Arunachal CM Pema Khandu bats for Bharat Ratna to Dalai Lama, says China ‘should not have role' in succession
Khandu also said it was the Dalai Lama who propagated and expanded the Nalanda school of Buddhism, which was born in India.
"Way back in the 8th century, from the Nalanda University, many gurus went to Tibet. At that time, there used to be a Bon religion in Tibet. By combining the Bon religion and Buddhism, the concept of Tibetan Buddhism emerged. So Buddhism spread throughout Tibet," the Arunachal Pradesh CM said in an interview with PTI Videos on Tuesday.
The concept of Tibetan Buddhism spread across the Himalayan belt -- from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh, he added.
All the big monastic centres that were in Tibet at that time, the different traditions like Sakya, all the old Buddhist traditions that existed in Tibet, were brought to India by the Dalai Lama, who established institutions in different places, especially in South India. These monasteries have hugely benefited the Buddhists of the Indian Himalayan region, Khandu further said.
"In that light, the demand for the Bharat Ratna... is definitely a very good step," he said.
Three foreign-born leading personalities have been awarded Bharat Ratna in the past: Mother Teresa (1980), Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1987), and Nelson Mandela (1990).
In 1959, after China invaded Tibet, the 14th Dalai Lama was forced to flee to India.
Since then, he has lived in Dharmashala in Himachal Pradesh with other Tibetans exiled.
Pema Khandu, who himself is a Buddhist, said: "The Dalai Lama institution has been continuous for over 600 years, from the first Dalai Lama to the current 14th. The Gaden Phodrang Trust manages the process of recognising the next Dalai Lama, which will start only after the current Dalai Lama passes away. There is no hurry, and the process follows strict rules."
"But before the 90th birthday, all heads of Buddhist traditions met and confirmed the institution will continue. China has objected to this ... China's objections are based on their own policies. But the Dalai Lama institution is recognised mainly in the Himalayan belt and by Tibetan Buddhists. China should not have a role in this matter," he commented.
Khandu added that Beijing has no locus standi in selecting the next Dalai Lama since Tibetan Buddhism is not even practised in mainland China, unlike in Tibet and the Himalayan regions of India.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
New Indian Express
3 hours ago
- New Indian Express
India's Modi meets China's top diplomat as Asian powers rebuild ties
NEW DELHI (AP) — Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hailed "steady progress" in improving relations with China after meeting its top diplomat Tuesday following a years long standoff between the nuclear-armed Asian powers. Modi noted "respect for each other's interests and sensitiveness" in a statement on social media after meeting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. China's foreign ministry said the countries have entered a "steady development track" and should "trust and support" each other. Wang on his visit also has met with Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and national security adviser Ajit Doval about the countries' disputed border in the Himalayan mountains. India's Foreign Ministry said Wang and Doval discussed "deescalation, delimitation and boundary affairs." The two sides agreed to resume direct flights and issuance of journalist visas and to facilitate business and cultural exchanges, according to a statement from China's Foreign Ministry. Relations plummeted in 2020 after security forces clashed along the border. Four Chinese soldiers and 20 Indian soldiers were killed in the worst violence in decades, freezing high-level political engagements. "The setbacks we experienced in the past few years were not in the interest of the people of our two countries. We are heartened to see the stability that is now restored in the borders," Wang said Monday. Modi emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and tranquility on the border and reiterated India's commitment to a "fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable resolution of the boundary question," his office said in a statement. The rebuilding of India-China ties coincides with friction between New Delhi and Washington after U.S. President Donald Trump imposed steep tariffs on India, a longtime ally seen as a counterbalance against China's influence in Asia. India is part of the Quad security alliance with the U.S., along with Australia and Japan. 'Compromise at the highest political level' The chill in relations after the deadly clash in 2020 between troops in the Ladakh region affected trade, diplomacy and air travel, as both sides deployed tens of thousands of security forces in border areas. Some progress has been made since then. Last year, India and China agreed to a pact on border patrols and withdrew additional forces along some border areas. Both countries continue to fortify their border by building roads and rail networks. In recent months, the countries have increased official visits and discussed easing some trade restrictions, movement of citizens and visas for businesspeople. In June, Beijing allowed pilgrims from India to visit holy sites in Tibet. Last week, India's foreign ministry said the two countries were discussing resuming trade through three points along their 3,488-kilometer (2,167-mile) border. Both sides will work together toward a consensus on border issues, Wang said after his meeting with Doval, according to China's Foreign Ministry. No specifics were given on what was decided. "Settling the boundary issue between the two countries requires political compromise at the highest political level," said Manoj Joshi, a fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi-based think tank. He also served as a member of the advisory board for India's National Security Council.
