Nuclear war is getting more likely by the week
In today's edition:
Post Opinions is embarking on a new series in which experts from the Federation of American Scientists examine the threat of nuclear conflict. I would love to tell you that these experts argue that 'today's global nuclear landscape is far [less] complicated and, in many ways, [less] precarious than during the Cold War' — but, unfortunately, those brackets are about as good a shield against reality as the top of a mid-century classroom desk was against an incoming ballistic missile.
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4 days ago
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Nuclear war is getting more likely by the week
In today's edition: Post Opinions is embarking on a new series in which experts from the Federation of American Scientists examine the threat of nuclear conflict. I would love to tell you that these experts argue that 'today's global nuclear landscape is far [less] complicated and, in many ways, [less] precarious than during the Cold War' — but, unfortunately, those brackets are about as good a shield against reality as the top of a mid-century classroom desk was against an incoming ballistic missile.
Washington Post
5 days ago
- Washington Post
Why we should worry about nuclear weapons again
Over the past 30 years, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the prospect of nuclear war has faded from the American consciousness. With the end of the Cold War, films depicting the last days of humanity, such as 1959's 'On the Beach,' or the 1983 TV drama 'The Day After,' largely disappeared from the Hollywood playbook. Schoolchildren no longer hid under their desks during practice drills to survive nuclear war. But the weapons never went away. While thousands were scrapped and nuclear inventories were significantly reduced, many other weapons were put into storage and still thousands more remain deployed, ready for use. Now, they and the dangers they pose are making a comeback. The last nuclear age was defined by two superpowers — the United States and the Soviet Union — poised to destroy one another in less than an hour. They both kept nuclear weapons locked and loaded to deter the other by threatening retaliation and certain destruction. Today's global nuclear landscape is far more complicated and, in many ways, more precarious. More countries and more advanced technologies are involved. Weapons can fly farther, faster, from more places. Information, accurate or false, can move even more quickly. Autocrats and extremists hold positions of power in nuclear-armed countries. Nuclear threats, once taboo, are now increasingly common. And the last nuclear arms control treaty still in force between Russia and the United States expires in February. The next nuclear age This article is the first in a series by experts from the Federation of American Scientists examining why today's global nuclear landscape is far more complicated and, in many ways, more precarious than during the Cold War. Previous Next Many of the most dangerous ideas from the Cold War are being resurrected: lower-yield weapons to fight 'limited' nuclear wars; blockbuster missiles that could destroy multiple targets at once; the redeploying of a whole class of missiles once banned and destroyed by treaty. On top of this, countries are testing new ways to deliver these weapons, including nuclear-powered cruise missiles that can fly for days before hitting their targets; underwater unmanned nuclear torpedoes; fast-flying, maneuverable glide vehicles that can evade defenses; and nuclear weapons in space that can attack satellites or targets on Earth without warning. Our organization, the Federation of American Scientists, was created by the same people who invented the atomic bomb at Los Alamos to ensure that when policy was made, it was informed by science and technical facts. For 80 years, we have sought to promote public accountability and transparency about nuclear arsenals. Relying only on unclassified information, including satellite imagery and government data, we maintain the world's most accurate publicly available estimates of the world's nuclear arsenals. Now that the nuclear threat has roared back to life, we believe it is our responsibility to provide accurate, nonpartisan information to help reduce the risk of nuclear disaster. We underestimate that risk at our collective peril. Story continues below advertisement Advertisement 'At this moment in human history,' the Nobel Committee said in announcing last year's Peace Prize, 'it is worth reminding ourselves what nuclear weapons are: the most destructive weapons the world has ever seen.' The prize went to Nihon Hidankyo, an association of survivors of the U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 — the only time nuclear weapons have ever been used in wartime. The numbers Nine nations now have nuclear weapons: Russia, the United States, Britain, China, France, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Together, they possess more than 12,200 nuclear warheads, located at approximately 120 sites in 14 countries. More than 9,500 are militarily active or deployed, ready for use. Roughly 2,100 of those are on high alert and can be launched in minutes and reach any point on the planet in less than half an hour. United States United States 3,700 warheads (2024) Russia Russia 4,309 warheads (2024) China China 600 warheads (2024) France France 290 warheads (2024) Britain Britain 225 warheads (2024) India India 180 warheads (2024) Pakistan Pakistan 170 warheads (2024) Israel Israel 90 warheads (2024) N. Korea North Korea 50 warheads (2024) 1945 1965 1985 2005 2025 2024 1995 2015 Color bands represent the estimated nuclear arsenal of each country. 