‘Virtually certain' Earth has already breached 1.5-degree warming threshold
The world may have already missed its chance to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, according to two new studies in Nature Climate Change.
The Paris Agreement was signed in 2015, with 196 countries agreeing to rein in greenhouse gas emissions to keep the global average temperature increase to 'well below' 2 degrees and ideally cap it at 1.5 degrees compared to pre-industrial times.
The new analyses showed the world would surpass the latter, underscoring the urgent need to cut carbon emissions.
'Every increment of warming above 1.5 degrees Celsius means worse extremes,' said Alex Cannon, a research scientist with Environment and Climate Change Canada, and author of one of the studies. 'If we continue warming the atmosphere, consequences will be greater.' Steam rises from the coal-fired power plant in Germany. File photo: AP
In 2024, global temperatures reached 1.5 degrees for the entire year, the first time it has happened in recorded history.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Asia Times
14-05-2025
- Asia Times
Trump defunding US out of Antarctica's great game
President Donald Trump has begun eroding the United States' presence in Antarctica by announcing deep funding cuts to his nation's science and logistics on the icy continent. The Trump administration has significantly reduced funding for both Antarctica's largest research and logistics station, McMurdo, and the National Science Foundation, which funds US research in Antarctica. More cuts are foreshadowed. If carried through, US science and overall presence in Antarctica will be seriously diminished, at a time when China is significantly expanding its presence there. Since 1958, the US has been a leader in both Antarctic diplomacy and science. Shrinking its Antarctic presence will diminish US capacity to influence the region's future. The US has historically focused its Antarctic influence in three key areas: 1. Keeping Antarctica free from military conflict The US has built considerable Antarctic geopolitical influence since the late 1950s. Under President Dwight D Eisenhower, it initiated (and later hosted) negotiations that led to the development of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. It was also key to establishing the fundamental principles of the treaty, such as using the Antarctic region only for peaceful purposes, and prohibiting military activities and nuclear weapons testing. 2. Governing Antarctica together The US was influential in developing the international legal system that governs human activities in the Antarctic region. In the 1970s, expanding unregulated fishing in the Southern Ocean led to serious concerns about the effects on krill-eating species – especially the recovery of severely depleted whale populations. The US joined other Antarctic Treaty nations to champion the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CAMLR), signed in 1980. It prioritises conservation of Southern Ocean ecosystems and all species, over maximum fish harvesting. The US also contributed to the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection. Among other measures it prohibits mining and designates Antarctica as 'a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.' The US has been vital to Antarctic governance. Pictured: US Secretary of State John Kerry, right, at Scott Base in Antarctica in 2016. Photo: Mark Ralston / AP 3. Scientific research and collaboration The US operates three year‑round Antarctic research stations: Palmer, Amundsen-Scott and McMurdo. McMurdo is Antarctica's largest research station. Amundsen-Scott is located at the South Pole, the geographic centre of Antarctica, and the point at which all Antarctic territorial claims meet. The South Pole station is thus important symbolically and strategically, as well as for science. The US has the largest number of Antarctic scientists of any nation on the continent. US scientific work has been at the forefront of understanding Antarctica's role in the global climate system and how climate change will shape the future of the planet. It has also played a major role in Southern Ocean ecosystem and fisheries research. This research has underpinned important policies. For example, US input into models to predict and manage sustainable krill yields has been pivotal in regulating the krill fishery, and ensuring it doesn't harm penguin, seal and whale populations. The US has also been a staunch supporter of a comprehensive network of marine protected areas in the Southern Ocean. The Ross Sea Region Marine Protected Area, proposed by the US and New Zealand, is the largest in the world. The US influence in Antarctica extends beyond the list above. For example, the US has a significant Antarctic-based space program. And US citizens make up most Antarctic tourists, and the US plays a significant role in regulating tourism