Trump's threats shift Quebec's views on independence ahead of Canada vote
Trump's broadsides against America's northern neighbor, and his avowed aim of making it the 51st state, have pushed people all over the country to reconsider what being Canadian means in the 21st century — a rethinking given added impetus by fast-approaching general elections.
Contrary to expectations, Quebec — the French-speaking province that loves to set itself apart from Canada's majority — has been among the most fervent adopters of the new patriotic sentiment.
"It's crazy, in just a few weeks I've evolved about a lot of things — I feel very Canadian," Carole Potvin said as she sat drinking a coffee in a Montreal neighborhood that is a stronghold of the pro-independence Bloc Quebecois party.
"We felt under threat, and to face up to the American enemy it seems clear to me that we must be united," she added, speaking in French.
The language, along with Quebec's distinct culture and political history, has nurtured dreams of independence.
The province's most recent referendum on breaking away was held in 1995 — although until recently many hoped a new one could take place soon.
For some, the weeks since Trump's inauguration south of the border have changed everything.
"I was long in favor of Quebec being independent, but I think it's a waste of time in today's world," said Potvin's partner, Pierre Choiniere. "When you're up against the U.S., you have to be big and strong," he added.
The proportion of Quebecers telling pollsters they were "proud" or "very proud" to be Canadian surged from 45% in December 2024 to 58% just two months later.
Those saying they were "very proud" increased even more than the overall figure — although Quebecers' overall "proud" ratio remains the lowest in Canada.
Such numbers have unsettled the Bloc Quebecois, which stands candidates for election only in the Francophone province.
Until autumn it had been counting on increased support in the April 28 national election, after securing 33 seats in Canada's parliament in 2021.
The party "has never faced such strong headwinds," said political veteran Regis Labeaume, mayor of Quebec City from 2007-21.
"It's not easy to position yourself when Canadian solidarity is growing," the pro-independence politician added. "Many people are going to vote tactically, not with their hearts" this time around, he said.
Labeaume sees the change as resulting clearly from voters' shock at Trump's threats to Canadian prosperity and sovereignty.
"As Quebecers and Canadians we've never seen war, we've never been afraid for our physical integrity, so that explains these threats being a huge shock," Labeaume said. "People are flabbergasted."
Other separatists, meanwhile, are trying to see the glass as half-full.
"Even when we're facing serious threats, almost one-third of people want Quebec's independence," said Camille Goyette-Gingras, president of separatist federation Oui Quebec. "Our province is different, including economically, from the rest of Canada, and so we'd benefit from being able to defend ourselves," she added.
Despite such arguments, the Bloc Quebecois looks set to glean just 25% of the province's vote in the coming elections, according to the latest polls.
That could leave the separatists with roughly half the number of seats they won last time around — a mere five to 6% of the national result.
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Even with the recent issues involving lithium projects, China may have more opportunity to invest due to the weakened state of Chile's Codelco, the state-owned mining company that is a critical player in Chilean copper and lithium. As reported in December 2024, Codelco's debt has ballooned to over $20 billion with production hitting a historic 25-year low in 2022. Beyond the mining sector, China is having a significant – albeit indirect – impact on Chile's transportation sector. Chile's largest port, the Port of Valparaíso handles 11.5 million tons of cargo a year. In 2024, Valparaíso exported 31 percent of its cargo to Asia – primarily China. Chile has plans to expand the port, which is owned by the state company EMPORCHI, including adding cargo terminals, extending cruise terminals, and expanding the flow of cargo ships. The goal is for the port to maintain competitiveness with the region. And the competition is fierce following the inauguration of the Chinese-built Chancay port in Peru. Chancay's rise may cut into the traffic heading for Chilean ports like Valparaiso. The new 'Chancay Express' connects the Chilean ports of Lirquen and San Antonio to Peru's port. Essentially, the route allows for Chilean goods to be shipped to China via Peru's Pacific coast, reducing shipping times from 35 days to 23 and cutting costs by 30 percent. Unlike Chilean ports, Chancay can handle Ultra Large Container Vessels (ULCVs) which means it has a double advantage: it can handle much more cargo on top of having shorter travel time to Beijing. For Beijing, it is clear Chancay is a vital transit hub not just for Peru but for all of Latin America. In addition to the Chancay Express linking Chile to Peru, China has revitalized negotiation for a trans-oceanic railway that would carry cargo from Brazil to Chancay. China's economic activity in Chile is thus a double-edged sword. Chinese companies have been making unprecedented investments in Chile's critical resources, yet at the same time, China's actions in other parts of Latin America, particularly its promotion of Chancay port in Peru, could undercut Chile's economy. Chile's upcoming election will be crucial for the future of the country's economy – and its ties to China. Jeannette Jara has been surging dramatically after the recent primaries. She is polling at 26 percent, putting her on top at the moment, although