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Powys County Times
30-04-2025
- Powys County Times
Report released into Talerddig train crash amid Storm Ashley
Four people were seriously injured including the train drivers, one of which was trapped attempting to leave the cab, in a crash that killed a man in Powys. Investigators have released more details about the collision between two Transport for Wales passenger trains which happened near Talerddig, between Carno and Llanbrynmair, during Storm Ashley on October 21 last year. An interim report from the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) has now revealed that one of the trains had attempted to stop at a passing loop but slid past while braking downhill into the single line, heading towards the other train at 24mph. On the morning of the collision, the Aberystwyth -bound train was stabled in a platform at Chester station which meant the driver did not have access to equipment on the train's underframe including the sander test button and consequently could not be checked. No faults had been reported during various routes to Aberystwyth, Shrewsbury and Birmingham that day. Around 10 minutes after departing from Caersws station at 7.15pm towards Machynlleth, the driver, who had been braking, called the signaller to say that the train was sliding and was probably going to pass the marker. The train then exited the Talerddig passing loop at around 20mph and the speed was increasing downhill despite the brakes remaining fully applied. The other train travelling towards Shrewsbury was told by the signaller to stop and over the next nine seconds the driver applied the brakes then the emergency brake before the collision happened four seconds later. Realising that a collision was imminent, the driver of the train heading towards Aberystwyth moved into the saloon area and warned nearby passengers. Two minutes after the collision the driver made a railway emergency call to the signaller after checking on the passengers. Neither the Machynlleth-bound train which was carrying 31 people, nor the Caersws-bound train with six passengers on board including two TfW staff, derailed in the collision. Significant damage was caused to the front of both trains, however. David Tudor Evans, 66, was suspected to have died from a heart attack, while 22 people were injured, four of which were seriously hurt. RAIB investigators have so far concluded that neither the automatic sander nor the emergency sander on the Aberystwyth-bound train discharged sand in the moments immediately before the collision. The orifice plates, which are part of the sander pneumatic system, were found to be installed incorrectly; both were upside down and one was incorrectly aligned. Both sand delivery hoses were found to be blocked which would have prevented the sand from being ejected but RAIB said there was no evidence of any significant build-up of sand and it had flowed freely when the test button was pressed during subsequent testing. However, no defects relating to the sanders were reported by any of the drivers on October 20 and 21. The last routine maintenance test which could have identified electrical faults with the sander isolation and the low-speed relay was completed nice days before the collision on October 12. The investigation is continuing and a full report is expected at a later date.
Yahoo
30-04-2025
- Yahoo
Safety checks not done before fatal train crash
Four faults were detected in a safety system for a train involved in a fatal crash, investigators have said. Tudor Evans, 66, died and four others were seriously injured when two Transport for Wales (TfW) trains collided near Llanbrynmair in Powys on 21 October. The trains were travelling in opposite directions on a single line and were meant to pass on an extra section of line, called the Talerddig Loop. But the braking system failed on the westbound train heading to Aberystwyth and it skidded past the loop, colliding with the eastbound train from Machynlleth. The Rail Accident Investigation Branch's (RAIB) interim report into the cause of the crash revealed the trains collided at a closing speed of about 30mph (48 km/h). Previously, the RAIB said an automated system that helped train wheels grip tracks had failed. It said it had inspected the system fitted to the train heading to Aberystwyth which automatically sprays sand via hoses when a wheel slide is detected during braking in a bid to generate more friction. Train safety system failed before fatal crash, report says On board the 18:31 to Aberystwyth as it smashed into another train Family of man who died in train crash thank well-wishers Wednesday's report revealed safety checks on the train braking system were not carried out because the driver was unable to do so as the train was parked next to a platform. "Early on the morning of 21 October, a train driver prepared the train for service, however the train was positioned adjacent to a platform," the report said. "This meant that the driver did not have access to equipment on the train's underframe, including the sander test button. "Consequently, certain safety systems, including the operation of the automatic sanding system, could not be checked." The hoses fitted to the TfW train to discharge sand when wheels slide during braking were "blocked" with leaves and debris from trees, the RAIB said. The investigators said: "This fault would have prevented sand from being ejected from the hoses." Two plates which measure the flow rate of sand were incorrectly installed, with both upside down and one misaligned. Two electrical faults were also discovered. A "basic check" of the system was carried out the day before the crash which "suggests that the sand hoses were not blocked at this time", the report stated. The reported highlighted other factors which could have contributed to the collision, including: Weather conditions - Storm Ashley had brought heavy rain three days previously Time of year - falling leaves on the line affected adhesion of the wheels on the track Adhesion improving gel was not used on the line The RAIB's investigation continues and a final report will be published at a later date. Passenger dies and 15 hurt after two trains crash Line reopens after four days of repairs How common are train crashes in Wales?
