For long, India had raised Indus treaty flaws
India placed the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in abeyance earlier this week, as part of a raft of diplomatic measures targeting Pakistan over the terrorist attack in Pahalgam that killed 26 people.
But discussions recorded in the parliamentary standing committees on external affairs and water resources over the past nine years show that Indian officials and the executive repeatedly expressed frustration with Pakistan's approach to the treaty, but also said they 'cannot exit' the 1960 pact.
In January 2017, in his testimony before the parliamentary committee for external affairs, then foreign secretary (now Union minister) S Jaishankar questioned the continued acceptance of the treaty simply because of its longevity. 'The key issue is the workability of the treaty. It is very easy to say that the treaty has stood the test of time or that we should be a responsible country and we should be careful about the statements we should make. I think we should also be objective about how this treaty is working and how the Pakistanis have handled it and whether we have the courage to deal with that reality, 'Jaishankar said.
He further said, 'If we decide that because something has lasted 70 years and it goes against us and we put up with it, that may be your thinking, it is not ours. The point I wish to make here is that the Pakistanis have used legal harassment techniques, they have taken minor issues and taken it to Court Of Arbitration with the sole purpose of tying up the treaty. They have not let the commission function. I think a very serious look at the treaty and its working is called for.'
When the same panel inquired whether India could unilaterally withdraw or abrogate the treaty, the foreign ministry officials made it clear that the treaty's provisions did not allow for unilateral action. The ministry cited Article XII of the treaty, which stated that 'the provisions of this treaty may from time to time be modified by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two governments' and that the treaty 'shall continue in force until terminated by a duly ratified treaty concluded for that purpose between the two governments.'
The government stated that its 'consistent position has been that it remains committed to addressing all matters within the Indus Waters Treaty's purview bilaterally with Pakistan through appropriate mechanisms in accordance with the treaty, till it is a party to the treaty.' This position effectively acknowledged that any modification or termination would require bilateral agreement through a new treaty.
The committee pointed out that 'present-day pressing issues such as climate change, global warming and environmental impact assessment' were not considered in the treaty. It recommended that the government 'take necessary diplomatic measures to renegotiate the Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan' to establish 'some kind of institutional structure or legislative framework to address the impact of climate change...'
A year later, the same panel noted that India had the right to create storage capacity of up to 3.6 million acre-feet (MAF) on the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab), no storage capacity had been created. In that same report, concerns were also raised about the maintenance of canals in border states.
The committee urged the government to complete projects such as Ujh and Shahpur Kandi on Ravi river, 'expeditiously so as to exploit full potential of the western rivers for irrigation and other purposes' and recommended that 'the canal system in Rajasthan and Punjab may be repaired strengthened and properly maintained in order to increase their water carrying capacity.'
In its response to the committee, the government informed Parliament in January 2022 that it was 'taking necessary steps for expeditious completion of Ujh and Shahpur Kandi Dam projects' and providing central assistance to the Shahpur Kandi Dam project as a national project. The government also said it was providing central assistance to two main canal systems of Punjab and Rajasthan.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
The Hindu
16 minutes ago
- The Hindu
Textbook on Indian knowledge systems in Calicut varsity: decision left to V-C
Even as classes for undergraduate (UG) students began in colleges affiliated to the University of Calicut on June 2, a decision is yet to be taken on following the textbook on Indian knowledge systems prepared by the Kerala State Higher Education Council (KSHEC). The multidisciplinary course is mandatory for third-semester students in the four-year programme. According to official sources, a steering committee on UG courses, which met last week, has left the decision to the Vice-Chancellor (V-C). There was some confusion among a section of teachers about the course after the KSHEC recently brought out the textbook titled Knowledge Systems of Kerala, because the university had already prepared its own syllabus on this much before. The KSHEC released its publication in both English and Malayalam, covering Kerala's traditional knowledge, including its performing arts, oral narratives, cultural practices, and documented literary sources. V-Cs of universities were requested to direct their Boards of Studies to consider this as a foundational resource for course design and syllabus preparation. However, some teachers had claimed it was 'an infringement' on the authority of the statutory academic bodies that are tasked with curriculum development. They pointed out that the syllabus prepared by the university for the course on Kerala Knowledge Systems in 2024 was in line with the National Education Policy framework. It had been vetted by the academic council and the faculty members, too. Also, textbooks had been prepared and classes had begun based on the syllabus prepared by the university. It was claimed that prescribing a uniform syllabus that will have to be taught in translation by the departments of English, Malayalam, Arabic, Urdu, Sanskrit, and other languages was against the concept of academic autonomy.
