Stockton Rush was known for defying rules. Had he survived submersible tragedy, he may have faced criminal investigation

CNN

10-08-2025

OceanGate co-founder and CEO Stockton Rush fancied himself an adventurer, visionary and MacGyver-esque experimenter. He was also an overly ambitious proponent of deep-sea tourism whose resistance to oversight and negligence ended in tragedy just over two years ago.
In the 335 pages of the US Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation report on the June 2023 implosion of the Titan submersible, Rush emerges as a controlling figure who failed to 'follow established engineering protocols.' The report accused his company of using 'intimidation tactics' and 'strategically creating and exploiting regulatory confusion and oversight challenges.' It cited a 'toxic workplace environment' where firings and the threat of termination dissuaded staffers from voicing safety concerns.
A Princeton graduate descended from two signers of the Declaration of Independence, Rush found his niche in the lucrative, high-risk industry of extreme tourism. But his negligence, in the words of marine investigators, contributed to five deaths — including his own — and he could have faced criminal investigation if he were alive.
The Marine Board of Investigation identified evidence of a potential criminal offense, particularly Misconduct or Neglect of Ship Officers, and said it would have recommended a referral to the US Department of Justice. The report specifically noted the 'seaman's manslaughter' statute. 'As both a corporate executive responsible for the vessel's operation and its Master during the casualty, Mr. Rush may have been subject to criminal liability' under US law, the report said.
Rush was killed in the implosion, along with businessman Shahzada Dawood and his 19-year-old son, Suleman Dawood. British businessman Hamish Harding and French diver Paul-Henri Nargeolet also perished. Their remains were matched to the five men on board through DNA testing and analysis. The vessel vanished during a dive to the wreck of the Titanic.
OceanGate is no longer operating. A spokesperson on Tuesday offered condolences to the families of those killed in the implosion.
'We again offer our deepest condolences to the families of those who died on June 18, 2023, and to all those impacted by the tragedy,' the spokesperson said. 'After the tragedy occurred, the company permanently wound down operations and directed its resources fully towards cooperating with the Coast Guard's inquiry through its completion.'
Over the years, Rush made his aversion to regulations abundantly clear. Former staffers told marine investigators his company routinely cut corners and disregarded safety. The CEO pushed back on safety concerns and fiercely controlled 'all engineering' decisions, according to the report, which described a sometimes dangerous, jack-of-all-trades approach on operational and safety matters.
'Rush was essentially Ocean Gate's CEO, Safety Officer, and primary submersible pilot, which enabled him to set operational safety parameters and then make all final decisions for TITAN operations without adequate input or checks and balances from the Board of Directors, the other OceanGate employees, regulators, or third-party organizations (e.g., classification societies),' the report said.
'The cumulative effect was an authoritarian and toxic culture where safety was not only deprioritized but actively suppressed. This toxic environment, characterized by retaliation and belittling against those who expressed safety concerns combined with a lack of external oversight, set the stage for the TITAN's ultimate demise.'
And Rush 'made all engineering decisions independently, despite having a Director of Engineering in place,' three of OceanGate's directors of engineering told the US Coast Guard Marine Board Investigation. The most recent engineering director — who left OceanGate in February 2023 — told investigators Rush often prioritized cost-cutting solutions, leading to tensions over safety.
'It was Stockton, for sure…. My job as the Director of Engineering is more about rounding up the cattle than it is about making all the choices, for sure,' OceanGate's first engineering director told investigators when asked who was the majority engineering decision maker.
Rush prided himself on being a rule breaker, with a longstanding antipathy toward regulations.
'At some point, safety just is pure waste,' Stockton told journalist David Pogue in a 2022 interview. 'I mean, if you just want to be safe, don't get out of bed. Don't get in your car. Don't do anything.'
In another interview, Stockton boasted that he'd 'broken some rules' in his career.
'I think it was General MacArthur who said you're remembered for the rules you break,' Rush said in a 2021 video interview with Mexican YouTuber Alan Estrada. 'And I've broken some rules to make this. I think I've broken them with logic and good engineering behind me.'
Rush, a 1984 Ivy League graduate with a degree in aerospace engineering, said he never outgrew his childhood dream of being an astronaut, but he told Smithsonian Magazine in 2019 that his eyesight wasn't good enough.