&w=3840&q=100)
First Post
4 hours ago
- First Post
Land trade, easier visas, direct flights: India and China warm ties with new deals
From reopening traditional Himalayan trade routes to easing travel and resuming direct flights, New Delhi and Beijing have unveiled a package of economic and people-to-people measures aimed at cautiously resetting their strained ties. In a sign of warming relations after years of strained ties, India and China have agreed to a series of trade and connectivity measures aimed at restoring economic confidence, reopening stalled exchanges, and building new foundations for people-to-people contact. The announcements made in India's official release, following wide-ranging talks that External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval had with visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in New Delhi. The agreed measures marked a cautious but significant step towards easing tensions and reviving bilateral cooperation. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Land border trade routes to open again Among the most striking outcomes of the joint discussions was the decision to reopen border trade through three traditional passes — Lipulekh, Shipki La and Nathu La. These routes have long been associated with local commerce and cross-border exchanges. These routes were closed in the aftermath of China's aggressive posturing on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), leading to the 2020 Galwan Valley clashes and long-drawn military stand-off in eastern Ladakh. Their reopening represents a tangible economic boon for communities in the Himalayan region and symbolises a cautious resumption of trust. Diplomats from both sides emphasised that the move was not merely symbolic: reopening of trade posts is expected to revive long-standing regional economic activity and provide opportunities to traders who depend heavily on cross-border markets. More trade and more investments The two countries also pledged to take 'concrete measures' to facilitate trade and investment flows. The leaders from India and China underscored the significance of mutual investment promotion in their talks during Wang Yi's New Delhi visit on August 18 and 19. India, looking to reduce trade deficits and diversify supply chains, emphasised the need for balanced exchanges. China, for its part, took note of India's concerns and expressed its commitment to fostering a more predictable trade environment. While details of the proposed measures are not immediately known, reports quoting government officials have suggested that discussions focussed on easing regulatory hurdles, scaling up sector-specific investments, and supporting enterprises navigating bilateral markets. How much India and China trade with each other According to official trade statistics, India–China economic exchanges have remained substantial despite recent bilateral tensions. Bilateral trade in 2023 reached $136.2 billion, with India importing goods worth $101.8 billion from China while exporting $34.4 billion. This resulted in a trade deficit of $67.4 billion, making China India's largest single-country source of imports as well as its most significant trade deficit partner. Figures for India's 2023–24 financial year show a similar trade gap. Imports from China stood at $101.7 billion, whereas India's exports were considerably lower at $16.7 billion, bringing the overall trade to $118.4 billion. The shortfall of more than $85 billion has been one of the key economic concerns that India has consistently raised with China. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD While two-way trade crossed the $100 billion mark for the first time in 2021, peaking at nearly $136 billion in 2022, the deficit has steadily widened over the past decade and a half – rising from $16 billion in 2007–08 to its current levels. India's imports continue to be dominated by electrical machinery, telecom equipment, chemicals and pharmaceutical ingredients, while its exports are largely concentrated in raw materials such as iron ore, cotton and certain petroleum products. Although the reopening of traditional border trade routes may have limited effect on the overall volume, it carries symbolic weight and promises concrete benefits for local communities. The wider package of measures, particularly on investment facilitation and air services, is also being viewed in New Delhi as part of a longer-term attempt to secure more balanced and diversified exchanges with China. In public focus: Direct India-China flights Air connectivity — another casualty of bilateral tensions — is also set to make a comeback. Though no deadline has yet been announced, the direct flights between the two countries are likely to resume soon. China has long sought resumption of direct flights, while New Delhi has been cautious weighing Beijing's request. India and China agreed to resume direct flights between Indian cities and the Chinese mainland 'at the earliest'. The two countries are likely to finalise an updated Air Services Agreement in the coming days to institutionalise connectivity. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The resumption of flights could be critical to restoring business and tourism exchanges, which have been hampered following China's Galvan ambush attempt five years ago. Direct services would also offer relief to students and professionals who continue to seek opportunities across the border, often forced to take longer indirect routes. Direct flights to also see easier visa processes In a further boost to mobility, both governments committed to facilitating visas for tourists, businesspersons and other categories of travellers including media representatives. The announcement is expected to benefit stakeholders on both sides who have been calling for a simpler, faster and more reliable visa regime. By enhancing cross-border mobility, policymakers hope to encourage not only commerce but also interpersonal links and cultural familiarity — factors seen as essential in tempering political misunderstandings. Kailash and Manasarovar: Pilgrimage tourism to get a boost As part of efforts to promote cross-border engagement, the two sides also announced that starting in 2026, the scale of annual pilgrimages from India to Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar in Tibet would be expanded. Though religious in nature, these journeys generate considerable economic activity, supporting tour operators, local guides, and services on both sides of the border. Expanding pilgrimage access could become another layer of people-centred diplomacy, blending cultural tradition with tourism-driven growth. Rivers and resources another sphere of cooperation Recognising the importance of trans-boundary resources, India and China agreed to strengthen cooperation on rivers through their expert-level mechanism on trans-border rivers. New Delhi and Beijing will also maintain communication on renewing relevant Memoranda of Understanding. Crucially, China has agreed to share hydrological information during emergency situations, a step considered vital given the vulnerability of downstream regions to flooding and climate variability. China also agreed to lift curbs on the exports of rare earths, fertilisers and equipment such as boring machines to India. These curbs have come in the spotlight against the backdrop of tariff measures announced by US President Donald Trump. The agreement on these exports is being seen as attempts by India and China to counter Trump tariffs by showing solidarity for a multipolar world as well as a multipolar Asia, as Jaishankar put forth during his talks with Wang. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD But it is still a cautious thaw The trade and connectivity measures form part of a wider package announced after Wang Yi's meetings in New Delhi, alongside discussions over border stability and de-escalation in Ladakh. While political and security issues remain contentious, both governments signalled their willingness to compartmentalise and build on areas of convergence in the economic domain. The timing of the announcements reflected both strategic and practical considerations. India has sought greater diversification of trade ties amid global uncertainties and has an interest in reopening avenues that benefit its exporters and border communities. China, facing economic headwinds at home and wary of prolonged estrangement, appears keen to normalise exchanges and stabilise one of its key bilateral relationships in Asia. Up next: PM Modi flies to China Prime Minister Narendra Modi is scheduled to travel to Tianjin later this month to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit, where a meeting with President Xi Jinping is expected. PM Modi told Wang, who called on the Indian prime minister on Tuesday evening, that he was 'looking forward' to the proposed meeting with President Xi during his visit for the SCO summit. The latest agreements on trade, flights, visas and resource management are likely to set the stage for higher-level discussions, offering a roadmap for cautious yet deliberate rebuilding of a relationship that had suffered deep mistrust. Despite lingering scepticism, the reopening of border trade, restoration of direct air links, and facilitation of investment and people flows mark an important recalibration in the India-China bilateral ties, strained over Chinese attempts to alter the status quo in eastern Ladakh and against the backdrop of Trump-induced chaos in the established global order. The policy thrust, Indian government officials suggested as quoted in reported, is to move towards 'a stable, cooperative and forward-looking relationship' while managing differences responsibly. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD
