Distracted Russia is losing central Asia to China

The Print

5 hours ago

Once viewed as Russia's backyard, Central Asia is now steadily tilting towards China, a point echoed in most Chinese commentary on the summit. According to scholars and internet users alike, the war in Ukraine has been a critical accelerant. In 2023, China overtook Russia as the region's largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching $94.8 billion last year.
Chinese discourse conveys quiet confidence that Beijing is outpacing Moscow economically, diplomatically, and ideologically in Central Asia. The very creation of the summit two years ago, as Russia became entangled in Ukraine, reflects China's calculated timing and strategic opportunism.
Chinese media coverage of President Xi Jinping's recent visit to Kazakhstan for the second China–Central Asia Summit reveals a carefully constructed narrative that underscores Beijing's ambitions in the region. Far from being a routine diplomatic event, the summit and its portrayal in state media reflect a broader effort to position China as the new centre of gravity in Central Asia , displacing Russia's long-standing dominance. The war in Ukraine, which has drained Moscow's attention and resources, has accelerated this shift, creating a vacuum that Beijing is eager to fill.
A Baidu commentator described the region's transformation as a 'silent metamorphosis' driven by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). According to this analysis, infrastructure projects like the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and Turkmenistan's gas pipeline to Shanghai highlight China's growing economic footprint and position it as the architect of connectivity and shared prosperity. In contrast, Russian anxiety is likened to 'a fire in its own backyard,' underscoring the asymmetry of influence. The commentator notes that in response to China, Moscow announced large-scale military exercises with Central Asian states and is promoting a new regional security treaty—potentially including 'military exclusion zones', in a bid to reassert control.
Chinese commentaries highlight developments, long delayed under Russian pressure, such as the launch of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and a $1 billion mining deal between China and Kazakhstan, as signs of a quiet pivot toward Beijing. Russia's isolation has weakened its ability to obstruct such projects. While the railway's mismatched gauges and outdated infrastructure suggest compromise, its deeper significance lies in the diminishing weight of Moscow's veto. Central Asian countries, once cautious, are now guided by economic pragmatism and a growing desire to reduce reliance on an enfeebled Russia.
Wang Minzhao, assistant professor at Tsinghua University, argues that the railway project could halve transport times and allow China to dominate Eurasian logistics. Wang cited an old Chinese proverb, 'The arm cannot wrestle the thigh' to project that Putin did not concede due to economic pressure but rather saw strategic value in leveraging Beijing to unlock new trade routes.
Headlines such as 'China and Central Asia have started building big projects, and Russia, which once blocked them, is now jealous' and 'The five Central Asian countries are striving to shake off the shadow of Russia; cultural confidence inspires national awakening' reflect this changing dynamic.
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De-Russification
Chinese discourse frames the shift in Central Asia as both inevitable and advantageous.
Li Lifan, Associate Researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, noted that Central Asia is seeking both political change and economic recovery. He described an emerging shift toward 'independent regional integrationism,' with Central Asian states embracing the C5+X model—engaging with powers like China, the US, Europe, Japan, and South Korea—while distancing themselves from traditional Russian-led structures.
Since the invasion and tightening of Western sanctions, Central Asian states are portrayed as reassessing ties with Moscow, prompting a quiet but steady push for 'de-Russification.' Families are prioritising native languages, and increasingly Chinese, over Russian in education. Cultural life is moving away from Soviet legacies, and even Turkmenistan is stressing 'neutrality' to signal distance from Russia's security orbit.
The BRI is cast as a natural and superior alternative. Kazakhstan is a key transit hub to Europe via the China–Europe rail corridor, while Uzbekistan is drawing major Chinese investment in textiles and energy. In markets, Chinese goods are steadily replacing Russian imports.
One Baidu analyst cited China's rejection of Russia's proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline route through Kazakhstan as a sign of shifting energy strategy. China now prefers a direct route, citing costs and outdated logic. This is part of a broader shift: reducing reliance on Russian gas, expanding non-fossil fuels, diversifying supply chains, and boosting RMB-based trade. With investment in digital infrastructure and financial innovation, Beijing is increasingly presented not just as a key player, but a rule-setter.
One Weibo post summarised this emerging attitude: 'Russia's efforts won't keep the US out, it's better to let China manage Central Asia.'
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Beijing's Central Asian playbook
Beijing's narrative is steeped in familiar foreign policy tropes: 'win-win cooperation,' a 'community with a shared future,' and 'harmonious development.' These themes are not incidental; they are calculated tools to legitimise China's expanding influence.
At the same time, the discourse subtly communicates that while the China–Russia relationship remains cooperative, it is neither permanent nor equal. China has no intention of rescuing Russia; it aims to outpace it. Xi's visit to Astana, outside the broader Shanghai Cooperation Organisation framework, is telling. With Russia distracted and losing sway, China is positioning itself as Central Asia's reliable partner—one that offers long-term engagement, economic development, and relative stability.
By crafting this carefully curated discourse, China presents itself not as a rival occupier but as a natural and constructive stakeholder in the region's future.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. She tweets @sanahashmi1. Views are personal.
(Edited by Theres Sudeep)