1k 5K 10K at approx. 40,159 in 1986. at approx. 31,255 in 1967. Russia's warheads peaked The United States' warheads peaked Source: Federation of American Scientists. Note: The number of warheads charted is as precise as possible and based on open-source information. Russia and the U.S. have long been the dominant nuclear powers. Today, nearly 90 percent of all warheads belong to them. Russia's current arsenal is the largest, followed by the U.S. Both nations have thousands of warheads awaiting dismantlement. Russia and the U.S. also remain the only two countries that have capped their nuclear arsenals through negotiated treaties and agreements, beginning in 1972. The last of that long string of agreements is the New START Treaty completed in 2010. Under New START, they are each limited to 1,550 deployed strategic weapons on land, at sea, and in the air. Once New START goes away, there will be no limits on the number of weapons the U.S. or Russia can deploy. Or, for that matter, on any of the other seven nuclear states. We survived the U.S.-Soviet arms race that defined the Cold War through a combination of deterrence, determination and luck. And though other countries have nuclear weapons, the size of China's arsenal is starting to cause major global concerns. Its dramatic growth makes this a much more dangerous world. Nuclear analysts like to refer to the U.S.-Russia-China nuclear dynamic as the three-body problem. This stems from the classic physics phenomenon: the gravitational interaction between three objects is exponentially more difficult to predict than between two. Even if the U.S. and Russia could again agree to limit their nuclear forces, the growth of China's capabilities could drive them both to pursue more weapons, throwing any limits into doubt. But this is not just a three-body problem; it's a nine-body problem, and it defies simple explanation or solutions. Addressing the dangers of this new nuclear reality will take more than relearning old lessons, because the ways in which these weapons are being deployed, could be delivered and the technologies they rely on are all evolving day by day. Instead of capping or limiting national missile defenses, as was done from 1972 to 2002, the U.S., Russia and China are developing more capable defenses — including the highly ambitious 'golden dome' missile defense system President Donald Trump announced recently. At the same time, multiple nuclear-armed countries are developing highly maneuverable hypersonic weapons that can carry nuclear payloads and take unpredictable pathways to their targets to evade missile protection systems. Russia and China are also both building new long-range missiles with multiple warheads that could hit multiple targets — reversing a major effort to limit such weapons during the Cold War. Both countries are also reportedly developing options to put nuclear weapons in space to attack satellites and/or targets on the ground. And the U.S. is considering building even more ways of delivering nuclear weapons, including with sea-launched cruise missiles capable of reaching Russia, China and beyond. It is as if the lessons of the Cold War — that there is never a finish line to the arms race and that more effective nuclear weapons do not lead to stability and security — have been forgotten by the current generation of defense planners. Finally, there is growing concern that Russia, China, the U.S. and even North Korea plan to use artificial intelligence to help manage their nuclear arsenals. Statements by the U.S. and China to keep a 'human in the loop' are designed to reassure, but AI is already being used in conventional military planning and nuclear-related early warning and detection. No one knows how this new technology will ultimately affect nuclear strategy. Many of the nuclear nations hold complex, intertwining deterrence relationships with one another. The U.S.-Russia nuclear rivalry, for example, inherently involves NATO allies Britain and France, both of whom maintain limited but significant nuclear forces. China is not only worried about U.S. action in the Pacific and about Russia, but also has a simmering border conflict and rivalry with nuclear-armed India, with the two sides shooting at each other as recently as 2021. And despite appearances, neither North Korea nor China truly trusts the intentions of the other. Pyongyang's tilt toward Russia has deepened these suspicions. India, for its part, has a long-standing conflict with Pakistan, and its ability to launch a rapid conventional invasion across the India-Pakistan border is an important driver for Pakistan's nuclear program. In May, both sides launched strikes against each others' bases, prompting serious fears of regional nuclear escalation. And in 2024, the Biden Administration publicly said that Pakistan was developing an intercontinental range missile that could eventually reach the United States. Russia India Britain Pakistan France North Korea United States Israel China The U.S.