Hindustan Times
18 minutes ago
- Hindustan Times
Former army chiefs briefed on Operation Sindoor's execution, impact
NEW DELHI: Several former army chiefs were on Tuesday briefed on different aspects of Operation Sindoor, including its execution, strategic impact and the military's jointmanship, on the opening day of a two-day brainstorming session involving army chief General Upendra Dwivedi and his predecessors, the army said. 'Being held in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, the conclave (Chiefs' Chintan) aims to provide a platform to leverage the institutional knowledge and experience of the former chiefs,' it said in a statement. India launched the operation in the early hours of May 7 and struck terror and military installations in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) following the Pahalgam terror strike in which 26 people were shot dead. It triggered a four-day military confrontation with Pakistan involving fighter jets, missiles, drones, long-range weapons and heavy artillery before the two sides reached an understanding on stopping all military action on May 10. A key highlight of the day was a comprehensive operational briefing on Operation Sindoor, including the synergised conduct of operations with the Indian Air Force (IAF) and navy, the army said. 'The operation's execution, strategic impact and jointmanship model were presented in detail to provide contextual understanding and invite insights from the former chiefs.' The retired chiefs present included Generals Manoj Pande, Bikram Singh, Deepak Kapoor, JJ Singh, NC Vij and VP Malik. Between the launch of the operation in the early hours of May 7 and the ceasefire on May 10 evening, Indian forces bombed nine terror camps in Pakistan and PoK and killed at least 100 terrorists. The IAF struck two terror sites at Markaz Subhanallah in Bahawalpur and Markaz Taiba near Muridke, both in Pakistan's Punjab province, while the army hit targets at seven places, including Mehmoona Joya in Sialkot, Sawai Nala and Syed Na Bilal in Muzaffarabad, Gulpur and Abbas in Kotli, Barnala in Bhimber, and Sarjal. On May 9-10, the IAF struck military targets in Rafiqui, Murid, Chaklala, Rahim Yar Khan, Sukkur, Chunian, Pasrur, Sialkot, Skardu, Sargodha, Jacobabad, Bholari and Malir Cantt in Karachi. Later it emerged that India's targeting of locations within Pakistan during the May 7-10 clash was more extensive than was previously known, with a Pakistani document acknowledging that Indian drones had struck locations ranging from Peshawar in the northwest to Hyderabad in the south. The graphics in the May 18 Pakistani document detailing India's drone strikes on May 8, 9 and 10 listed seven locations --- Peshawar in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province, Attock, Bahawalnagar, Gujrat and Jhang in Punjab province, and Chhor and Hyderabad in Sindh province --- that were not acknowledged as targets by Indian officials at any briefings held during or after the hostilities. Pakistan's Operation Bunyan-um-Marsoos, which was mounted in response to Operation Sindoor, 'folded in eight hours' on May 10 belying Islamabad's ambitious target of bringing India to its knees in 48 hours, chief of defence staff General Anil Chauhan said on June 3. Jointness among the three services --- an essential prerequisite to the creation of theatre commands --- was in focus during Operation Sindoor. The forward presence of INS Vikrant, along with its Mig-29K fighters and airborne early warning helicopters, prevented hostile aircraft from coming within several hundred kms of the carrier battle group consisting of several warships. Dwivedi underlined the importance of the former chiefs' continued engagement in shaping the ongoing transformation and future direction of the army. The former chiefs were updated on the induction of niche technologies and modernisation initiatives aimed at enhancing the force's operational capabilities. The topics discussed included steps being taken by the army for technology absorption, the force's contributions to the goals of Viksit Bharat, and reforms in human resource policies and welfare initiatives for veterans.
