"Pollution Should Be The Criteria": Minister On Old Vehicles' Ban In Delhi
The Delhi government has approached the Supreme Court seeking a review of its 2018 order, which bans diesel vehicles older than 10 years and petrol vehicles older than 15 years in the Delhi-NCR region. The petition argues that the age-based ban is outdated and unfairly targets even roadworthy, non-polluting vehicles, hitting middle-class owners the hardest.
The plea comes amid growing backlash over the Commission for Air Quality Management's (CAQM) July order to stop fuel supply to vehicles that fall under the "end-of-life" category. That order has now been deferred till November 1 after strong public opposition and intervention by the Delhi government.
Environment Minister Manjinder Singh Sirsa confirmed the development, saying the situation has changed significantly since 2018.
"The situation of 2025 is totally different from 2018, and there are many modern technologies available now. We want to apprise the honourable court, and that's why we have filed the review," Mr Sirsa told NDTV.
Mr Sirsa added, "If a vehicle is polluting, it should be banned, regardless of whether it's five years old or fifteen. Pollution should be the criteria, not the age of the vehicle."
The petition warns that continuing with the 2018 ruling will lead to even BS-VI compliant vehicles being taken off the roads in the coming years, without scientific justification. It questions why even BS-IV vehicles that pass Pollution Under Control (PUC) tests are being sidelined and calls for decisions to be based on updated emissions data.
The government has urged the court to order a comprehensive, scientific study on how older vehicles contribute to pollution, rather than relying on blanket age-based rules.
The petition also cited that other countries like Japan, the US, and those in the EU do not ban vehicles solely based on age. Instead, they rely on regular testing and real-time emissions data to decide if a vehicle should remain on the road.
The debate has struck a chord with vehicle owners across NCR, many of whom say they've suffered despite owning well-maintained cars.
Naresh Malik, a South Delhi resident, shared his ordeal, "I had to sell my Corolla Altis, which had only run 34,000 km in 15 years, at a throwaway price. It was in perfect condition. Today's cars can easily last 2.5 lakh kilometres. Why are we judged just on age?"
"If the aim is to reduce pollution, the focus should be on traffic congestion and stricter PUC (Pollution Under Control) checks, not arbitrary rules. I'm hopeful the court will understand the practical concerns of people like us, especially the financial burden we face," he added.
The CAQM's July 1 directive to stop refuelling ELV vehicles had triggered widespread public outcry. Minister Sirsa wrote to the commission asking for a pause, and Lt Governor VK Saxena later advised the government to take the matter to the Supreme Court.
The case is now listed for hearing on Monday, and its outcome could impact thousands of vehicle owners across the capital region, as well as future national policies on vehicle retirement and pollution control.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Indian Express
14 minutes ago
- Indian Express
SC recalls verdict on liquidation of Bhushan Power and Steel, says ‘matter needs to be considered afresh'
The Supreme Court on Thursday recalled its May 2, 2025, judgment that ordered the liquidation of Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd (BPSL) after rejecting steel major JSW Steel Ltd's Rs 19,000 crore bid to acquire it through the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) route. A bench of Chief Justice B R Gavai and Justice S C Sharma said it will consider the appeal challenging the resolution plan afresh. 'We…think that this is a fit case wherein the judgment under review needs to be recalled and the matter needs to be considered afresh. So needless to say that while we are allowing the review, we keep all the questions available to both parties open to be argued at the stage of hearing,' the bench said. A Supreme Court bench of Justices Bela M Trivedi and S C Sharma had on May 2 quashed and set aside the September 5, 2019, National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) order and February 17, 2020, National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) order upholding JSW's resolution plan. It said, 'the Resolution Plan…as approved by the CoC (Committee of Creditors) stands rejected, being not in conformity with the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 30, read with sub-section (2) of Section 31' of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC). Section 30 (2) deals with the resolution professional's duty to examine the resolution plans. Section 31(2) empowers the adjudicating authority (NCLT) to reject a resolution plan if it does not meet the requirements under IBC. Deciding a batch of appeals challenging the NCLAT decision, the Supreme Court said it was 'without any authority of law and without jurisdiction' and 'is perverse, coram non judice and liable to be set aside'. Exercising suo motu powers under Article 142, the court also directed NCLT to initiate liquidation proceedings against BPSL. Seeking its review, Solicitor General of India Tushar Mehta, appearing for the CoC, submitted that BPSL was in severe financial stress but had become 'healthy' after the acquisition and has about 25,000 workers. The May 2 ruling said that 'JSW even after the approval of its Plan by the NCLAT, wilfully contravened and not complied with the terms of the said approved Resolution Plan for a period of about two years, which had frustrated the very object and purpose of the IBC, and consequently had vitiated the CIR proceedings