BBC News
30-04-2025
- BBC News
Powys train crash: Safety checks not done before fatal collision
Safety checks on a train braking system were not carried out before a fatal rail crash, a report has Evans, 66, died and four others were seriously injured when two Transport for Wales (TfW) trains collided near Llanbrynmair in Powys on 21 trains were travelling in opposite directions on a single line and were meant to pass each on an extra section of line, called the Talerddig the braking system failed on the eastbound train heading to Aberystwyth and it skidded past the loop, colliding with the westbound train from Machynlleth. The Rail Accident Investigation Branch's (RAIB) interim report into the cause of the crash revealed the trains collided at a closing speed of about 30mph (48 km/h).Previously, the RAIB said that an automated system that helped train wheels grip tracks had said it had inspected the system fitted to the train heading to Aberystwyth, which automatically sprays sand via hoses when a wheel slide is detected during braking in a bid to generate more friction. Wednesday's report revealed the driver was supposed to check the sanding system, but was unable to do so because the train was parked next to a platform."Early on the morning of 21 October, a train driver prepared the train for service, however the train was positioned adjacent to a platform," the report said."This meant that the driver did not have access to equipment on the train's underframe, including the sander test button."Consequently, certain safety systems, including the operation of the automatic sanding system, could not be checked." The reported highlighted other factors which could have contributed to the collision, including:Weather conditions - Storm Ashley had brought heavy rain three days previouslyTime of year - falling leaves on the line affected adhesion of the wheels on the trackAdhesion improving gel was not used on the lineThe RAIB's investigation continues and a final report will be published at a later date.
Wales Online
30-04-2025
- General
- Wales Online
Final moments that led to head-on train crash in which man died revealed
Final moments that led to head-on train crash in which man died revealed A man died in the head-on collision between two Transport for Wales services at Talerddig in October, 2024. A report on the crash has now been released Two Transport for Wales trains crashed head on at Talerddig which left a man dead and others seriously injured (Image: RAIB ) A train which crashed into another, in an incident which left a man dead, missed its stopping point by more than 1km after skidding on the tracks, investigators have found. Tudor Evans, 66, died after two Transport for Wales passenger services crashed on the line in October last year. There was a head-on collision between two services. While one driver was able to leave their cab before the collision, the other wasn't and was trapped and seriously injured. Their train was moved 35 metres by the collision. The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) is responsible for conducting independent investigations into railway accidents in the UK and has published an interim report of its findings into the crash. For our free daily briefing on the biggest issues facing the nation, sign up to the Wales Matters newsletter here Investigators have found there were blocked sand delivery hoses on one of the trains, which should have released sand to help with friction and reduce any braking issues. It said that at 7.26pm, on Monday, October 21, the 6.31pm service from Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth, collided with the 7.09pm service running from Machynlleth to Shrewsbury. Both services were operated by Transport for Wales and each was made up of two carriages. The crash took place on the Cambrian Line, to the west of the passing loop located at Talerddig, Powys. Article continues below Video shows the moments after a train crash as passengers were evacuated There were six people, including two staff, on the eastbound train and 31 including three staff on the westbound service. In total, Mr Evans died and four other people were seriously injured in the collision. Neither train derailed in the collision, although significant damage was caused to the leading vehicles of both trains. The railway is single line here and the Talerddig passing loop is designed so trains can pull in to allow services to pass. On the night of the incident the RAIB said the Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth service was due to use the loop to allow the eastbound train to pass. It was braking as it approached but was unable to stop within the loop as intended. When it re-entered the single line, it travelled 1,080 metres beyond its intended stopping point, before colliding with the other train. At the time of the collision, the Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth train was travelling at around 24mph while the train from the opposite direction was travelling at 6mph. The report looked at weather conditions and whether there was anything on the track that would have impacted the ability of the train to stop. Leaves and rain are both things that can impact trains. Both trains were made up of class 157 units, and the braking system