India Today
19 minutes ago
- India Today
Deal or No Deal? Inside India's high-stakes trade gamble with the US
When Indian and American negotiators sat across the table in New Delhi from June 5 to 7, the atmosphere was businesslike but charged. The stakes were higher than ever. On one side stood President Donald Trump, newly re-elected, charging into his second term with economic nationalism as his war cry. On the other, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, having just secured a third term, was recalibrating India's global economic engagement with a sharpened sense of sovereignty. The long-pending limited trade deal between India and the United States—which had simmered unresolved since Trump's first tenure—was back on the table, but under new political compulsions and strategic calculations. India and the US aim to double bilateral trade to $500 billion by Washington, this deal is no longer about symbolism or goodwill. The Trump administration, determined to rewrite global trade on its own terms, sees the Indian market as both an untapped export opportunity and a strategic wedge against Chinese dominance. But unlike in earlier phases, there is little appetite for compromise in Trump's America. Every trade pact must now deliver visible benefits for American jobs and exporters. Anything less risks being branded a loss—especially in the high-decibel domestic climate leading into the 2026 US midterms. The President has repeatedly signalled that past arrangements were too generous to countries like India, which he claims have long taken advantage of American openness. With this in mind, US trade officials arrived in Delhi with a short but pointed agenda—remove tariff barriers, open up sensitive sectors, and secure digital and regulatory commitments that align with corporate America's however, is not the same player it was during earlier trade rounds. Over the past few years, New Delhi has rebuilt its strategic and economic confidence. Its global standing has improved, its exports diversified, and its domestic market deepened. But more importantly, there has been a clear shift in how trade is approached in policy circles—moving from passive liberalisation to active negotiation. India is no longer eager to sign deals merely for optics or as diplomatic sweeteners. The experience of asymmetric free trade agreements in the past, and the lessons from rejecting the Regional Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (RCEP), have deeply informed the present of 2025, India is in talks with major partners, including the EU and ASEAN, while also exploring new agreements with Africa, Latin America and the Arab Gulf. The emphasis now is on aligning trade with national development goals, safeguarding regulatory space, and building domestic capabilities in key sectors such as digital infrastructure, clean energy and What makes this negotiation different is not just the hardened positions on both sides but the strong presence of ideological and institutional voices in India pushing back against what they perceive as a lopsided deal. Over the past months, affiliates of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, including the Swadeshi Jagran Manch, have flagged several red lines for Indian negotiators. These are not merely academic critiques but deeply rooted ideological objections that enjoy resonance in key segments of the ruling political ecosystem. Encouragingly for them, India's official position appears to be largely aligned with many of their another letter from 20 former officials—including former cabinet secretary K.M. Chandrasekhar, G.K. Pillai, Ujal Singh Bhatia, Amarendra Khatua and Sanjaya Baru—along with some economists, cautioned New Delhi to 'walk away' from a lopsided deal. They note that without a trade promotion authority in the US, any concessions would be limited to Trump-era executive tariffs—not durable legal changes—and that compromising India's core interests today could result in long-term sovereignty loss. In short, they argue that temporarily closed doors on US markets may be better than structurally weakened regulatory Sangh affiliates have their own set of red flags, but at the top of the list is digital sovereignty. The US wants binding commitments on cross-border data flows, curbs on data localisation and relaxed regulation for American digital firms operating in India. Indian negotiators have reportedly resisted these asks. There is a growing recognition in New Delhi that accepting such provisions would jeopardise the integrity of India's digital public infrastructure—UPI, Aadhaar, DigiLocker, ONDC—all of which are premised on public control over data and technology ecosystems. The fear is that Big Tech companies could use trade deals as Trojan horses to dismantle domestic regulatory autonomy, reduce accountability and monopolise critical sectors. For the Swadeshi camp, this is not just a technical debate—it is about ensuring that India's digital future is not outsourced to Silicon Valley giants under the garb of free major point of friction lies in the area of intellectual property rights, especially in pharmaceuticals. The US pharma lobby has long pressured India to adopt TRIPS-plus provisions—ranging from extended patent terms and patent linkage to the dilution of compulsory licensing. But for India, these are red lines. The country's success as the world's leading supplier of affordable generics, including vaccines, depends on a flexible intellectual property regime that prioritises public health over monopolies. The battle over Section 3(d) of the Indian Patents Act—designed to prevent evergreening of patents—is