Indian Express
5 hours ago
- Indian Express
Ports, polities, and partnerships: The history of India-Philippines ties
Given the recent camaraderie between the governments of India and the Philippines, a short history of their ties is in order. A cautious long-term approach suggests that there are four kinds of historical evidence — inscriptions and chronicles, archaeological findings, texts and performing genres, and secondary historiographical syntheses — that inform the historiography in question. Romantic narratives of civilisational unity between the two polities are exaggerated. However, there are concrete grounds to observe how India and the Philippines are natural partners on the cultural and maritime frontiers. The 11th-century Chola naval operations remain a touchstone for debates on South Asian history and ancient India's maritime expanse. According to Tamil inscriptions, Chola naval campaigns struck at ports of the Srivijaya Empire (Sumatra and parts of the Malay Archipelago). The Tirukkadaiyur inscription and related archaeological materials convey ships, gates, and booty as measures of Chola success in Southeast Asia. Historians of Southeast Asian maritime polities tell us that political sovereignty in the region was often thalassocratic — organised around ports rather than contiguous land empires. Historian Hermann Kulke emphasises Srivijaya's role as a maritime mandala that mediated Indian cultural forms to islands further east. India's Southeast Asian influence cannot be articulated without recapitulating the journeys of a diaspora of Indo-Southeast Asian merchants and priestly travellers who transmitted Sanskrit vocabulary and ritual artefacts into the Malay Archipelago. Seen thus, the Chola expedition was a chapter in a much longer history of maritime diplomacy and cultural exchanges between India and Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, India's Coromandel ports became integrated into an eastern Indian Ocean circuit that reached the Strait of Malacca. Subsequently, this undergirded exchanges with the Philippines. This circuit, for understandable reasons, is of special interest to history enthusiasts. This is particularly true for those with a fancy for a Greater-India-narrative. However, it needs to be framed within a broader maritime zeitgeist that unfolded around maritime Srivijaya (the 7th-13th-century Indonesian Empire) and Majapahit (the 13th-early-16th-century Hindu-Buddhist Javanese Empire). A deeper understanding of India's long-distance contacts with Southeast Asia can help achieve far greater, sophisticated cultural cooperation under India's Act East policy. The Philippines' ostensible lack of monumental Hindu-Buddhist temple complexes — which are otherwise conspicuous in Cambodia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand — leads one to often underestimate Indianate ties to the Philippine archipelago. According to Filipino scholar Joefe B. Santarita, India-Philippines contacts are embodied in smaller, more mobile cultural forms, like texts, dance forms, vocabulary, and portable artefacts. Intangible (fables, dances, lexicon) and tangible (icons, pendants, stamps, beads) relics from this heritage constitute a composite index of precolonial India-Philippines connectivity. On the textual and performative side, there is the indomitable Maharadia Lawana, the Maranao variant of the Ramayana canon of epics found in Southeast Asia. As the Filipino linguist Juan R. Francisco's fieldwork has shown, Maharadia Lawana condenses the Ramayana into a sequence of episodes that correspond roughly to canonical kandas (Balakanda, Aranyakanda, Kiskindhakanda, Sundarakanda and Yuddakanda). The core narrative frames of the Ramayana still survive in Filipino cultural memory, except for original locations and subtexts that metamorphose in the light of local habitats, altered episodes, and historically distinct moral emphases. Scholars agree that the Filipino Maharadia Lawana is an indigenised Ramayana mutant of the original Indian epic authored by sage Valmiki, absorbed through Malay-Javanese channels