allows a driver to apply three levels of braking. Step one is the lowest, step three is called a full service brake and they can also make an emergency brake application. Both trains had wheel slide protection fitted which is similar to anti-lock braking in a car. They were also equipped with on-board sanders, which is a way to counter low wheel-rail adhesion. When needed, sand is dispensed from the train and delivered through hoses aimed directly to where the wheel meets the track. Most passenger trains which operate on GB mainline railways are fitted with an on-board sanding system. Three days before the accident, on October 18, Storm Ashley was forecast to bring strong winds and heavy rain to the UK. Network Rail received a warning that there would be "moderate to poor" adhesion on the track caused by leaf fall and weather. The alert estimated there would be 3% to 4% of the season's leaves on the ground in the morning and that more leaves would fall during the day, leading to an increased risk. Rain had also fallen meaning there were also damp conditions. The report said the westbound train had, two nights before the collision, had a routine maintenance which is carried out every 1,500 miles including refuelling the train and carrying out checks on safety equipment, including the train's automatic sanders. "To check the automatic sanders, a maintenance technician presses a sander test button and visually observes if sand is ejected from the sand hoses. The sander test button is mounted on the sand hopper, which is on the train's underframe," the report explains. Before going into service on October 20, it was checked and operated as normal on that day. It was going to be left at Crewe overnight, but due to service disruption, the train was instead driven to Chester station and stabled in a platform, arriving just before midnight. The following morning, the train driver prepared the train for service, but as it was next to a platform they could not access the underframe and certain safety systems, including the operation of the automatic sanding system, could not be checked. The report explains sanders, which apply sand to the track to help with friction, were blocked (Image: RAIB ) No faults were reported during its journeys during the day. At around 7.22pm, as it travelled to Talerddig, the westbound service's driver shut off traction power while the train was travelling at 77mph. At this point, the intended stopping point, was approximately 1,900 metres away. Over the next 39 seconds, the driver braked twice to bring the train's speed down to 58mph. At 7.23pm, the driver braked again at step two - the middle of the range - with the intended point 730m away. Three seconds later, the train system intervened and applied a full brake. The train's wheels began to slide a second later, data has shown. After six seconds, the emergency brake was applied - with the stopping point 500m away. The driver called the signaller to say the train was sliding and would pass the block marker they were aiming for. Twenty seconds later, it passed that marker. The train then ran through the points, and exited the loop at 20mph. The train then entered a descent and sped up. The driver went into the train to warn passengers and the signaller called the other train driver to warn them. That driver also tried to brake, and applied the emergency brake, the collision happened four seconds after the emergency brake was applied. The eastbound service was moved 35 metres by the collision. Two minutes after the crash, the driver called for emergency services - having checked on the passengers. On the westbound service, one person died and three were seriously injured. All had been in the rear carriage. Another 18 received minor injuries. The driver of the eastbound service was trying to leave the cab when the collision occurred but became trapped and was seriously hurt. The leading end of each train suffered damage in the collision. A passenger in the leading vehicle of the eastbound service needed help to force open the internal sliding door before being able to get out. The other driver and a passenger managed to force open the damaged door to help the injured driver. The line re-opened seven days later. The RAIB investigation concluded that the westbound train had encountered low wheel-rail adhesion and that its sand delivery hoses were blocked. The report's findings are: Trains rely on friction to accelerate or decelerate so if there is any contamination or moisture it can limit the grip between the wheels and rails, reducing the braking performance of the train. At 2am on the night of the incident, investigators found there was contamination on the track. Talerddig is also a known area of low adhesion. Network Rail uses treatment trains to clean the railhead. On October 20, the night before the accident that was planned at Talerddig and both tracks at the passing loop. It can apply an adhesion-improving gel, but this was not used on the Cambrian line. It can also apply "traction gel applicators" which is a track-mounted device which can dispense an adhesion-improving gel onto the railhead. That is installed 280m east of the collision site, but there was no visible evidence of traction gel on the railhead the day after the accident and when