emblematic of the larger ideological divide. Domestic lobbies and health policy experts have argued that compromising on this front would not only increase the cost of medicines for Indian citizens but also damage India's global standing as the pharmacy of the Global agriculture front has also emerged as a flashpoint. The US has pushed for greater market access for genetically modified crops, chlorine-washed poultry and hormone-treated dairy products. For Indian negotiators, this is politically and economically sensitive territory. Indian farmers operate in vastly different conditions—small holdings, traditional practices and a deep reliance on biodiversity. Introducing GMOs or industrial food products without adequate safeguards could destabilise local supply chains, damage soil health and displace small farmers. The RSS and its affiliates have repeatedly warned against diluting the precautionary principle in food safety, pointing out that long-term food sovereignty cannot be compromised for short-term tariff Trump administration's insistence on restoring tariff benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) only if India allows market access for such products has complicated the talks further. Indian negotiators have remained firm, citing consumer safety, regulatory autonomy and domestic sensitivities. With Washington pushing hard for its agro-export lobbies, especially on GM corn, soy and dairy, Indian officials worry such concessions could open the floodgates for unsustainable imports and threaten food security. This deadlock underscores the deeper tensions between trade liberalisation and India's developmental and agricultural contentious American demand is the inclusion of an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism, which would allow US firms to sue the Indian government in international arbitration forums if they believe domestic laws have hurt their profits. The Indian side has reportedly flatly rejected this, consistent with its stance in other FTAs over the past decade. ISDS provisions are viewed as a serious threat to India's sovereign policy space and judicial process. Past experiences with multinational disputes have made it clear that such mechanisms often bypass domestic courts and leave the country exposed to disproportionate liabilities. The Swadeshi camp argues that any dispute resolution framework must be reciprocal, limited in scope and rooted in Indian legal the big-ticket issues, there are more subtle but equally significant concerns. American negotiators have insisted on liberalisation in strategic sectors such as e-commerce, defence production, clean energy and agri-logistics. While India has opened selectively in these areas, full-scale liberalisation without safeguards could be disastrous for local firms, cooperatives and startups. The domestic lobby advocates a calibrated approach—one that combines FDI caps, localisation mandates and domestic value-addition norms to protect India's long-term industrial is also unease about the growing trend of inserting side chapters in trade agreements—covering labour standards, gender rights, environmental norms and civil society engagement. While these may appear progressive, Swadeshi voices caution that they often serve as pressure points for future litigation or reputational coercion. The preference is for India to evolve its own ESG standards, rooted in its civilisational values, livelihood priorities and federal structure—not adopt imported frameworks that may not suit Indian there is growing awareness that trade liberalisation often overlooks cultural and traditional knowledge systems—Ayurveda, handicrafts, tribal knowledge and local foods—that don't fit into Western IPR definitions. These represent real economic capital for India, particularly for rural and indigenous communities. RSS affiliates have pushed for stronger protection of geographical indications, cultural commons and rural creative industries within trade rising chorus of Swadeshi caution has not gone unnoticed. Many of India's recent trade decisions—including the cautious pace of the FTA with the UK and the shelving of RCEP—reflect a deeper institutional consensus that unbalanced deals are no longer acceptable. Recent warnings by retired trade negotiators and policy veterans have only added weight to this stance. They argue that New Delhi must be ready to walk away if the deal appears skewed, urging the government not to trade long-term autonomy for short-term optics. The sentiment is increasingly shared by officials across ministries: India can afford patience, but not policy the American side is feeling the pressure to deliver. Trump's trade doctrine, powered by his electoral calculus, leaves little room for nuanced diplomacy. Deals must be announced with a bang. Benefits must be quantifiable. And foreign governments must be shown to have conceded. In such an environment, India's insistence on a balanced, development-friendly deal risks being read in Washington as resistance. Yet New Delhi appears ready to absorb that cost, preferring friction over latest round in New Delhi ended without a final breakthrough, but with enough movement to suggest the door remains open. Both sides are expected to hold another round later this summer. But the message from India is increasingly clear: the era of trade policy as a diplomatic concession is over. What replaces it is a new framework—pragmatic, sovereign and deeply aware of the ideological choices embedded in every clause. For a country aspiring to be Vishwaguru, mastering the art of tradecraft is no longer optional. It is a strategic to India Today Magazine
