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Kuwait Times
6 hours ago
- Business
- Kuwait Times
Without papers: Ghost lives of many Pakistanis
Without papers: Ghost lives of many Pakistanis KARACHI: Ahmed Raza is invisible in the eyes of his government, unable to study or work because, like millions of other Pakistanis, he lacks identification papers. In the South Asian nation of more than 240 million people, parents generally wait until a child begins school at the age of five to obtain a birth certificate, which is required for enrolment in most parts of Pakistan. Raza slipped through the cracks until the end of elementary school, but when his middle school requested documentation, his mother had no choice but to withdraw him. 'If I go looking for work, they ask for my ID card. Without it, they refuse to hire me,' said the 19-year-old in the megacity of Karachi, the southern economic capital. He has already been arrested twice for failing to present identification cards when stopped by police at checkpoints. Raza's mother Maryam Suleman, who is also unregistered, said she 'didn't understand the importance of having identity documents'. 'I had no idea I would face such difficulties later in life for not being registered,' the 55-year-old widow told AFP from the single room she and Raza share. Pakistan launched biometric identification cards in 2000 and registration is increasingly required in all aspects of formal life, especially in cities. In 2021, the National Database and Registration Authority estimated that around 45 million people were not registered. They have declined to release updated figures or reply to AFP despites repeated requests. To register, Raza needs his mother's or uncle's documents - an expensive and complex process at their age, often requiring a doctor, lawyer or a newspaper notice. The paperwork, he says, costs up to $165 - a month and a half's income for the two of them, who earn a living doing housework and odd jobs in a grocery shop. Locals whisper that registration often requires bribes, and some suggest the black market offers a last resort. 'Our lives could have been different if we had our identity cards,' Raza said. In remote Punjab villages like Rajanpur, UNICEF is trying to prevent people from falling into the same fate as Raza. They conduct door-to-door registration campaigns, warning parents that undocumented children face higher risks of child labor and forced marriage. Currently, 58 percent of children under five have no birth certificate, according to government figures. Registration fees depend on the province, ranging from free, $0.70 to $7 - still a burden for many Pakistanis, about 45 percent of whom live in poverty. 'Our men have no time or money to go to the council and miss a day's work,' said Nazia Hussain, mother of two unregistered children. The 'slow process' often requires multiple trips and there is 'no means of transport for a single woman,' she said. Saba, from the same village, is determined to register her three children, starting with convincing her in-laws of its value. 'We don't want our children's future to be like our past. If children go to school, the future will be brighter,' said Saba, who goes by just one name. Campaigns in the village have resulted in an increase of birth registration rates from 6.1 percent in 2018 to 17.7 percent in 2024, according to UNICEF. This will improve the futures of an entire generation, believes Zahida Manzoor, child protection officer at UNICEF, dispatched to the village. 'If the state doesn't know that a child exists, it can't provide basic services,' she said. 'If a child does not have an identity, it means the state has not recognized their existence. The state is not planning for the services that the child will need after birth.' Muhammad Haris and his brothers, who have few interactions with the formal state in their border village in the mountainous province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, have not registered any of their eight children. 'The government asks for documents for the pilgrimage visa to Makkah,' a journey typically made after saving for a lifetime, he told AFP. For him, this is the only reason worthy of registration. – AFP
News18
10 hours ago
- Politics
- News18
Pakistan's New Travel Policy For Shia Pilgrims Reveals A Deep Sectarian Fault Line
