High-level Indian delegation visits Cairo to boost India-Egypt defence ties
During their visit, the delegation held several meetings and productive discussions with Egyptian Defence Authorities such as the Air Defence Chief for Armament, the Chairman Arab Organisation for Industrialisation, and the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Air Force.
C. Sushma, the Charge d'Affaires at the Embassy of India in Cairo, and Defence Attache Group Captain Perminder Antil also joined the discussions along with Eng Emeil Helmy Elyes, Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors at the National Authority for Military Production and Managing Director of Egypt which focused on building closer defence ties between both nations.
"Egyptian side appreciated the briefing on the significant advances in India's Defence manufacturing Industry, with special focus on reliability, affordability and high quality of India's Defence Products. Both sides committed to closer collaboration on various aspects of defence industrial collaboration. This is yet another demonstration of close and growing defence related exchanges between India and Egypt," the Embassy of India in Cairo posted on X.
Egypt and India enjoy cordial defence relations. After a brief hiatus due to the Covid pandemic, numerous defence delegations - including aircraft and naval ship transits - have visited Egypt since June 2021.
During his visit to Egypt in September 2022, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh called on Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and held bilateral discussions with former Egyptian Minister of Defence Mohamed Zaki. An agreement on defence cooperation was also signed during the visit, which remains a milestone in bilateral ties.
The first ever IAF-EAF Joint Tactical Air Exercise, 'Desert Warrior', was held in Cairo in October 2021. For the first time, an Indian Air Force contingent with three Su-30MKI and two C-17s also participated in the Tactical Leadership Programme (TLP) of the Egyptian Air Force held in June-July 2022.
In May 2023, the Indian and Egyptian Air Forces conducted a joint exercise at an Egyptian airbase, aimed at strengthening military cooperation between the two countries. India also participated for the first time in the multilateral tri-service exercise 'Bright Star-2023' led by US CENTCOM and the Egyptian Army, held in August 2023.
A bilateral air force exercise with four Rafale aircraft of IAF took place in June 2024 in Egypt. The IAF-EAF also participated in the 8th Tactical Leadership Programme in 2024 at Cairo West Airbase, Egypt. The Egyptian Navy participated in the Multilateral Indian Naval Exercise MILAN-2024 in February 2024.
The third edition of 'Exercise Cyclone', a joint exercise between Special Forces of India and Egypt, was held in February 2025.
The Egyptian delegation also participated in Aero-India 2025 in February 2025.
Egypt continues to be a major transit hub for Indian aircrafts and naval vessels enroute/returning from overhauls as well as military exercises in the European region and Atlantic. In the past few years, a number of Indian Air Force aircraft and Indian Navy ships have visited or transited through Egypt.
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Time of India
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