-Russia nuclear rivalry, for example, inherently involves NATO allies Britain and France, both of which maintain limited but significant nuclear forces. Russia India Britain Pakistan France North Korea United States Israel China China is not only worried about U.S. action in the Pacific and about Russia, but also has a simmering border conflict and rivalry with nuclear-armed India, with the two sides shooting at each other as recently as 2021. And despite appearances, neither North Korea nor China truly trusts the intentions of the other. Pyongyang's tilt toward Russia has deepened these suspicions. Russia Britain India Pakistan France North Korea United States Israel China India, for its part, has a long-standing conflict with Pakistan, and its ability to launch a rapid conventional invasion across the India-Pakistan border is an important driver for Pakistan's nuclear program. In May, both sides launched strikes against each others' bases, prompting serious fears of regional nuclear escalation. And in 2024, the Biden Administration publicly said that Pakistan was developing an intercontinental range missile that could eventually reach the United States. Russia India Britain Pakistan France North Korea United States Israel China The U.S.-Russia nuclear rivalry, for example, inherently involves NATO allies Britain and France, both of which maintain limited but significant nuclear forces. Russia India Britain Pakistan France United States North Korea Israel China China is not only worried about U.S. action in the Pacific and about Russia, but also has a simmering border conflict and rivalry with nuclear-armed India, with the two sides shooting at each other as recently as 2021. And despite appearances, neither North Korea nor China truly trusts the intentions of the other. Pyongyang's tilt toward Russia has deepened these suspicions. Russia Britain India Pakistan France North Korea United States Israel China India, for its part, has a long-standing conflict with Pakistan, and its ability to launch a rapid conventional invasion across the India-Pakistan border is an important driver for Pakistan's nuclear program. In May, both sides launched strikes against each others' bases, prompting serious fears of regional nuclear escalation. And in 2024, the Biden Administration publicly said that Pakistan was developing an intercontinental range missile that could eventually reach the United States. Russia India Britain Pakistan France North Korea United States Israel China The U.S.-Russia nuclear rivalry, for example, inherently involves NATO allies Britain and France, both of which maintain limited but significant nuclear forces. Russia India Britain Pakistan France North Korea United States Israel China China is not only worried about U.S. action in the Pacific and about Russia, but also has a simmering border conflict and rivalry with nuclear-armed India, with the two sides shooting at each other as recently as 2021. And despite appearances, neither North Korea nor China truly trusts the intentions of the other. Pyongyang's tilt toward Russia has deepened these suspicions. Russia Britain India Pakistan France North Korea United States Israel China India, for its part, has a long-standing conflict with Pakistan, and its ability to launch a rapid conventional invasion across the India-Pakistan border is an important driver for Pakistan's nuclear program. In May, both sides launched strikes against each others' bases, prompting serious fears of regional nuclear escalation. And in 2024, the Biden Administration publicly said that Pakistan was developing an intercontinental range missile that could eventually reach the United States. Russia India Britain The U.S.-Russia nuclear rivalry, for example, inherently involves NATO allies Britain and France, both of which maintain limited but significant nuclear forces. Pakistan France North Korea United States Israel China Russia India Britain China is not only worried about U.S. action in the Pacific and about Russia, but also has a simmering border conflict and rivalry with nuclear-armed India, with the two sides shooting at each other as recently as 2021. And despite appearances, neither North Korea nor China truly trusts the intentions of the other. Pyongyang's tilt toward Russia has deepened these suspicions. Pakistan France United States North Korea Israel China Russia India, for its part, has a long-standing conflict with Pakistan, and its ability to launch a rapid conventional invasion across the India-Pakistan border is an important driver for Pakistan's nuclear program. In May, both sides launched strikes against each others' bases, prompting