washington-based journalist Barry Wood, who suspected that his dismissal from government-funded broadcaster RTHK earlier this year was linked to a column about the 2019 protests he wrote years earlier.
It also interviewed journalist Lam Yin-pong, who founded a one-man outlet, reNews, after losing his job at Stand News nearly four years ago. Stand News was forced to shut down in December 2021, following the arrest of its top editors and a police raid.
Lam told Nikkei Asia that he 'strikes a balance between caution and conviction' when reporting. He said he would review past court rulings to 'avoid crossing red lines' but would not self-censor.
Hong Kong has plummeted in international press freedom indices since the onset of the 2020 and 2024 security laws. Watchdogs cite the arrest and jailing of journalists, raids on newsrooms and the closure of around 10 media outlets including Apple Daily, Stand News and Citizen News. Over 1,000 journalists have lost their jobs, whilst many have emigrated. Meanwhile, the city's government-funded broadcaster RTHK has adopted new editorial guidelines, purged its archives and axed news and satirical shows.
In 2022, Chief Executive John Lee said press freedom was 'in the pocket' of Hongkongers but 'nobody is above the law.' Although he has told the press to ' tell a good Hong Kong story,' government departments have been reluctant to respond to story pitches.
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As the Azerbaijan–Uzbekistan axis evolves, its core strength may lie in the combination of hydrocarbon pragmatism with renewable ambition and its marriage of regional self-definition with international interoperability. This is about much more than mere supply-chain logistics; it foretokens a structural realignment with long-term consequences for the balance of power across greater Eurasia.