He moved to Seattle after college to work for the McDonnell Douglas Corporation as a flight test engineer on the F-15 program. He obtained an MBA from UC Berkeley in 1989, according to his company bio. But his dreams of cosmic exploration shifted in 2004, Rush told Smithsonian, after Richard Branson launched the first commercial aircraft into space.
Instead, Rush set his sights on sea exploration. In 2009, he founded OceanGate, with a stated mission of 'increasing access to the deep ocean through innovation.'
At the time of the catastrophic implosion, OceanGate operated three submersibles for conducting research, film production and 'exploration travel' — including tours of the site of the Titanic more than 13,000 feet below the ocean's surface. The price for a single seat on the eight-day mission: $250,000.
Former staffers told marine investigators the company designated Titan passengers as 'mission specialists' — though they performed no specialized work — in an attempt to skirt federal regulations.
Mission specialists had to sign liability waivers before dives, often shortly after paying and traveling to the departure point, according to the report. The terms of the waiver were only discussed in detail after arrival, leaving little opportunity for participants to decline.
The money paid by mission specialists was absorbed directly into OceanGate's operating account, with no guarantee of a refund or a future opportunity if a mission was canceled or aborted, according to the report.
'The immediate use of mission specialist funds added pressure on OceanGate to conduct TITAN operations to fulfill its obligations and protect its reputation,' the report stated.
OceanGate's director of marine operations — whose responsibilities included 'ensuring the safety of crew and clients during operations' — told investigators the company dismissed his safety concerns, focusing more on 'image and marketing than on building a safe and reliable operation,' according to the Coast Guard's report.
A 'culture of secrecy' abounded at OceanGate and 'contributed to the ongoing dysfunction between the teams,' according to the director, who was hired in early 2016 and had more than 25 years of experience in subsea operations.
'I believe my concerns were dismissed due to cost-cutting measures and poor engineering decisions, driven by the desire to reach the TITANIC quickly to start generating profit,' the director told investigators.
Rush spoke of an almost-spiritual attraction to the deep sea, describing it in his 2019 interview with Smithsonian as 'the deep disease.' He believed the sea, rather than the sky, offered humanity the best shot at survival when the Earth's surface becomes uninhabitable.
'The future of mankind is underwater, it's not on Mars,' he told Estrada. 'We will have a base underwater … If we trash this planet, the best life boat for mankind is underwater.'
But marine investigators said OceanGate failed to adequately design, test and analyze the submersible's carbon-fiber hull, despite numerous issues with the material, manufacturing and testing — something compounded by the 'inherently hazardous environment' of the deep sea.
On May 29, 2019, a Titan pilot discovered what appeared to be a crack in the carbon fiber structure during a pre-dive inspection in the Bahamas, according to the Coast Guard report. OceanGate's engineering director traveled to the Bahamas and confirmed 'the crack was both larger and deeper than initially assessed.'
'After the crack was detected and fully assessed, OceanGate did not make any external notifications (e.g., customers with pending deposits, government authorities, classification societies) regarding the crack found in the TITAN hull,' the report said.
Rush 'planned to grind it out, repair it, and reassemble the sub in three weeks, then dive it again,' the engineering director told investigators.
'I was strongly opposed to diving in a hull with a significant crack, even at the dock,' the engineering director said. 'But (Mr. Rush) was insistent — he was focused on making sure the media saw that OceanGate was still in operation, so he could explain the delay in the TITANIC mission.'
In July 2019, Rush invited the engineering director to lunch and fired him.
'According to him, the message was clear: Either he or I had to go. Then he looked at me and said, 'It's not going to be me,'' the engineering director recalled Rush saying.
The start of OceanGate's ill-fated expedition to the Titanic in 2023 was marked by setbacks, an inexperienced crew and rising frustrations, according to the report.
Several missions and planned dives were plagued by technical issues, repairs and maintenance, the report said. By mid-June, Rush was frustrated that no dives had been able to leave the support platform, according to the report.
One mission specialist told marine investigators, 'They felt Mr. Rush was beginning to get 'antsy' and 'clearly frustrated.'' The specialist recalled Rush saying at one point: 'I'm going to get a dive in, even if it kills me.'
On June 18, 2023, at 10:47 a.m. local time, the submersible's hull 'experienced a critical event that compromised the structural integrity of its pressure vessel, resulting in an instantaneous and catastrophic implosion of the TITAN,' the report said.
CNN's Dakin Andone, Elise Hammond, Eric Levenson, Graham Hurley, Lauren Mascarenhas and Meg Wagner contributed to this report.