serious fears of regional nuclear escalation. And in 2024, the Biden Administration publicly said that Pakistan was developing an intercontinental range missile that could eventually reach the United States. Britain India Pakistan France North Korea United States Israel China And the number of nuclear states might not stop at nine. We might be entering an age in which nuclear weapons spread rapidly to friend and foe alike. Iran is now within weeks of having enough material for its first nuclear weapon and could decide to go nuclear at any time. If so, Saudi Arabia would likely follow suit. And U.S. allies in East Asia and Europe, worried about long-term American commitment to their security, might decide to pursue their own independent nuclear arsenals. Story continues below advertisement Advertisement The total power of the warheads in the nine nuclear-armed states is an inconceivable destructive force: equivalent to more than 4.8 trillion pounds of TNT — or more than 145,000 Hiroshima bombs. A single U.S. strategic submarine can carry enough warheads to destroy any country, and detonation of a few hundred weapons could propel enough dust and soot into the air to block sunshine, cool the atmosphere and halt crops from growing — 'nuclear winter.' Such a sequence of events would lead to worldwide famine. In her 2024 bestseller, 'Nuclear War: A Scenario,' Annie Jacobsen draws on scientific research to describe a postapocalyptic world in which cities and forests burn, temperatures plunge, lakes and rivers freeze, crops and farm animals die, toxic chemicals poison the air, people succumb to radiation poisoning or disease. 'Only time will tell if we humans will survive,' she writes. Everyone makes mistakes The next nuclear age will bring severe new tests. Without restraint, nations will be building ever more nuclear weapons, and the chances of mistakes or miscalculations will grow. Each of the nine countries' leaders and the systems they use to control nuclear weapons will have to get every decision right every time. Deterrence theory relies on the assumption that decision-makers are rational actors. In recent years, we've seen leaders such as Russia's Vladimir Putin and North Korea's Kim Jong Un increasingly willing to use the manipulation of nuclear risk as a tool of coercion — an unsettling departure from the past. And in 2021, Trump's own chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Mark A. Milley, intervened to guard against any effort by Trump to use nuclear weapons in the waning days of his first term. Can we trust that leaders won't make decisions based purely on emotion or instinct? And can we trust that these leaders, many of whom operate in authoritarian contexts surrounded by yes men, are receiving accurate information that they can use to make reasoned and deliberate decisions? Aside from intentional nuclear attacks, accidents can happen. And they have. In March 2022, India accidentally launched an unarmed missile toward Pakistan — where it landed, damaging a parking lot but causing no casualties. India blamed a 'technical malfunction.' Story continues below advertisement Advertisement In 1979 and 1980, while the Cold War was in full swing, the U.S. early-warning system produced five false alarms of nuclear attack. Several showed dozens or hundreds of Soviet missiles heading toward the United States. Repeatedly, the president's 'doomsday plane' — kept at the ready as a mobile command center in case of nuclear war — was readied for takeoff. The errors were caused by a training tape wrongly inserted into a console, and by the failure of a single computer chip. At least one similar false alarm occurred on the Soviet side in the tense months of autumn 1983. In all cases, cooler heads prevailed, but will they in the future? In an undated photo, the exterior of the PAVE PAWS early-warning radar system is seen at Beale Air Force Base near Marysville, California. (Joseph Scott Murphey/Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division) At the same time, many of the 20th-century agreements to limit nuclear arms have been torn apart, and countries appear to be much more interested in blaming and shaming their rivals than engaging in good-faith negotiations. The stakes of inaction could not be higher: Once the New START treaty expires next February, Russia and the U.S. will enter an era without limits on their nuclear forces for the first time in over 50 years. Time to wake up At the height of the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet stockpiles of nuclear warheads together reached 70,000. Arms limitation treaties as well as countries acting on their own brought that number way down. Then, when the Soviet Union collapsed, many observers thought the threat of nuclear war was history. But the nuclear threat remained. In 1994, for example, the U.S. adopted a nuclear policy of 'lead, but hedge,' meaning the U.S. would promote nonproliferation and reduce its bloated arsenal, but keep many of the modern strategic nuclear weapons intact. Russia followed suit, as did Britain, France and China. The U.S. and Russia did reduce the total overall