Last Updated: From January 1, 2026, Pakistani nationals undertaking pilgrimages to Shia sacred sites in Iran and Iraq will no longer be allowed to travel independently In a move justified through bureaucratic reasoning but deeply rooted in longstanding sectarian inequalities, the Pakistani government has unveiled extensive new measures that will significantly affect the country's Shia community. On July 15, interior minister Mohsin Naqvi announced that, starting from January 1, 2026, Pakistani nationals undertaking pilgrimages to Shia sacred sites in Iran and Iraq will no longer be allowed to travel independently. Instead, such religious journeys must be conducted exclusively in closely monitored groups, overseen by government-certified operators known as Zaireen Group Organisers (ZGOs). Presented as a necessary reaction to diplomatic concerns from Iran and Iraq regarding visa overstays and unauthorised activities, the newly announced policy has raised more concerns than clarity, drawing attention to the pronounced sectarian bias embedded within it. The government's rationale fails to hold under closer examination, particularly when contrasted with its tolerant approach to similar violations committed by Sunni pilgrims visiting Saudi Arabia. Consequently, this directive represents more than a mere procedural alteration—it conveys a veiled message to Pakistan's Shia population that they are not deemed trustworthy to travel independently. The double standard is unmistakable. For example, in December 2024 alone, Saudi Arabia deported nearly 5,000 Pakistani citizens in just one month—primarily Sunni pilgrims who had overstayed their Umrah visas and were found begging. This issue is not limited to Saudi Arabia; other Gulf nations such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also deported hundreds of Pakistanis for similar infractions. In fact, in April 2025, Saudi authorities imposed a temporary visa ban on 14 countries, including Pakistan, citing the need to curb unauthorised Hajj participation and widespread visa violations. Despite these developments, the Pakistani government has not implemented any restrictions on individual Sunni pilgrimages to Mecca or Medina, nor has it introduced a system of regulated group travel for them. If the core concern truly lies in visa breaches and diplomatic pressures, it raises a pressing question: why has only one sect been subjected to such punitive regulation, particularly when Gulf monarchies have consistently expressed concerns about Pakistani nationals engaging in begging and other illicit activities? The stance adopted by the Pakistani government reveals a clear sectarian inclination and forms part of a broader, long-standing pattern of discriminatory practices against the Shia minority, which constitutes an estimated 15-20 per cent of the national population. For decades, Pakistan's Shia citizens have faced state-backed marginalisation —ranging from explicit exclusion in key government positions to more covert institutional apathy that overlooks violence perpetrated by the Sunni majority, as notably seen in Parachinar within the Kurram district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. While many such forms of bias are subtle, others have been overt and violently repressive. Viewed within the broader historical context, the newly introduced pilgrimage regulation is merely another addition to a persistent trend of policies that have implicitly, if not explicitly, relegated the Shia community to a subordinate status. This so-called 'administrative requirement" fails to withstand scrutiny when placed against the wider backdrop of the state's consistent alignment with Sunni orthodoxy. For many Shia Muslims, visiting the sacred sites of Najaf and Karbala in Iraq, as well as Qom and Mashhad in Iran, represents more than merely a religious duty—it serves as a profound emotional, spiritual, and cultural connection. These pilgrimages, primarily undertaken during the Islamic months of Muharram (for Ashura) and Safar (for Arbaeen), are vital expressions of faith and identity within the Shia tradition. Under the newly imposed regulations, such pilgrimages must now be conducted exclusively through state-approved organisers, many of whom impose prohibitively high charges and operate with little transparency. Independent travel options, which tend to be more affordable and allow for greater flexibility, will be rendered unlawful under this system. As a result, this policy effectively marginalises low-income Shia families and places additional constraints on their already restricted religious liberties. The disparity is striking. Sunni pilgrims travelling to Saudi Arabia for Umrah continue to benefit from a largely unmonitored travel framework, despite persistent reports of visa overstays, unlawful employment, and even infractions such as widespread begging. The government's reaction has typically been to ignore these issues or, at most, issue mild advisories—without imposing any broad restrictions or invoking claims of 'administrative necessity". Although it is accurate that the Iranian and Iraqi authorities have raised concerns about certain pilgrims, particularly during mass gatherings like Arbaeen, it is misleading to argue that the new restrictions are solely a response to these issues. If that were genuinely the case, the Pakistani government would have already put in place a regulatory policy addressing Umrah travel to Saudi Arabia—especially given Riyadh's repeated complaints regarding visa violations and begging by Pakistani citizens. Yet, instead of devising such a framework, Islamabad has consistently chosen to overlook these infractions committed by Sunni