Israel plans to widen coming offensive beyond Gaza City into last areas not under its control
The mobilization of forces is expected to take weeks, and Israel may be using the threat of a wider offensive to try to pressure Hamas into releasing more hostages or surrendering after 22 months of war sparked by its Oct. 7, 2023, attack into Israel.
Any expansion of Israeli operations is likely to bring even more death and destruction to the war-ravaged territory, around 75% of which is already largely destroyed and controlled by Israel. A wider offensive would also force more people to flee and further disrupt the delivery of humanitarian aid during a severe hunger crisis.
The plans have also sparked controversy in Israel. Families of the remaining hostages fear another military escalation could doom their loved ones, while former senior security officials have said there is little to be gained militarily.
Israel announced last week its plans to take over Gaza City , where it has already carried out major raids and heavy bombardment throughout the war. On Sunday, Netanyahu told a news conference that operations would be expanded into the 'central camps' and beyond.
He appeared to be referring to the built-up Nuseirat and Bureij camps in central Gaza that date back to the 1948 war surrounding Israel's creation . Israel has carried out near-daily airstrikes in the camps since the start of the war but no major ground operations.
Netanyahu referred to Gaza City, the central camps and Muwasi — a vast cluster of displacement camps along the coast — as Hamas strongholds. These areas, along with the central city of Deir al-Balah, are the only parts of Gaza that have not been almost completely destroyed in previous Israeli operations. They are also areas where Hamas may be holding hostages in tunnels or other secret locations.
An Israeli official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss aspects of the plans that have not been made public, said the operation will not begin immediately and will take a significant amount of time to scale up. One indication will be the potential mobilization of thousands of reservists.
The official said the announced plans were partly aimed at putting pressure on various parties.
Netanyahu said Israel will allow civilians to flee to 'designated safe zones,' where 'they will be given ample food, water and medical care, as we have done before.' He did not say where they would go.
Israel designated Muwasi as a humanitarian zone earlier in the war. The barren stretch of sandy coastline was soon filled with tents housing hundreds of thousands of people with little in the way of food, running water, toilets or trash collection. Israel has regularly carried out airstrikes against what it said were militants hiding out there, often killing women and children .
Last month, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz reportedly floated the idea of transferring Gaza's population to a so-called 'humanitarian city' that the military would build on the ruins of the southernmost city of Rafah — now a largely uninhabited Israeli military zone — on the border with Egypt.
Netanyahu has vowed to eventually relocate much of Gaza's population to other countries through what he refers to as voluntary emigration. The Palestinians and much of the international community see it as forcible expulsion because Israel's offensive has made much of Gaza uninhabitable .
They fear that concentrating people in the south would be a step toward implementing such plans.
Netanyahu has said he will end the war if Hamas gives up power, lays down its arms and releases the remaining 50 hostages — around 20 of whom are believed by Israel to be alive.
Israel would still maintain open-ended security control over Gaza and facilitate the departure of those who wish to leave, according to Netanyahu. He has said Arab forces friendly to Israel would administer the territory, but none are known to have volunteered, aside from an Israeli-backed armed group known for looting aid .
Hamas has said, in line with international demands , that it would release the remaining hostages in return for a lasting ceasefire and an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The militant group says it is willing to hand over power to other Palestinians but will not give up its weapons as long as Israel occupies lands the Palestinians want for a future state.
Israel may hope that ratcheting up pressure will yield further concessions from Hamas in U.S.- and Arab-mediated talks that appear to have broken down last month .
But the hostages are Hamas' only remaining bargaining chip, and it is unlikely to give them up if it believes that Israel will then resume the war, attempt to eradicate the group and carry out plans to depopulate Gaza.
Israel ended a previous ceasefire in March that had facilitated the release of 25 hostages and the remains of eight others. Since then, it has imposed a 2 1/2 month blockade that pushed the territory toward famine, launched daily airstrikes across Gaza , expanded its buffer zone and ordered mass evacuations.
Hamas has only released one hostage during that time, as a gesture to the United States.
Hamas-led militants killed some 1,200 people, mostly civilians, and abducted 251 others in the 2023 attack. More than half of the hostages have been released in ceasefires or other deals. Israel's offensive has killed around 61,500 Palestinians, according to Gaza's Health Ministry.
The ministry, which is part of the Hamas-run government and run by medical professionals, does not say how many of those killed were civilians or combatants, but it says women and children make up around half of the fatalities. The agency's numbers are considered a reliable estimate by the U.N. and independent experts. Israel disputes them but has not offered its own figures.
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Associated Press Writer Melanie Lidman in Tel Aviv, Israel, contributed to this report.
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Follow AP's war coverage at https://apnews.com/hub/israel-hamas-war
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