rather than Indian cultural supremacy over the island nation. The Darangen of the Maranao is a Filipino archive of epic memory that complements Maharadia Lawana. The Darangen is an extensive oral epic — some 25 narrative chapters — whose principal hero, Bantugen, and episodes such as 'The Abduction of Princes Lawanen' mirror structural motifs of the Ramayana, interweaving tropes of martial romance, supernatural agencies, and localised cosmologies, with accretions from Islamic elements layered onto a pre-Islamic core. The Darangen is not merely a repository of remote memory but a lived moral archive, whose codification is recited in households, and whose episodes shape communal ideals and social conduct, further demonstrating how Philippine epic adaptations conserve Indianate narrative and performative structures within local idioms. The Filipino theatre tradition has repeatedly drawn on Maharadia Lawana and related materials, and modern productions and adaptations use these narratives to explore identity and history under changing political conditions. Performance and community rituals thus act as living archives of shared narrative structures and social memory shared between the two sovereign nation-states. Similarly, another vector of cultural transmission — dance performances — is seen in the Maranao Singkil dance. The dance form's choreographic grammar — the step patterns across crossed bamboo poles, the role of the principal dancer (Princess Gandingan), the parasol and the accompanying gong and kulintang ensemble — reflect a larger Southeast Asian performance repertoire with formal affinities to Indian dance traditions. Interestingly, a comparative study of Orissan art underscores the point that there are formal affinities in sculptural motifs, bead-types, and other small finds that travel with merchants and pilgrims from Kalinga/Orissa into Malay and Indonesian contexts. These correspondences make it plausible that similar material currents reached the Philippine islands through intermediary ports. This does not itself suggest a literal borrowing of styles of Indian dance forms; rather, the bodily gestures, hand positions, and embodied narrative techniques of Singkil point to enduring stylistic diffusions caused by Srivijayan and Majapahit cultural circulations. There is also a wealth of Sanskrit loanwords across Philippine languages — almost 340 Sanskrit-derived items exist in Philippine vocabularies, about half of which have demonstrable Sanskrit provenance. Examples of this include guro (teacher), saksi (witness), and dukha (sorrow), which have been handed down through sustained lexical transmission across centuries, typically dating to a period between the tenth and fifteenth centuries, mediated through Malay and Javanese intermediaries who had links with the Coromandel coast. Besides these, there are portable objects discovered from the Philippines whose typology and historical contexts point to Indianate circuits. The Agusan gold 'Vajralasya' Tara (found in the Agusan River and now in the Field Museum, Chicago), a clay votive stamp from Calatagan depicting Avalokitesvara/Padmapani in tribhanga pose (14th-15th c.), the Golden Garuda pendant from Palawan (linked stylistically to the Majapahit corpus), and a variety of Indo-Pacific trade beads find worthy mentions in this list. These material nodes confirm maritime networks linking the Philippine littoral to eastern Indian Ocean commerce through Indonesian and Malayan merchants. Imported images, beads and textiles served as prestige objects in precolonial Philippine polities, circulating in elite gift networks and funerary contexts to acquire social values transcending mere commerce. So, instead of material legacies being enshrined as temple complexes, Indo-Philippine cultural transactions were embodied as portable, high-value objects in elite contexts. This signals a difference in the political ecology of the Indo-Philippine heritage within the larger heritage of Indo-Southeast Asian cultural memories, but surely not the cultural isolation of this trajectory of transactions. There is a strong practical counterpart to this historical context. As contemporary Filipino scholars like Santarita believe, Indian culture may not have been the sole driver of the modernisation in the transition of Southeast Asian chiefdoms to kingdoms, but Indian notions of kingship and allied cultural beliefs and rituals influenced the metamorphosis of chiefs into rajas and maharajas in the Malay Archipelago — even in precolonial Philippines. Since India-Philippines historic ties are empirically accessible, the prospect of institutions to