Why India needs to play hardball on UNSC reform
Unlike in the past, where Indian diplomacy played a very small role in shaping institutions, this time we should be among the key rule-makers, and not just in name. The world order that emerged after World War 2 was largely influenced by America, and, to some extent, by Europe and Russia. Whether it is the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Bank, or the International Monetary Fund, India does not significantly influence decisions of any of these bodies in any way, despite being the most populous country in the world, and, by some accounts, the fourth-largest economy. It wasn't only India that lost out. The two defeated nations in that war, Germany and Japan, despite becoming major powers a few decades later, did not get their due in the power structure either.
In a crumbling world order, where the so-called rules-based institutions have been mangled out of shape by recalcitrant big powers, why shouldn't India take its own little hammer and knock some portions off the edifice? When a structure is creaking, isn't it better to accelerate its fall rather than seeking temporary shelter under it?
While four of the five permanent members agree that India must join the UNSC, China has been against it. The US may not formally object, but is willing to let China be the bad guy in this case.
Time to gatecrash
When the powerful are not willing to open the gates for the deserving, it is time to gatecrash and make oneself heard. A few things can be done, one with the partners, and the other on our own.
The G4 foreign ministers meeting, held at the margins of the 79th Session of the UN General Assembly in September last year, made another pitch for changes in the UNSC, both by expanding its permanent and rotating memberships.
The appeal has, as always, fallen on deaf ears, as China has no interest in allowing India or Japan to join the league of permanent members.
It is now time to start forcing the issue. But the question is how?
Three things can be done fairly quickly, in sequence.
One, a summit of the G4 prime ministers must endorse the call for UNSC reform and set a deadline for change in its structure, failing which they will act. It must force the P5 to listen and change.
Two, to signal serious intent, secretariats for the G4 outlining UN reform can be created in Delhi and Bonn (Germany), with the purpose of engaging not only among themselves, but also to consult more members who want change. Pressure must be built to create a new charter for the UNSC, where it has wider powers to stop small wars and where no single power can veto action. A graded majority of veto-wielding powers would be needed to stop (or start) action. At least two of the five current members may object to that, but we must start piling the pressure on the P5.
Three, even if it is not joined by the other three in the G4, India should prepare for unilateral action by saying that it will no longer be bound by UNSC decisions unless it is part of the process. This could, in fact, lead to temporary sanctions, but merely talking and doing nothing is not an option. The US imposed sanctions on India soon after the Pokhran 2 nuclear tests in 1998. But within a few years, it was forced to change course. Today, there is even less chance that the US or China can even jointly enforce any sanctions, given how poorly sanctions have worked against Iran and even Russia.
Also read: No more lip service on UNSC reforms—it's time to form an implementation roadmap
'Netaji redux'
Kishore Mahbubani, a former Singapore diplomat, who is usually an expert on Chinese affairs and critical of Western policies toward China, says that India can, and should, force the issue. He pointed out, in an interview with The Times of India last year, that the UNSC was forced to back off when unfair resolutions were imposed on Libya in 1998. When the Organisation of African Unity declined to accept it, the Council backtracked. 'The UNSC will also blink if India were to defy UN resolutions,' Mahbubani said.
India needs to play hardball on UN reform from now on.
Thanks to Donald Trump's shenanigans, where both friends and foes have been treated badly, and China's growing military power and dominance in manufacturing and tech economy, most countries feel threatened enough to seek change. Germany and Japan are remilitarising. They are looking beyond an unpredictable US to widen military cooperation and build economic partnerships that will gradually reduce over-dependence on China.
India should be offering co-development, joint ownership, and even outright purchases of military and other equipment to force change. German and Japanese investments in India must be fast-tracked.
Let's call this Netaji redux. In the 1940s, when India was still under British rule, Subhas Chandra Bose struck up links with Germany and Japan to help free India. It was doomed to fail, as it happened when the war was beginning to turn in favour of the Allies, and most Indian leaders balked at the idea of supporting warmongers like Hitler and Hideki Tojo. Today, neither Germany nor Japan, both solid democracies, belong in the 'League of the Bad'. It is time to rebuild this partnership for both defence and economic development.
The G4 must rise for the P5 misrule, based purely on narrow interests, to end.
R Jagannathan is the former editorial director, Swarajya magazine. He tweets @TheJaggi. Views are personal.
(Edited by Aamaan Alam Khan)
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