nationals deported from these Gulf states. The sole discernible distinction appears to lie in sectarian affiliation. Pakistan's centres of power—particularly its military-intelligence apparatus and dominant Sunni religious institutions—have long influenced the definition of full citizenship. Consequently, this measure does not merely constitute a travel regulation; it symbolises what appears to be a litmus test for citizenship, wherein a Pakistani Shia is denied the right to undertake pilgrimages independently, while a Sunni remains free to do so. By implementing such exclusionary travel protocols, the state not only marginalises a segment of its population but also risks exacerbating sectarian divisions in a nation already burdened by deep polarisation, political suppression, and widespread instability. Historically, Pakistan's constitution guaranteed equal rights to all citizens regardless of their faith or sect, although it has explicitly discriminated against the Ahmadiyya community—another oppressed group alongside Hindus, Shias, and Christians. Yet, for many within the Shia community, as with other religious minorities, that constitutional assurance has rarely translated into practice. The introduction of the new travel regulation serves as a stark reminder that in the Islamic Republic, religious liberty is not a universal entitlement but rather a tightly controlled and selectively granted privilege, managed and rationed by the state. Although visa enforcement, like border control, is a legitimate responsibility of the state, its impartiality is compromised when its execution aligns with sectarian fault lines. At that point, it no longer remains a neutral administrative act but becomes a vehicle for discrimination. If Pakistan genuinely seeks to foster national unity, it must reject the selective application of the law and commit to governance grounded in fairness—applying rules uniformly across all communities without favour or prejudice. This approach should also support, rather than restrict, religious expression, regardless of sectarian identity. Crucially, it requires avoiding the misuse of bureaucratic mechanisms as tools of sectarian exclusion. top videos View all Until such principles are upheld, the concept of 'equal citizenship" in Pakistan will continue to ring hollow—serving more as a bitter irony than a constitutional assurance. This is particularly evident for communities that are repeatedly compelled to demonstrate their loyalty, even in their most sacred journeys of faith. The writer is an author and a columnist. His X handle is @ArunAnandLive. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. tags : pakistan Shia sunni view comments Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: July 22, 2025, 19:32 IST News opinion Global Watch | Pakistan's New Travel Policy For Shia Pilgrims Reveals A Deep Sectarian Fault Line Disclaimer: Comments reflect users' views, not News18's. Please keep discussions respectful and constructive. Abusive, defamatory, or illegal comments will be removed. News18 may disable any comment at its discretion. By posting, you agree to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
Business Recorder
12 hours ago
- Politics
- Business Recorder
Without papers: Ghost lives of millions of Pakistanis
KARACHI: Ahmed Raza is invisible in the eyes of his government, unable to study or work because, like millions of other Pakistanis, he lacks identification papers. In the South Asian nation of more than 240 million people, parents generally wait until a child begins school at the age of five to obtain a birth certificate, which is required for enrolment in most parts of Pakistan. Raza slipped through the cracks until the end of elementary school, but when his middle school requested documentation, his mother had no choice but to withdraw him. 'If I go looking for work, they ask for my ID card. Without it, they refuse to hire me,' said the 19-year-old in the megacity of Karachi, the southern economic capital. He has already been arrested twice for failing to present identification cards when stopped by police at checkpoints. Raza's mother Maryam Suleman, who is also unregistered, said she 'didn't understand the importance of having identity documents'. 'I had no idea I would face such difficulties later in life for not being registered,' the 55-year-old widow told AFP from the single room she and Raza share. Pakistan launched biometric identification cards in 2000 and registration is increasingly required in all aspects of formal life, especially in cities. In 2021, the National Database and Registration Authority estimated that around 45 million people were not registered. They have declined to release updated figures or reply to AFP despites repeated requests. To register, Raza needs his mother's or uncle's documents – an expensive and complex process at their age, often requiring a doctor, lawyer or a newspaper notice. The paperwork, he says, costs up to $165 – a month and a half's income for the two of them, who earn a living doing housework and odd jobs in a grocery shop. Locals whisper that registration often requires bribes, and some suggest the black market offers a last resort. 