How India is waiting in the wings to seize China-rejected Boeing planes
India 's airlines are circling dozens of Boeing jets rejected by Chinese carriers , in what aviation analysts describe as a rare convergence of geopolitics and market timing that could give Indian aviation a decisive edge amid global supply constraints and surging passenger demand.
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The potential deal – led by
Air India , which aims to acquire up to 10 of the 737 Max jets – could offer a windfall for Indian carriers facing capacity shortfalls and delivery delays from both Boeing and rival manufacturer Airbus.
An industry executive familiar with the ongoing negotiations told This Week in Asia that talks between Indian operators and
Boeing were at a 'serious stage, if not the final phase' of reaching an agreement.
Air India declined to comment, but Boeing told This Week in Asia that the national carrier was potentially one of several options under consideration for the diverted aircraft.
'The deal appears quite bright at this stage, and it'll be a bounty for Indian aviation as it will add more planes with literally no waiting time. However, specifics need to be ironed out,' said the industry expert, who was not authorised to speak to the media.
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Senior government officials in New Delhi are believed to be aware of the negotiations.
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Asia Times
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Asia Times
4 hours ago
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'In order to achieve a fighter aircraft that meets the necessary performance and to avoid jeopardizing the defense of Japan, it is necessary to transfer finished products from Japan to countries other than partner countries,' said Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, as quoted in the report. However, maintaining strategic autonomy when it comes to critical capabilities could be a significant factor in any Japan decision not to acquire F-47s. 'The desire to retain significant sovereign capabilities in each of the three (Japan, UK, Italy) nations… is being reinforced by the concerns around the US's behavior,' says Andrew Howard, director of Future Combat Air at Leonardo UK, as quoted in a Financial Times article last month. The F-35 is a case study in how the US maintains control over exported military hardware. Brent Eastwood writes in a March 2025 article for 1945 that rumors have persisted about a 'kill switch' being installed in exported F-35s, which would act as a means to veto geopolitical behavior that is against its interests. While the US F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) states that no such kill switch exists, Stacey Pettyjohn warns in a March 2025 Breaking Defense article that the US could cut off maintenance networks, suspend spare parts shipments and stop critical software updates. Without those, Pettyjohn said the F-35 could still fly, but it would be far more vulnerable to enemy air defenses and fighters, and without US spare parts and maintenance, its international operators would struggle to keep the jets flying. In a world of contested skies and transactional diplomacy, Japan's next jet won't just define its airpower—it will define its strategic independence.