size of the strategic arsenals, eliminating thousands of nuclear weapons. (Most of them were well past retirement age.) And to prevent weapons from the former Soviet Union from falling into the hands of other states or terrorist groups, the U.S. and Russia agreed to remove smaller, battlefield nuclear weapons away from the field, submarines and surface ships. The two countries also signed agreements every decade or so to increase the transparency over their arsenals and cap the number of longer-range weapons each could deploy. Signing ceremonies and speeches reassured their own people and the world that the threat of nuclear war was diminishing. Yet, all the while, every nuclear state planned for, exercised and prepared for the prospect of a nuclear war, the battlefield weapons destined for scrap were sometimes kept, or even replaced with newer versions. Story continues below advertisement Advertisement The brief period of cooperation between the United States and Russia began to fray at any number of key turning points, including President George W. Bush's withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, Putin's angry denunciation of the West at the Munich Security Conference in 2007, Russia's violation and America's subsequent withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or Russia's seizure of Crimea in 2014. The future Chinese nuclear buildup, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and repeated nuclear threats have caused many to call for the United States to enhance and even increase its nuclear arsenal. Trump will likely speed this up. Without working treaties, legal limits or a mutual agreement to cap their forces, both the United States and Russia could double their deployed nuclear arsenals in a year or two without building a single new weapon. Each country could simply move several hundred warheads out of storage and redeploy them on missiles, bombers and submarines. Such a sprint to rebuild would be easily detectable, via both commercial satellite imagery and classified intelligence sources. The pressure on both states to upload faster than the other — and the mutual perception that the other state's uploading was designed to achieve nuclear superiority — could trigger nuclear threats or ultimatums. In a time of crisis those events could lead to nuclear conflict. President Barack Obama, left, shakes hands with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev after the two leaders signed the New START treaty in Prague in April 2010. (Dmitry Astakhov/AFP/Getty Images) While buildups proceed, nations are becoming more secretive about their nuclear weapons. During the first Trump administration, the U.S. reversed nearly a decade of transparency measures and refused to declassify the size of the American nuclear stockpile — a previously annual practice during Barack Obama's administration. Britain immediately followed suit, in a highly out-of-character move from one of the most transparent nuclear-armed states. Our organization advocated that the Biden administration declassify its arsenal numbers, which it did in 2024 — a practice Trump will undoubtedly roll back. Previous arms-control agreements, including New START, included transparency measures that required states to exchange data about their nuclear forces, as well as verification mechanisms. Those have all since been discarded or are soon to expire. This has had immediate implications for the ability of Russia and the United States to understand the sizes of each other's arsenals. With access to the New START data, for years, our team was able to calculate the size and breakdown of both countries' nuclear arsenals, in some cases down to the individual launcher types. We haven't had access to this data in more than 2½ years. The era of nuclear reductions is over. Every nuclear country is improving its weapons systems, while some are growing their arsenals. Others are doing both. This is how an arms race starts. Each state takes action it deems necessary to address a weakness, while others view those moves with suspicion or fear, triggering their own action. Story continues below advertisement Advertisement Surviving this new nuclear age will require the constant and informed attention of leaders, policymakers and engaged citizens alike. Getting that attention is harder than ever, as there are now multiple global risks competing for attention and action — from climate change to global pandemics, to rising inequality and mass migration. Yet none of these threatens the sudden and complete destruction of human civilization the way nuclear weapons do. In the early 1980s, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in Europe and the United States to demand a nuclear freeze. These mass movements, coupled with the vision of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, ended the last arms race. Without renewed public pressure or political will, the world is condemned to live under the shadow of nuclear annihilation. We deserve better. Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight-Boyle, senior research assistants at FAS, contributed to this piece.