'Our lives could have been different if we had our identity cards,' Raza said. 'No time or money' In remote Punjab villages like Rajanpur, UNICEF is trying to prevent people from falling into the same fate as Raza. They conduct door-to-door registration campaigns, warning parents that undocumented children face higher risks of child labour and forced marriage. Currently, 58 percent of children under five have no birth certificate, according to government figures. Registration fees depend on the province, ranging from free, $0.70 to $7 – still a burden for many Pakistanis, about 45 percent of whom live in poverty. 'Our men have no time or money to go to the council and miss a day's work,' said Nazia Hussain, mother of two unregistered children. The 'slow process' often requires multiple trips and there is 'no means of transport for a single woman,' she said. Saba, from the same village, is determined to register her three children, starting with convincing her in-laws of its value. 'We don't want our children's future to be like our past. If children go to school, the future will be brighter,' said Saba, who goes by just one name. Campaigns in the village have resulted in an increase of birth registration rates from 6.1 percent in 2018 to 17.7 percent in 2024, according to UNICEF. This will improve the futures of an entire generation, believes Zahida Manzoor, child protection officer at UNICEF, dispatched to the village. 'If the state doesn't know that a child exists, it can't provide basic services,' she said. 'If a child does not have an identity, it means the state has not recognised their existence. The state is not planning for the services that the child will need after birth.' Muhammad Haris and his brothers, who have few interactions with the formal state in their border village in the mountainous province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, have not registered any of their eight children. 'The government asks for documents for the pilgrimage visa to Mecca,' a journey typically made after saving for a lifetime, he told AFP.
Indian Express
12 hours ago
- Politics
- Indian Express
Mumbai train blasts case: What happened to the Pakistan nationals accused?
While all 12 Indian men convicted in the 2006 Mumbai train blasts case were acquitted by the Bombay High Court on Monday, questions now linger around the Pakistani nationals who were alleged to have played a key role in the conspiracy. According to the prosecution, at least 10 Pakistani nationals infiltrated India in the months leading up to the attacks. Among these, many were said to have planted the bombs that killed over 180 people. Yet nearly two decades later, these foreign operatives remain largely unaccounted for, with most said to have fled, one killed in the blasts, and another gunned down in a police encounter. What was the Pakistani connection, as per the prosecution? The prosecution had alleged that the 7/11 Mumbai local train blasts conspiracy mastermind was a Pakistani national, Azam Cheema aka Babaji, associated with the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Cheema and the Indian accused, particularly Faisal Shaikh and Asif Shaikh, are alleged to have conspired sometime in 1999 to wage war against India and train Indian Muslim youth in subversive activities. The prosecution, however, does not state when and how they met. Cheema is subsequently said to have sent funds to India to train youths to 'avenge the alleged atrocities committed on Muslims in India, by causing widespread insurgent and terrorist activities by exploding/bombing financial nerve centers and causing mass damage to life and property thereby crippling the economy,' the chargesheet states. On the back of this, between 2001 and 2005, seven of the 12 now acquitted accused, namely Faisal Shaikh, Tanveer Ansari, Kamal Ansari, Muzammil Shaikh, Suhail Shaikh, Zameer Shaikh, and Shaikh Mohd Ali, were alleged to have gone to Pakistan through Iran and undertake 'subversive training'. Faisal was the first to go and is said to have gone multiple times, with the prosecution claiming that he even met Hafiz Saeed. A Pakistani Army Havaldar, Tafheem Akmal Hashmi, who is in Indian custody, had during the trial claimed to have met Faisal at a Lashkar-e-Taiba training camp near Muzaffarabad in June or July 2004. How did the alleged conspiracy unfold? The prosecution had alleged that in May 2006, Cheema asked Faisal Shaikh to identify targets, who informed Cheema that suburban trains were suitable for 'causing explosions.' In the same month, several Pakistanis infiltrated into the country. Mohammed Majid, a resident of Kolkata, made arrangements and ensured the infiltration of six Pakistani nationals, namely Sabir, Abu Bakr, Kasam Ali, Ammu Jaan, Ehsanullah, and Abu Hasan, through the Bangladesh border. They then traveled from Kolkata