Final moments that led to head-on train crash in which man died revealed

Wales Online

30-04-2025

Final moments that led to head-on train crash in which man died revealed
A man died in the head-on collision between two Transport for Wales services at Talerddig in October, 2024. A report on the crash has now been released
Two Transport for Wales trains crashed head on at Talerddig which left a man dead and others seriously injured
(Image: RAIB )
A train which crashed into another, in an incident which left a man dead, missed its stopping point by more than 1km after skidding on the tracks, investigators have found. Tudor Evans, 66, died after two Transport for Wales passenger services crashed on the line in October last year.
There was a head-on collision between two services. While one driver was able to leave their cab before the collision, the other wasn't and was trapped and seriously injured. Their train was moved 35 metres by the collision.
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The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) is responsible for conducting independent investigations into railway accidents in the UK and has published an interim report of its findings into the crash. For our free daily briefing on the biggest issues facing the nation, sign up to the Wales Matters newsletter here
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Investigators have found there were blocked sand delivery hoses on one of the trains, which should have released sand to help with friction and reduce any braking issues.
It said that at 7.26pm, on Monday, October 21, the 6.31pm service from Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth, collided with the 7.09pm service running from Machynlleth to Shrewsbury. Both services were operated by Transport for Wales and each was made up of two carriages.
The crash took place on the Cambrian Line, to the west of the passing loop located at Talerddig, Powys.
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Video shows the moments after a train crash as passengers were evacuated
There were six people, including two staff, on the eastbound train and 31 including three staff on the westbound service. In total, Mr Evans died and four other people were seriously injured in the collision.
Neither train derailed in the collision, although significant damage was caused to the leading vehicles of both trains.
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The railway is single line here and the Talerddig passing loop is designed so trains can pull in to allow services to pass. On the night of the incident the RAIB said the Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth service was due to use the loop to allow the eastbound train to pass. It was braking as it approached but was unable to stop within the loop as intended. When it re-entered the single line, it travelled 1,080 metres beyond its intended stopping point, before colliding with the other train.
At the time of the collision, the Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth train was travelling at around 24mph while the train from the opposite direction was travelling at 6mph.
The report looked at weather conditions and whether there was anything on the track that would have impacted the ability of the train to stop. Leaves and rain are both things that can impact trains.
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Both trains were made up of class 157 units, and the braking system allows a driver to apply three levels of braking. Step one is the lowest, step three is called a full service brake and they can also make an emergency brake application.
Both trains had wheel slide protection fitted which is similar to anti-lock braking in a car. They were also equipped with on-board sanders, which is a way to counter low wheel-rail adhesion. When needed, sand is dispensed from the train and delivered through hoses aimed directly to where the wheel meets the track. Most passenger trains which operate on GB mainline railways are fitted with an on-board sanding system.
Three days before the accident, on October 18, Storm Ashley was forecast to bring strong winds and heavy rain to the UK. Network Rail received a warning that there would be "moderate to poor" adhesion on the track caused by leaf fall and weather. The alert estimated there would be 3% to 4% of the season's leaves on the ground in the morning and that more leaves would fall during the day, leading to an increased risk.
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Rain had also fallen meaning there were also damp conditions.
The report said the westbound train had, two nights before the collision, had a routine maintenance which is carried out every 1,500 miles including refuelling the train and carrying out checks on safety equipment, including the train's automatic sanders.
"To check the automatic sanders, a maintenance technician presses a sander test button and visually observes if sand is ejected from the sand hoses. The sander test button is mounted on the sand hopper, which is on the train's underframe," the report explains.
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Before going into service on October 20, it was checked and operated as normal on that day. It was going to be left at Crewe overnight, but due to service disruption, the train was instead driven to Chester station and stabled in a platform, arriving just before midnight. The following morning, the train driver prepared the train for service, but as it was next to a platform they could not access the underframe and certain safety systems, including the operation of the automatic sanding system, could not be checked.
The report explains sanders, which apply sand to the track to help with friction, were blocked
(Image: RAIB )
No faults were reported during its journeys during the day.
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At around 7.22pm, as it travelled to Talerddig, the westbound service's driver shut off traction power while the train was travelling at 77mph. At this point, the intended stopping point, was approximately 1,900 metres away.
Over the next 39 seconds, the driver braked twice to bring the train's speed down to 58mph.
At 7.23pm, the driver braked again at step two - the middle of the range - with the intended point 730m away.
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Three seconds later, the train system intervened and applied a full brake. The train's wheels began to slide a second later, data has shown. After six seconds, the emergency brake was applied - with the stopping point 500m away.
The driver called the signaller to say the train was sliding and would pass the block marker they were aiming for. Twenty seconds later, it passed that marker. The train then ran through the points, and exited the loop at 20mph. The train then entered a descent and sped up.
The driver went into the train to warn passengers and the signaller called the other train driver to warn them. That driver also tried to brake, and applied the emergency brake, the collision happened four seconds after the emergency brake was applied. The eastbound service was moved 35 metres by the collision.
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Two minutes after the crash, the driver called for emergency services - having checked on the passengers.
On the westbound service, one person died and three were seriously injured. All had been in the rear carriage. Another 18 received minor injuries. The driver of the eastbound service was trying to leave the cab when the collision occurred but became trapped and was seriously hurt.
The leading end of each train suffered damage in the collision. A passenger in the leading vehicle of the eastbound service needed help to force open the internal sliding door before being able to get out. The other driver and a passenger managed to force open the damaged door to help the injured driver.
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The line re-opened seven days later.
The RAIB investigation concluded that the westbound train had encountered low wheel-rail adhesion and that its sand delivery hoses were blocked.
The report's findings are:
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Trains rely on friction to accelerate or decelerate so if there is any contamination or moisture it can limit the grip between the wheels and rails, reducing the braking performance of the train.
At 2am on the night of the incident, investigators found there was contamination on the track. Talerddig is also a known area of low adhesion.
Network Rail uses treatment trains to clean the railhead. On October 20, the night before the accident that was planned at Talerddig and both tracks at the passing loop. It can apply an adhesion-improving gel, but this was not used on the Cambrian line.
It can also apply "traction gel applicators" which is a track-mounted device which can dispense an adhesion-improving gel onto the railhead. That is installed 280m east of the collision site, but there was no visible evidence of traction gel on the railhead the day after the accident and when Network Rail inspected the TGA on October 25, it was found to be not working.
No defects have been found on the westbound service but there have been defects found with the sanding system
No issues were found on the eastbound train
Maintenance was up to date
Neither the automatic sander nor the emergency sander on the westbound train discharged sand in the moments immediately before the collision.
Following the accident, RAIB inspected and tested the automatic sanding system on vehicle 57841 and found four defects
"No defects relating to the sanders were reported by any drivers of unit 158841 on 20 or 21 October. However, it cannot be determined if the train encountered areas of low wheel-rail adhesion during this period which would have activated these systems and potentially alerted drivers to any defects which may have existed."
While the blocked sand delivery hoses were identified shortly after the accident the two electrical defects and incorrectly installed orifice plates were found in testing 11 weeks later but that may have been as a result of the accident, or during post-accident recovery and storage, the report says
The sanders blockage was 30mm deep and was caused by leaves and debris from ash, acer and wild cherry trees
Since the collision TFW has issued a report about the blocked sanders and given additional checks to be carried out, and a second which highlights the electrical defects identified with the automatic sanding system and described additional checks to be carried out.
A final report will be published by RAIB on completion of its investigation.
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