reactivate bilateral cultural legacies is unignorable. Considering that discoveries of India-Philippines transactions are portable and perishable — instead of being monumental temple complexes — these dispersed traces all the more need conversion into durable institutional ties. Collaborative maritime-archaeology programmes between Indian and Philippine institutions can better preserve discoveries (like beads and ceramics found in the Bay of Bengal-Malacca Straits axis) and test hypotheses about their circulation and chronology, drawing from experts in this area. Objects such as the Agusan Tara or the Calatagan stamp can become pedagogic tools for exhibitions with layered histories of mediation by Malay and Javanese intermediaries. The Filipino critic and cultural commentator, Nicanor G. Tiongson, hints at the possibility of comparative philological projects to document continuities and divergences between Singkil, Darangen, and South Indian linguistic, narrative, and dance repertoires. As he adds, Lord Ram's 'quest for enlightened leadership is the region's quest for enlightened nationhood.' Meanwhile, historian Daniel G.E. Hall's reminder about Southeast Asian historical autonomy is salutary here, in that Indo-Southeast Asian contacts did not necessarily equal political subordination, and local agencies always had the autonomy to negotiate with incoming elements. Nonetheless, a provisional frame labelled the 'Chola Network' can be useful — provided it is used carefully as a heuristic rather than as a celebratory genealogy. The phrase captures important structural features documented in the sources: coastal polity-formation and sustained littoral orientation on the Coromandel and Andhra-Kalinga tracts, episodic projection of naval force and symbolic ritual, resident Tamil mercantile diasporas attested in inscriptions, and a Srivijayan thalassocratic matrix that mediated cultural flows across the Straits of Malacca. In practice, the 'Chola Network' might serve as a policy metaphor to frame institution-building along historically plausible lines, if cautiously embedded in peer-reviewed research, transparent pedagogy, and multilateral frameworks. Chakravarti, R. (2011, January). Sectional President's Address: The Pull Towards the Coast: Politics and Polity in India (C. 600-1300 CE). In Proceedings of the Indian History Congress (Vol. 72, pp. 22-42). Indian History Congress. Christie, J.W. (1998). The medieval Tamil-language inscriptions in Southeast Asia and China. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 29(2), 239-268. Fernandez, D.G. (1995). The playbill after 1983: Philippine theatre after Martial Law. Asian Theatre Journal, 12(1), 104-118. Francisco, J.R. (1989). The Indigenization of the Rama Story in the Philippines. Philippine studies, 101-111. Ghosh, A. (1992, January). The Gangetic Campaign by the Cholas (11th Century). In Proceedings of the Indian History Congress (Vol. 53, pp. 79-86). Indian History Congress. Hall, D.G.E. (1973). The integrity of Southeast Asian history. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 4(2), 159-168. Herujiyanto, L.H.N. (2024, January). Maharadia Lawana: The Indigenous Filipino 'Ramayana' by Way of Diaspora and. In Proceedings of the Critical Island Studies 2023 Conference (CISC 2023) (Vol. 818, p. 33-39). Springer Nature. Kulke, H. (2016). Śrīvijaya Revisited: Reflections on State Formation of a Southeast Asian Thalassocracy. Bulletin de l'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient, 102, 45-96. Mishra, P.P. (2000, January). Orissan Art in Island Southeast Asia: A Case Study of Cultural Interaction. In Proceedings of the Indian History Congress (Vol. 61, pp. 1062-1070). Indian History Congress. Saber, M. (1961). Darangen: The epic of the Maranaws. Philippine Sociological Review, 9(1/2), 42-46. Santarita, J. B. (2018). Panyupayana: The emergence of hindu polities in the pre-islamic Philippines. In Shyam Saran (ed.), Cultural and civilisational links between India and Southeast Asia: Historical and contemporary dimensions (pp. 93-105). Singapore: Springer. Santarita, J. B. (2023). Enhancing India-Philippines Cooperation in Culture. Act East: Asean-India Shared Cultural Heritage. New Delhi: Research and information System for Developing Countries, 209-222. Spencer, G. W. (1976). The politics of plunder: The Cholas in eleventh-century Ceylon. The Journal of Asian Studies, 35(3), 405-419. Tiongson, N.G. (2019). Transforming Tradition in the Dance Drama Realizing Rama, 1997-2004: Documenting the Process of 'Inter-Creation' in an ASEAN Production. Perspectives in the Arts and Humanities Asia, 9(2), 3-28.