to Mumbai by train, the prosecution said. In the same month, four more individuals infiltrated from the Kutch border into Gujarat. They included two Pakistani individuals, Salim and Abu Umed, and two Indian nationals, Abdul Raazak from Hyderabad and Sohail Shaikh from Pune, who had settled in Pakistan. One of the accused, Kamal Ansari, is alleged to have facilitated the entry of two Pakistanis, Aslam and Hafizullah, through the Nepal border. In all, 10 Pakistanis and two Indian nationals staying in Pakistan infiltrated to carry out the blasts in May 2006, according to the prosecution. One of the Pakistanis, Ehsanullah, was believed to have brought along 15 kg of RDX. The prosecution alleged that all the 12 infiltrators reached Mumbai in May. The first group of six, who had come in from Bangladesh, were put up in a flat in Mira Road by Asif Khan. The four who came in from the Gujarat border were housed in Bandra West by Faisal Shaikh, and the two from Nepal were housed in Mira Road in the house of Sajid Ansari. Subsequently, the planning for the bombings started, with three men, including Sajid Ansari, Sohail Shaikh, an Indian staying in Pakistan, and an unnamed Pakistani assembling seven explosive devices in the house of Mohammed Ali in Govandi. The explosives were made from July 8 to 10. The prosecution has claimed that Kamal Ansari, along with Pakistani accused Salim, Hafizullah, and Aslam, planted the bomb in the train that exploded at Matunga Railway Station. Naveed Khan along with wanted Pakistani accused Abu Umed planted the bomb that blasted between Santacruz and Khar Railway Stations. Faisal Shaikh along with wanted Pakistani accused Abu Bakr put the explosives that blasted at a train on the Jogeshwari Railway Station. Asif Shaikh with Pakistani accused Sabir were responsible for the Borivali Railway Station train blast. Ehtesham Siddiqui along with wanted Pakistani accused Ammu Jaan planted the train bomb that blasted at Mira Road Railway Station. Bombs in trains also went off at Mahim and Bandra Railway Stations, but the names of the accused were not made public. What happened to the Pakistanis after the blasts? The prosecution has claimed that six Pakistanis were given shelter at the Mumbai residence of one Wahid Shaikh after the blasts, and then provided safe passage out of Mumbai by Mohamed Majid. The prosecution does not state what happened to the other Pakistanis, barring the claim that one Pakistani national, Salim, died in the blast as he could not get off the train in time, while the other, Abu Osama alias Abu Umed, a Faisalabad resident, was gunned down on August 22, a month after the blast, in an encounter with the Mumbai ATS in Antop Hill. His presence in Mumbai after all his associates allegedly returned to Pakistan remained unexplained. What does the HC verdict say about the Pakistani nationals? The court has noted that the defendants in their confession had claimed that they made seven pairs for planting bombs in the trains, which included one local and one Pakistani. The court has noted, however, that a confession by another defendant states that he was accompanied by three Pakistanis, stating that 'the truthfulness of this statement is under the cloud of doubt.' The verdict also notes that complete details of the seven pairs who were accused of planting the bombs were not given. It also notes that the details of how the Pakistanis managed to escape were also not known and pointed out that the Indian accused did not attempt to run away. 'This is important to state because many accused were called as suspects at the initial stage of investigation and they were not arrested and allowed to go home. Even then, no one ran away,' the Bench observed. The verdict also states that the prosecution has not detailed the dates on when the Pakistanis arrived in Mumbai, and neither is much known about the physical description of these men. The verdict also talks about how there are no details about how the RDX was brought to Mumbai. 'There is even no mention whether the full quantity of 15kgs RDX was used in making the bombs or some quantity was left over. If some quantity was left over, what was done with the same…' it states. The verdict also states that the prosecution's argument that the accused had visited Pakistan was not evidence to state that they had committed the blasts. It also states that while it was the prosecution's case that the accused were in contact with the key conspirator Azam Cheema and members of the terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba, the prosecution failed to place the call details on record. 'It is pertinent to note that the prosecution had sought the police custody remand of the accused on the ground, inter alia, that the accused were in contact with Pakistanis, Azam Cheema and his associates. Yet, even after the defence produced the CDR, the prosecution failed to establish any nexus between the accused and Pakistani nationals, including Azam Cheema and his associates,' the verdict states.
