Rubio Says US and Russia Have Exchanged New Ideas for Ukraine Peace Talks
'I think it's a new and a different approach,' Rubio told reporters after talks with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. 'I wouldn't characterize it as something that guarantees a peace, but it's a concept that, you know, that I'll take back to the president.' He didn't elaborate.
Rubio added that President Donald Trump has been 'disappointed and frustrated that there's not been more flexibility on the Russian side' to bring about an end to the conflict.
'We need to see a roadmap moving forward about how this conflict can conclude. And then we shared some ideas about what that might look like,' he said of the 50-minute meeting. 'We're going to continue to stay involved where we see opportunities to make a difference.'
In a statement released shortly after Thursday's meeting, Russia's Foreign Ministry said that 'substantive and frank exchange of views' had taken place on issues including Ukraine, Iran, Syria, and other global problems.
'Both countries reaffirmed their mutual commitment to finding peaceful solutions to conflicts, restoring Russian-American economic and humanitarian cooperation, and unimpeded contact between the societies of the two countries, something which could be facilitated by resuming direct air traffic,' the statement said. 'The importance of further work to normalize bilateral diplomatic relations was also emphasized.'
The two men held talks in Kuala Lumpur on the sidelines of the annual Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, which brings together 10 ASEAN members and their most important diplomatic partners including Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, European nations and the U.S.
The meeting was their second encounter since Rubio took office, although they have spoken by phone several times. Their first meeting took place in February in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as the Trump administration sought to test Russia and Ukraine on their willingness to make peace.
Thursday's meeting occurred shortly after the U.S. resumed some shipments of defensive weapons to Ukraine following a pause, ostensibly for the Pentagon to review domestic munitions stocks, that was cheered in Moscow.
The resumption comes as Russia fires escalating air attacks on Ukraine and as Trump has become increasingly frustrated with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
US diplomatic push could be overshadowed by tariff threats
Rubio was also seeing other foreign ministers, including many whose countries face tariffs set to be imposed Aug. 1.
'These letters that are going out in these trade changes are happening with every country in the world,' Rubio told reporters. 'Anywhere in the world I would have traveled this week they got a letter.'
Rubio sought to assuage concerns as he held group talks with ASEAN foreign ministers.
'The Indo Pacific, the region, remains a focal point of U.S. foreign policy,' he told them. 'When I hear in the news that perhaps the United States or the world might be distracted by events in other parts of the planet, I would say distraction is impossible, because it is our strong view and the reality that this century and the story of next 50 years will largely be written here in this region.'
'These are relationships and partnerships that we intend to continue to build on without seeking the approval or the permission of any other actor in the region of the world,' Rubio said in an apparent reference to China.
Trump notified several countries on Monday and Wednesday that they will face higher tariffs if they don't make trade deals with the U.S. Among them are eight of ASEAN's 10 members.
U.S. State Department officials said tariffs and trade won't be Rubio's focus during the meetings, which Trump's Republican administration hopes will prioritize maritime safety and security in the South China Sea, where China has become increasingly aggressive toward its small neighbors, as well as combating transnational crime.
But Rubio may be hard-pressed to avoid the tariff issue that has vexed some of Washington's closest allies and partners in Asia, including Japan and South Korea and most members of ASEAN, which Trump says would face 25% tariffs if there is no deal.
Rubio met earlier Thurday with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, who has warned global trade is being weaponized to coerce weaker nations. Anwar urged the bloc Wednesday to strengthen regional trade and reduce reliance on external powers.
Rubio's 'talking points on the China threat will not resonate with officials whose industries are being battered by 30-40% tariffs,' said Danny Russel, vice president of the Asia Society Policy Institute and a former assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific during the Obama administration.
When Anwar said 'ASEAN will approach challenges 'as a united bloc' he wasn't talking about Chinese coercion but about U.S. tariffs,' Russel noted.
Majority of ASEAN members face major tariff hikes
Among ASEAN states, Trump has announced tariffs on almost all of the bloc's 10 members.
Trump sent tariff letters to two more ASEAN members Wednesday: Brunei, whose imports would be taxed at 25%, and the Philippines at 20%. Others hit this week include Cambodia at 36%, Indonesia at 32%, Laos at 40%, Malaysia at 25%, Myanmar at 40% and Thailand at 36%.
Vietnam recently agreed to a trade deal for a 20% tariffs on its imports, while Singapore still faces a 10% tariff that was imposed in April. The Trump administration has courted most Southeast Asian nations in a bid to blunt or at least temper China's push to dominate the region.
In Kuala Lumpur, Rubio also will likely come face-to-face with China's foreign minister during his visit.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is a veteran of such gatherings and 'fluent in ASEAN principles and conventions,' while Rubio 'is a rookie trying to sell an 'America First' message to a deeply skeptical audience,' Russel noted.
Issues with China remain substantial, including trade, human rights, militarization of the South China Sea and China's support for Russia in Ukraine.
U.S. officials continue to accuse China of resupplying and revamping Russia's military industrial sector, allowing it to produce additional weapons that can be used to attack Ukraine.
Earlier on Thursday, Rubio signed a memorandum on civilian nuclear energy with Malaysia's foreign minister, which will pave the way for negotiations on a more formal nuclear cooperation deal, known as a 123 agreement after the section of U.S. law allowing such programs.
Those agreements allow the U.S. government and U.S. companies to work with and invest in civilian energy nuclear programs in other countries under strict supervision.
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These would be repayable to Russia, but only if and when it abided by the restitution award that a postwar international tribunal will most certainly make, given the clear illegality of Putin's invasion. And since the World Bank estimates Ukraine's reconstruction bill at $524 billion and counting, any such award is highly likely to cover the full $300 billion of Russian assets. I can't be sure how a court would view this plan. Yet the logic of its proponents — Lee Buchheit, an American lawyer who spent a career specializing in sovereign debt, U.K. journalist Hugo Dixon and the French European Parliament legislator Nathalie Loiseau — is clear. The Russian assets would not change ownership, but merely custodianship, unless Moscow refused to pay duly awarded damages. At that point, a court order would seize them with full due process. The loans would be made in tranches to ensure not only that Ukraine gets money at a rate it can efficiently use, but also to give Putin one more reason to halt his invasion. Should he do so, the loan system also would reduce the future fatalities and destruction for which Russia must compensate. Whether this particular proposal is adopted isn't the critical point, which is that a nontaxpayer source for funding Ukraine's defense has long been hiding in plain sight. It's time to fully use Russia's frozen assets if all the lofty talk of urgency from European leaders — most recently at last week's Ukraine recovery conference in Rome — is to have meaning. Putin's no fool. He knows it isn't politically viable for the Europeans to finance the war on their own for long and that he can outwait them. The best way to turn Trump's commercialization of U.S. foreign policy into a strategy for ending the war is if the additional financial burden it creates does not depend on the lasting goodwill of European taxpayers, but rather on the Kremlin's own central bank reserves. Marc Champion is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Europe, Russia and the Middle East.