there. The full extent of the Trump administration's cuts is yet to play out. But clearly, if they proceed as signalled, the cuts will be a major blow not just to US interests in Antarctica, but those of many other countries. The US has the best-resourced logistics network in Antarctica. Its air transport, shipping and scientific field support has traditionally been shared by other countries. New Zealand, for instance, is closely tied with the US in resupply of food and fuel, and uses US air and sea logistics for many operations to the Ross Sea region. And joint research programs with the US will be affected by reduced funding in Antarctica directly, and elsewhere. For example, reported cuts to the climate programs of NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) may hamper satellite coverage of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean. This would affect Australian scientists collecting data on ocean temperature, sea-ice state and other metrics used in climate research and weather forecasting. China has signalled its intention to be a key geopolitical player in Antarctica and has greatly expanded its Antarctic presence in recent years. China has five Antarctic research stations. Its sixth summer station is due for completion in 2027. China also operates two icebreaker ships, helicopters and a fixed-wing aircraft in Antarctica and is building new, large krill trawlers. Both China and Russia are increasingly active in their opposition to environmental initiatives such as marine protected areas. A smaller US presence creates greater opportunities for others to shape Antarctica's geopolitics. This includes pressure to erode decades-long protection of the Antarctic environment, a push for more intensive fish and krill harvesting, and potentially reopening debate on mining in the region. Lynda Goldsworthy and Tony Press co-authored the chapter Power at the Bottom of the World in the new book Antarctica and the Earth System. Lynda Goldsworthy is research associate, Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies, University of Tasmania and Tony Press is adjunct professor, Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies, University of Tasmania This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Asia Times
29-04-2025
- Asia Times
As global players focus on the Arctic, US icebreakers are scarce
Nowhere on earth is global warming proceeding more rapidly than inside the Arctic Circle. Over the past two decades, the Arctic has grown five degrees Celsius warmer. And the trend is accelerating, with the Arctic warming nearly four times as rapidly as the rest of the planet. Climate scientists expect that Arctic median temperatures will rise as much as 2 degrees Celsius annually over the coming decade. Although temperatures normally change with glacial speed, in the Arctic those transformations are now noticeable to the naked eye: Last year marked a concerning increase in arctic wildfires and flooding. And, as climate change continues unabated, the waters of the Arctic Sea, which stretch from Russia's northern Siberian shores across Alaska to Greenland, are opening at an unprecedented pace. This is bringing regularly scheduled commercial navigation to the Arctic for the first time in recorded history. Attempts to circumnavigate Eurasia are certainly not new. Almost three centuries ago, in 1728, Vitus Bering rounded the strait between Alaska and Siberia that bears his name to explore the polar seas. It was not until the 1870s that the Northern Sea route across the Arctic's Russian coast was even navigated fully by explorers. And only in 2013 did a commercial vessel actually make the entire long northern trek from Europe to Asia, even with an icebreaker escort. Yet in the last decade, the Arctic Seas have become significantly more navigable. As a result, geopolitics is rapidly arriving in the region, a trend that I outline in my recent book, Eurasian Maritime Geopolitics. For starters, the economic stakes are higher than ever. The Arctic is a vast, unexploited storehouse of raw materials critical to 21st century competition. The region harbors roughly a quarter of the unexplored oil and natural gas reserves on earth, as well as 150 rare earth deposits, valued at around $1 trillion. Platinum, nickel, and other rare metals stored below the ocean are crucial to high-tech industries, and therefore to the countries and companies seeking to preserve industrial power status. The Arctic Sea, roughly 1.5 times the size of the United States, is relatively shallow, making it amenable to exploitation, climatic conditions permitting, with 240 species of fish in ample quantities, adding to all the inanimate resources. The political-military stakes are as high as the economic ones, with the international system increasingly polarized and the Arctic a prime bone of contention. The Arctic Ocean is an area of unusual importance and a natural zone of conflict due to its