Mint
19 hours ago
- Mint
7/11 Mumbai train blasts: Software engineer, call centre employee — Who are the 12 accused acquitted by Bombay HC?
The Bombay High Court in a landmark decision on Monday acquitted all 12 accused in the 2006 Mumbai train blast incident, almost two decades after the attack killed more than 180 people. Pronouncing the order, the bench said that the prosecution utterly failed to prove the case and it was "hard to believe the accused committed the crime". The court allowed the appeals filed by the accused challenging their conviction and sentences imposed on them by a special court in 2015 regarding the Mumbai train blasts. The special court had sentenced five out of the 12 accused to death, while the remaining seven were sentenced to life imprisonment. One of the accused on death row passed away in 2021. The death row convicts in the 7/11 Mumbai train blast incident were Kamal Ansari (now dead), Mohammad Faisal Ataur Rahman Shaikh, Ehtesham Qutubuddin Siddiqui, Naveed Hussain Khan and Asif Khan. The court had imposed life imprisonment on Tanveer Ahmed Mohammed Ibrahim Ansari, Mohammed Majid Mohammed Shafi, Shaikh Mohammed Ali Alam Shaikh, Mohammed Sajid Margub Ansari, Muzammil Ataur Rahman Shaikh, Suhail Mehmood Shaikh and Zameer Ahmed Rehman Shaikh. 1. Kamal Ansari: Ansari was accused of planting the bomb that exploded at Matunga, after having received arms training in Pakistan. A Bihar resident, he died in 2021 while awaiting hearing of the appeal at age 50. 2. Mohammad Faisal Rahman Shaikh: A resident of Thane's Mira Road area, he was accused of being one of the main conspirators of the Mumbai train blasts. As per prosecution, Shaikh, 50, got money from Pakistan, assembled the bombs and planted one of them on a train. 3. Ehtesham Qutubuddin Siddiqui: It was alleged that Siddiqui had conducted a recce of the trains ahead of the attack and planting a bomb in one of the trains. 4. Naveed Hussain Khan Rasheed: Rasheed, a former call centre employee, was arrested from Secunderabad on charges of assembling the bombs and planting one of them on a train that exploded in Bandra. 5. Asif Khan: Khan, 52, was accused of helping assemble the bombs and planting an explosive that went off in Borivali. The Jalgaon resident was also accused of being a key member of SIMI. 6. Tanveer Ahmed Mohammed Ibrahim Ansari: A resident of Mumbai's Agripada, Ansari was accused of visiting Pakistani terror camps and carrying out a recce of Mumbai local trains. 7. Mohammed Shafi: He was accused of procuring money from Pakistan for the blasts through a hawala racket. 8. Shaikh Mohammed Ali Alam: This 55-year-old was sentenced to life on charges of assembling bombs at his Govandi residence alongwith help of Pakistanis who entered India. Alam was also accused of being a key SIMI member. 9. Mohammed Sajid Margub Ansari: The 47-year-old, a resident of Mira Road, was accused of getting the timers for the bombs, helping to assemble them and harbouring two Pakistani nationals. 10. Muzammil Rahman Shaikh: Aged 20 during the time of the incident, Shaikh was the youngest accused in the case, who allegedly received training in Pakistan and conducted a recce of the local trains. He was a software engineer. 11. Suhail Mehmood Shaikh: The 55-year-old was arrested for taking arms training in Pakistan and conducting a recce of the trains. 12. Zameer Ahmed Rehman: Rehman, now 50, was accused of attending conspiracy meetings and taking training in Pakistan.
