Syria orders women to cover up on beaches with conservative new dress code
The Tourism Ministry said the new guidelines were made in 'the requirements of public interest.'
'Visitors to public beaches and pools, whether tourists or locals, are required to wear appropriate swimwear that takes into account public taste and the sensibilities of various segments of society,' Tourism Minister Mazen al-Salhani said in a directive posted to Facebook.
'More modest swimwear is required at public beaches and pools (burkinis or swimsuits that cover more of the body),' said the directive, adding, 'When moving between the beach and other places, it is necessary to wear a beach cover-up or loose-fitting robe (for women) over swimsuits.'
Men are required to wear shirts under the new guidance, which says that 'topless clothing is not permitted in public areas outside of swimming areas, hotel lobbies, and food service areas.'
'In public areas outside of beaches and pools, it is preferable to wear loose clothing, covering shoulders and knees, and avoid transparent or overly tight clothing,' according to the directive.
However, the ministry said that in resorts and hotels 'classified as international and premium (4-star)' and in private beaches and swimming pools 'typical Western swimwear is permitted.'
It's unclear what repercussions people who do not follow the guidelines will face, but the ministry said that 'lifeguards and beach supervisors' would monitor people to ensure compliance.
The new regulations reflect the influence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Islamist coalition now leading Syria's transitional government. Formerly known as Al-Nusra Front, HTS is designated as a terrorist group by the US and UK.
Interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, who signed the dress-code directive, led HTS in the lightning offensive that led to the fall of Assad, whose regime had been in power for several decades.
In March, al-Sharaa signed an interim constitution mandating Islamist rule for a transitional phase of five years. Al-Sharaa said in December that rewriting Syria's constitution might take three years, with elections potentially taking place within five years.
The US-based Human Rights Watch said in March that Al-Sharaa's 'broad authority raises serious concerns about the durability of the rule of law and human rights protections unless clear safeguards are put in place.'
Tourism Minister al-Salhani, who recently courted Qatari and Saudi investors for tourism projects worth 'billions of dollars,' framed the rules as respecting Syria's cultural, social, and religious diversity.'
The announcement comes amid a push to revive Syria's tourism industry following the lifting of US sanctions in May 2025 – a move US President Donald Trump described as a 'chance at greatness' for Syria.
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