geographic value. It is across the North Pole that the United States and Russia lie in closest proximity, making the Arctic seas a natural arena of rivalry in the nuclear age. The same geopolitical reality has episodically made Greenland important: it is not accidental that the US submitted a bid to buy Greenland in 1946; that the US has maintained a major Strategic Air Command base in northern Greenland since 1951; or that President Donald Trump has been obsessed with Greenland as well. Current international conflicts are amplifying the economic and military dimensions of Arctic competition. Russia, in particular, has strong stakes for status-quo revision in the rapidly emerging Arctic sea lanes. Fifty-three percent of the Arctic shore lies in Russia (compared with less than four percent for America's Alaska). The Northern Seaway along Russia's northern Arctic shores is becoming navigable as the continent warms more rapidly than on the US-Canadian side. Crucially, the opening of the Arctic Ocean to commerce and naval transport gives Russia unimpeded access to the open sea that it has sought for centuries – from Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin – but never decisively achieved elsewhere in the world. The Arctic has likewise become a zone of strong geo-economic and geopolitical interest for China in recent years. Arctic energy resources, of course, are naturally attractive to the largest energy consumer on earth. China is especially motivated to win the Arctic exploration race because it imports heavily from the Persian Gulf via vulnerable Indo-Pacific sea lanes that are dominated by the United States. Once accessible to China, the Arctic would solve the problem of American strangulation of chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca. It would also extend Beijing's critical minerals lead, further complicating Washington's efforts to compete effectively. And Beijing's congenial ties to Russia, a powerful force in the Arctic, are an additional geopolitical plus. Global economic and political-military stakes driving today's Arctic geopolitical competition began in slow motion. In August 2007, Russia planted a titanium flag on the North Pole. Moscow now quietly claims over 50 percent of the Arctic Ocean floor. Two decades ago, with Vladimir Putin in power, Russia began refurbishing Cold War military bases in the North, and building more icebreakers. Today it has well over 40 bases, roughly a third more than the combined total for all the major NATO powers in the near-Arctic, including Finland, Canada and the United States.. The atomic icebreaker Yamal assisting in the dismantling of a Russian North Pole research station in 2009; Photo: Moscow Times On the economic side, Russia has also pioneered exploitation of energy resources along the Arctic shores – with China's help. Moscow's original proposals two decades ago were to involve Western multinationals such as Exxon, Shell, and British Petroleum, with their superior technology for drilling in Arctic climes. Western firms soon fell away, however, both for economic reasons and following the sanctions associated with the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea. In 2013 Russia began construction on the massive $27 billion Yamal LNG project on the Arctic shores, with China's CNPC as a 20 percent shareholder. The first Yamal LNG train was completed in 2017. In 2018 Russia also began construction on the nearby Gydan Peninsula Arctic II project, again with East Asian participation. In exchange for the provision of capital and equipment, China receives Russian oil from these specific projects today – and does so illicitly through the Northern Sea Route. Economic logic – Russia's massive resources, coupled with the economic rise of Asia – propelled gradual Arctic sea-lane development for fifteen years in the early twenty-first century. Yet it was critical junctures – short, sharp periods of structural transformation like war – that catalyzed the age of serious Arctic maritime geopolitics currently prevailing. Western sanctions following Russia's occupation of Crimea were one catalytic event, but far more important was Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February, 2022. That led to several sweeping geo-economic and geo-political changes animating the intense Arctic maritime geopolitics now emerging. Climate change, as noted above, is a quiet background factor raising the stakes of geopolitical conflict: When the seas are opened, economic and political-military opportunities become more realistic. The decisive responses of key players to the new Russian aggression, however, were what gave explosive new life to simmering geopolitical rivalries. Most importantly, Finland (April, 2023) and then Sweden (March, 2024) became members of NATO. Following their actions, seven of the eight nations directly bordering on the Arctic were members of NATO, with only Russia – with the longest Arctic