China's dying EV batteries, solar cells are powering a circular economy in new-energy era
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And in the new-energy era, his map leads to exhausted lithium-ion batteries – veritable troves of reusable resources that are supercharging profits at Ma's company, a maker of solid-waste-recycling equipment in central China.
Pricey components such as lithium – a silvery-white alkali metal aptly nicknamed 'white gold' – along with other materials such as cobalt and nickel, hold their value beyond the life of the batteries powering China's massive electric-vehicle (EV) industry.
'There is huge potential in the business of new-energy waste, because new energy is where China and the world are going,' said the sales manager at a subsidiary of Henan Hairui Intelligent Technology in Zhengzhou, Henan province.
Speaking at a recent trade fair for environmental technologies in Shanghai, Ma said 70 per cent of his company's business is dedicated to machines for recycling batteries and solar panels.
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As more and more batteries and solar panels reach the end of their life cycle in China – a global leader in renewable-energy deployment – Chinese businesses like Ma's are embracing a circular economy, where materials are reused and reintroduced into new products, reducing waste and conserving resources.
And with valuable metals comprising essential components in many of today's fast-growing, clean-energy technologies, the cycle is especially meaningful in terms of improving China's mineral independence as it navigates intensifying global trade tensions, according to some analysts.
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AllAfrica
an hour ago
- AllAfrica
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US President Donald Trump's 90-day extension of a tariff truce with China while tightening the screws on India is rooted in the cold arithmetic of open macroeconomics – where the balance of real economic power, supply chain leverage and strategic resources determines who can endure a trade war and who must yield. In 2024, the United States ran a US$295.5 billion goods trade deficit with China, a function of China's dominance in manufacturing and its role as the world's low-cost supplier of electronics, machinery and intermediate goods. Roughly 30% of US imports originated in China, embedding a structural dependency that tariffs alone could not unravel without provoking inflation and supply chain chaos at home. Trump's peak tariff threat of 145% on Chinese imports was a negotiating tactic, not a path to decoupling. The macroeconomic reality was unavoidable: the United States consumes what China produces, and China produces at a scale and price that sustains US price stability. By May 2025, the so-called 'truce' reducing tariffs to 30% acknowledged that the costs of a prolonged tariff war would fall squarely on US consumers, industries and markets. China's $3.59 trillion export machine is not merely large; it is diversified and resilient. In 2024, despite punitive tariffs, Beijing maintained a $262.33 billion total goods and services trade surplus with the US, offsetting losses by diverting goods to ASEAN, Europe and Belt and Road Initiative partners. Its sheer export scale—nearly 30 times India's—allows it to absorb shocks that would cripple smaller economies. When Washington escalated tariffs, Beijing countered with up to 125% duties on US farm products, hitting Trump's electoral base. This capacity to impose politically targeted retaliation, while sustaining export growth, forced Trump into the Geneva negotiations of May 2025 to stabilize trade flows and global GDP projections, which had slid to 2.8% amid market turbulence. For the US, continued escalation risked not only consumer price spikes but also investor panic, as evidenced by a 3% drop in the S&P 500 during the tariff peak of 2025. The yuan, unlike the rupee, is a controlled currency, enabling Beijing to offset tariff impacts through managed depreciation—5% against the dollar in 2024—keeping its exports competitive without triggering domestic instability. This monetary lever is a powerful macroeconomic equalizer in trade conflicts, one India simply does not possess. Washington's August 2025 extension of the tariff ceasefire implicitly recognized China's ability to neutralize tariff pressure through currency policy, ensuring that US tariffs could not structurally undermine Chinese competitiveness without self-inflicted inflation. Critical supply chains cemented China's negotiating position. In 2024, 60% of U.S. semiconductor imports came from China or Chinese-affiliated networks. Beijing's dominance in rare earths and strategic minerals—the indispensable inputs for high-tech, energy, and defense industries—means that any prolonged disruption would raise US production costs in technology and automotive sectors by 10–15%. In open macroeconomics, the ability to choke an adversary's production chain is as potent as controlling oil in the 1970s. China wields that leverage; India does not. Trump could threaten tariffs of theatrical proportions, but Beijing could quietly remind Washington that it sits atop the supply of critical minerals without which the 'real' US economy—production of goods, services, energy, raw materials and technology—cannot function. Trump's 'madman' tariff brinkmanship was designed to extract concessions, but it met a near-peer in China—a $1 trillion trade surplus economy in 2024 with $3.4 trillion in reserves, 5% GDP growth and diversified markets. By contrast, US inflation had climbed to 4.2% in 2025 under tariff pressure, and farm-state discontent was mounting. The June 2025 agreement, which included expanded US agricultural exports to China, was less a victory than an admission that the world's largest manufacturing economy could not be coerced into submission by tariff policy alone. India's predicament is the mirror opposite. With a $3.9 trillion GDP in 2024—about one-fifth of China's—its real economy lacks the scale to withstand a full-spectrum trade confrontation with the United States. Its $87 billion in exports to the US, equal to 2% of GDP, are concentrated in vulnerable sectors like pharmaceuticals, textiles, and IT services. Trump's 50% tariff regime (a 25% baseline plus 25% penalty for Russian oil imports) jeopardizes $40 billion in annual export revenue. 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With $700 billion in reserves—a fraction of China's—India lacks the firepower to defend its currency or subsidize export industries for long. India's core Inflation, already at 4.5% in 2025, could easily breach 7% under sustained tariff shocks, while the fiscal deficit of 5.1% of GDP leaves little room for counter-cyclical spending. China, by contrast, could deploy $500 billion in economic stimulus in 2024 without risking fiscal credibility. The domestic political economy amplifies India's fragility. The 2–3 million jobs at risk from US tariffs on leather, gems, and other labor-intensive exports would fuel immediate political unrest in a democratic system sensitive to price shocks and unemployment. Beijing can suppress dissent and stretch a trade war over electoral cycles; New Delhi must answer to voters far sooner. This structural asymmetry in political tolerance is a critical, if rarely stated, element of trade resilience. Geopolitically, India has blundered. 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Liu Yue, deputy director at China's Academy of Macroeconomic Research (AMR), and Yuan Qian, a researcher at the AMR, co-wrote an article on August 6 stating that China encourages and supports Chinese manufacturers to move overseas. They said the relocation should be of high quality, meaning that manufacturers should localize their workforce, understand local markets, and invest in research and development. They said China's professional groups and industry associations should also support companies going overseas. China's state media widely circulated Liu's article. Zheng Yijun, the general manager of a Chongqing-based logistics firm, told state-owned Phoenix TV that when the US imposed 145% tariffs on imports from China, many Chinese manufacturers accelerated their plans to move to Vietnam, creating new logistics demand for his firm. 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HKFP
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