Network Rail inspected the TGA on October 25, it was found to be not working. No defects have been found on the westbound service but there have been defects found with the sanding system No issues were found on the eastbound train Maintenance was up to date Neither the automatic sander nor the emergency sander on the westbound train discharged sand in the moments immediately before the collision. Following the accident, RAIB inspected and tested the automatic sanding system on vehicle 57841 and found four defects "No defects relating to the sanders were reported by any drivers of unit 158841 on 20 or 21 October. However, it cannot be determined if the train encountered areas of low wheel-rail adhesion during this period which would have activated these systems and potentially alerted drivers to any defects which may have existed." While the blocked sand delivery hoses were identified shortly after the accident the two electrical defects and incorrectly installed orifice plates were found in testing 11 weeks later but that may have been as a result of the accident, or during post-accident recovery and storage, the report says The sanders blockage was 30mm deep and was caused by leaves and debris from ash, acer and wild cherry trees Since the collision TFW has issued a report about the blocked sanders and given additional checks to be carried out, and a second which highlights the electrical defects identified with the automatic sanding system and described additional checks to be carried out. A final report will be published by RAIB on completion of its investigation. Article continues below
The Herald Scotland
23-04-2025
- The Herald Scotland
Stonehaven derailment fatal accident inquiry 'could last nine weeks'
A criminal prosecution saw Network Rail fined £6.7 million in 2023 after it admitted health and safety failings over the crash, which happened on a day of torrential rainfall. At a preliminary hearing held virtually from Aberdeen Sheriff Court on Wednesday, Alex Prentice KC, representing the Crown, said it would be a 'large and complex' fatal accident inquiry (FAI). During a previous preliminary hearing in January, the lawyer suggested the FAI could last around 12 weeks but on Wednesday he said it could take less time. READ MORE: Probe into Stonehaven train derailment could last 12 weeks Fatal Accident Inquiry to be held following Stonehaven train derailment Victims and relatives speak out after Network Rail guilty over Stonehaven crash He said: 'It is very difficult to at this stage identify the duration of the hearing, but we think about eight to nine weeks.' Mr Prentice said that at a previous hearing, Sheriff Principal Derek Pyle made it clear the views of bereaved relatives and the passengers were important when deciding how the FAI should be held, be it virtually or in person. He said there appears to be no strong united view on the matter. The lawyer told the hearing: 'I suggest it might be better that further thought is given to that so that a final decision can be made at the next hearing. 'From the Crown's point of view I think a hybrid model might be the best, with some evidence taken remotely and some evidence taken in person and statements and other matters would be referred to.' Participants in the inquiry include the RMT and Aslef unions, ScotRail, the Office of Rail and Road, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB), Network Rail Infrastructure, British Transport Police and the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service. The inquiry heard on Wednesday that the Scottish Ambulance Service will also participate. A date for the FAI has not yet been fixed, however Sheriff Lesley Johnston on Wednesday asked participants to provide dates of their availability for the inquiry over the next 18 months to help with planning. A further preliminary hearing will take place on June 23. Unlike criminal proceedings, FAIs are inquisitorial in nature, and are used to establish facts rather than apportion blame. The purpose of an FAI includes determining the cause of death, the circumstances in which the death occurred, and establishing what reasonable precautions could have been taken to minimise the risk of future deaths in similar circumstances. At the High Court in Aberdeen in September 2023, Network Rail admitted a series of failings that resulted in the deaths, pleading guilty to a charge covering the period from May 1 2011 to August 12 2020. This included failing to inform the driver that it was unsafe to drive the train at 75mph, or caution him to reduce his speed amid bad weather on the day of the derailment, which also left six people injured. An RAIB report published in March 2022 found errors in the construction of a drainage system installed by Carillion meant it was unable to cope with heavy rain which fell in the area on the morning of the crash. Carillion went into compulsory liquidation in January 2018. The RAIB report made 20 recommendations to improve railway safety, many of which were directed at Network Rail. Network Rail previously said it is determined to build on the 'significant changes' it has made since the incident, which have 'helped us to manage the risk of severe weather to the network', and it has invested millions to improve the resilience of the railway.