coastline and the strongest economic stakes – excluded. Russia not surprisingly responded to the new geopolitical environment surrounding the Ukraine conflict with countermeasures of its own. As Putin himself has stressed, Arctic development is an 'indisputable priority' with Russia, due to its strategic importance and economic potential. To consolidate its position in a vital region, Moscow has both escalated provocative actions of its own in the Arctic, as in the Baltic seas also, and simultaneously teamed up with China to put pressure on NATO and on the US bilaterally. In 2023 ships from the Russian and Chinese navies jointly patrolled near Alaska; in July 2024 Russian and Chinese bombers launched a collaborative probe in the US ADIZ over the Bering Sea within 200 miles of the Alaskan coast; and in October, 2024, the Russian and Chinese Coast Guards conducted their first joint patrol in the Arctic seas. The United States has naturally responded to Russian and Chinese Arctic brinkmanship. In 2013, following the first Arctic seaway transit of China's icebreaker Xue Long ( Ice Dragon ) and the inauguration of Russia's Yamal LNG project, the Obama administration articulated a US Arctic strategy. In 2014 Washington made controls over the supply of advanced US cold-water oil-drilling technology a major element of Crimea sanctions. In 2024 the Biden administration's Department of Defense issued an update to the 2013 strategy, mentioning both Russia and China as primary challengers, with the goal o curbing Russia's long-term Arctic development capacity. The US has grown steadily bolder in its Arctic response, with an increasingly bipartisan emphasis on the region. Despite far-sighted diplomatic gestures and a laudable concern regarding environmental dangers, the United States has nevertheless been slow to address the core geo-economic challenges now deepening along the Arctic sea lanes. Most importantly, the US has failed to build up its domestic icebreaker capacity, nor has it begun developing related naval capabilities that would allow it to actively contest and contain the rapid Russian and Chinese buildup along the Arctic sea lanes. And it has done remarkably little, until lately, to support its friends in the Arctic with respect to infrastructure investment support. The US, for example, has no Arctic deepwater ports to host heavy container ships. Canada has only one, lying 500 miles south of the Arctic Circle. Even though Russia now has over 40 icebreakers, several of nuclear-powered, and an active building program, the United States presently lacks even a single heavy or medium-duty icebreaker active in the Arctic. US icebreaker capacity, such as it is, is concentrated entirely in the Great Lakes. The July, 2024 ICE agreement with Canada and Finland, concluded at the 2024 Washington NATO summit, does begin to address the icebreaker crisis in multilateral fashion. Yet the massive deficiency in America's own icebreaker capacity, rooted in the striking weaknesses of its own domestic shipbuilding industry, still remains. In the emerging game of Arctic maritime geopolitics, too many of the high cards still ominously lie in Russian and Chinese hands. Kent Calder is Director of the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins University SAIS, former Special Advisor to the US Ambassador to Japan and the recent author of Eurasian Maritime Geopolitics (Brookings, 2025).
South China Morning Post
23-04-2025
- South China Morning Post
Beijing, Shanghai lead global construction of life sciences centres, CBRE says
Beijing and Shanghai are leading the global construction of life sciences facilities, with nearly 14 million sq ft of research and development (R&D) space under development in China's top two cities, according to a CBRE report. Advertisement The mainland Chinese cities are driving construction growth in the sector, spurred by rising health challenges and an ageing population. Last year, construction of such research facilities globally topped 35 million sq ft, of which 7.4 million sq ft was built in Beijing and 6.4 million sq ft in Shanghai, accounting for more than a third of the worldwide total, the property consultancy said in the report released on Tuesday. 'Beijing, Shanghai, Singapore and Greater Tokyo are the largest life sciences markets in the Asia-Pacific region,' said Paul Peeters, senior director and Asia-Pacific head of life sciences, advisory and transaction services at CBRE. San Francisco has 43.6 million sq ft of life sciences facilities, the second largest in the US. Photo: AP While China leads the world in construction of such facilities, there is strong growth momentum in the life sciences industry in the region, he added. Advertisement Overall, the US leads in terms of existing facilities, with cities such as Boston, San Francisco and San Diego hosting 56 million sq ft, 43.6 million sq ft and 27.3 million sq ft, respectively, according to the report.