Jara is closely followed by Kast at 22 percent. Of the many issues these two candidates face, ensuring the future of Chilean mining will be key for economic growth – especially with the bleeding assets of Codelco. Kast aims to open Codelco to private capital in the hopes of allowing boosting production and restoring revenue growth. His plan includes selling non-core assets to pay Codelco's debts while focusing on operational efficiency and not state revenue. Given China's track record of investing in Chile's natural resources, Chinese firms would likely be keen to take part in the bidding. On the other hand, Jara opposes the deal between Codelco and SQM, instead calling for a new public company to aid in developing lithium resources. Codelco is a copper-mining company, and Jara aims to create a new state-owned firm playing a similar role for lithium resources. That would have implications for China, given its minority stake in SQM. On foreign policy specifically, Jara has emphasized 'not wanting Chile subordinated to foreign government or external models' and emphasizes human rights. She has made no explicit statements about China in this regard. Instead, Jara noted that her foreign policy goal is diversification of trade and multilateralism, focusing on expanding ties with China, India, and Latin America. However, Kast, the incumbent president, has been strongly aligned with Western powers. He is particularly in sync with Trumpian positions such as removing Chile from the United Nations Human Rights Council and opposing immigration, LGBT rights, or any policies he views as 'communist.' With these very different individuals running for office, Chile is at a crossroads. While Chinese investment won't be top of mind for the average voter, the next president will determine the extent of China's influence in the country's economy.
The Diplomat
10 hours ago
- The Diplomat
China Calls on Cambodia and Thailand to Resolve Border Conflict
China stands ready to help Thailand and Cambodia resolve their bitter border dispute, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said yesterday, after convening a three-way meeting with the countries' foreign ministers in Yunnan province. The meeting between Wang, Thai Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa, and Cambodian Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn took place on the sidelines of the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Anning, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement. The three envoys 'had a friendly and candid communication over the conflict along the border between Cambodia and Thailand in a harmonious atmosphere,' and they 'agreed to keep communication channels open through a flexible approach,' the statement said, as per China Daily. The Foreign Ministry also said that Wang held separate one-on-one meetings with Maris and Sokhonn, which covered the border dispute as well as other issues of bilateral concern. On July 28, Cambodia and Thailand agreed to a ceasefire that ended five days of fierce fighting, which killed at least 43 people and displaced more than 300,000 on both sides of the border. The two sides followed this up with a meeting of their bilateral General Border Committee in Malaysia on August 7, at which they agreed to a number of means of de-escalating tensions. Among these were mutual pledges to freeze border troop movements and patrols, not to reinforce their positions along the border, and 'not to undertake provocative actions that may escalate tensions.' However, the situation remains febrile, with both nations trading near-daily accusations of ceasefire violations, often with reference to territorial claims that are not internationally recognized. Wang said that China 'supports Cambodia and Thailand in engaging in dialogue, clearing misunderstandings, rebuilding mutual trust and restoring normal exchanges and cooperation,' the China Daily reported. China also promised support and assistance for landmine clearance in the border areas of Cambodia and Thailand, and the three ministers agreed to continue communication in a 'flexible manner.' Beijing also hoped for the stabilization of relations between the two nations and the reopening of border crossings as soon as possible, Wang said. Chinese officials have been present as observers at the recent bilateral talks, along with their American counterparts, and China's Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong hosted an informal trilateral meeting with representatives from both nations in Shanghai on July 30. During the meeting, both Cambodia and Thailand 'reaffirmed their commitment to the ceasefire consensus and expressed appreciation for China's positive role in de-escalating the situation,' the Global Times reported. Yesterday's meetings could signal a Chinese desire to play a more active role in mediating the conflict. Despite enjoying good relations with both Thailand and Cambodia, China has been somewhat upstaged in this respect by the United States. President Donald Trump was widely credited with pushing Thailand and Cambodia to agree to the initial ceasefire on July 28 by threatening to withhold tariff deals if they did not cease hostilities. (Cambodia later nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his role.) However, since securing relatively competitive 'final' tariffs of 19 percent, the two nations have continued to spar over the border issues, making a return to hostilities a very real prospect. In any event, the mistrust between the Thai and Cambodian governments remains at such a high pitch, and the issue has now become an issue of such salience to domestic politics in both nations that Beijing will have to do a lot more to reverse the deterioration of the relationship that has taken place over the past few months.
