
UK newspaper The Telegraph set for US ownership
AFP | London
British right-wing newspaper The Telegraph has agreed a takeover by US investment group RedBird Capital Partners, ending a two-year saga marked by UK government intervention over press freedoms.
RedBird has struck an 'in-principle agreement' to purchase The Telegraph Media Group (TMG), which comprises the 170-year-old paper's print and online operations, for £500 million ($670 million), the pair announced in a statement on Friday.
It concludes a protracted sale that involved an intervention by the previous Conservative government.
US-Emirati consortium RedBird IMI, comprising RedBird Capital, had already struck a deal for TMG in late 2023.

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