of the Corporate Debtor-BPSL.' Countering this, Solicitor General Mehta said this timeline, the violation of which was flagged as something serious, is extendable. He wondered, 'Suppose for some justifiable reason which cannot be attributed to the parties, the timeline is breached, would the breaking of the timeline be so fatal that a successfully implemented plan can be set aside and a direction be issued under 142 to liquidate a company which has been revived in these 5 years?' Mehta said the May 2 ruling also concluded that CoC did not exercise its commercial wisdom. To this, the CJI said, 'We have consistently held that it is not open for this court or NCLT or NCLAT to sit in appeal over the wisdom of CoC.' Senior Advocate N K Kaul, who appeared for JSW, said the judgment 'will have a devastating effect on IBC'. Urging the court to recall the order and hear it afresh, he said, 'There is clear, glaring, palpable error, statutory provisions and law have been ignored. Wrong facts have been taken into account which should not have been taken into account which were not argued or pleaded.' CJI Gavai orally remarked that 'prima facie, we are inclined to allow the review. We will give a full-fledged hearing, but prima facie it appears that the view is not in consonance with earlier settled decisions.' He added that while hearing it afresh, the court 'will not go into any other documents, just the judgment'. The bench also said it cannot overlook the fact that it involved the livelihood of about 25,000 workers and thousands of crores in investments. 'We also have to take into account the ground realities….25,000 people cannot be thrown onto the road. Article 142 has to be utilised to do complete justice, not to do injustice to 25,000 workers…The purpose of IBC is to make a company functional,' CJI Gavai added.
Hindustan Times
14 minutes ago
- Hindustan Times
Need to rethink cooling off period before arrest in family-related cases
The Supreme Court (SC), recently, while disposing of a transfer petition in Shivangi Bansal versus Sahib Bansal and quashing a number of litigations related to a case of cruelty for dowry under section 498A of the IPC, said that 'the guidelines framed by the High Court of Allahabad in the impugned judgment dated 13.06.2022 … vide paras 32 to 38, with regard to 'Constitution of Family Welfare Committees for safeguards regarding misuse of Section 498A, IPC shall remain in effect and be implemented by the appropriate authorities.' The SC did not discuss or analyse any of the above-mentioned guidelines in its judgment. These guidelines specifically direct the police authorities to comply with the mandatory cooling-period of two months before effecting arrest of the accused persons, and constitution and duties of the Family Welfare Committees (FWCs) in some cases registered under Section 498A of the IPC. The Supreme Court (ANI) The directions by the two-Judge Bench of the SC are in direct contravention to the judgment of the three-Judge Bench of the SC in Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar and another versus Union of India, Ministry of Law and Justice and others (2018) which overruled its own judgment in Rajesh Sharma and others versus State of U.P. and another (2017) and held that 'the directions pertaining to constitution of a (Family Welfare) Committee and conferment of power on the said Committee is erroneous.' The SC in Rajesh (supra) had issued some directions to prevent the misuse of Section 498A of the IPC. These directions included formation of one or more Family Welfare Committees in districts which would look into every complaint under Section 498A. The FWC shall look into such a complaint, may interact with the parties and submit a report to the authority (police or the magistrate as the case may be) within one month. No arrest shall normally be effected by the police till report of the committee is received. The FWC shall be constituted by the District Legal Service Authorities (DSLAs) and members could be out of para legal volunteers/social workers/retired persons/wives of working officers/other suitable and willing citizens. The Court also said that in cases where settlement is reached, the district and session judge or any other senior judicial officer nominated by him to dispose of the proceedings including closing of the criminal case. The SC in Social Action Forum (supra) case held that such directions could not be issued by the method of interpretation of the CrPC. The 'constitution of the FWCs by the DSLAs' and 'the prescription of duties of the Committees and further action … are beyond the Code and the same does not really flow from any provision of the Code.' The Court clarified that the third agency had nothing to do with the Code and directions pertaining to no arrest till the receipt of the report from the Committee were out of scope of the Code. Since a criminal proceeding which is not compoundable can be quashed by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC, 'the directions to settle a case after it is registered is not a correct expression of law' the Court held. Despite Rajesh (supra) being overruled by the SC in September 2018, the High Court of Allahabad issued similar directions as in the Rajesh case. Moreover, it directed that no arrest or police action to nab the named accused persons shall be made after lodging of the FIR or complaints without concluding the 'cooling period' which is two months from the lodging of the FIR or the complaint. During this period, the matter would be immediately referred to Family Welfare Committee in each district. All cases of 498A IPC 'with, no injury 307 and other sections of the IPC in which the imprisonment is less than 10 years' are required to be transmitted to the FWC, the High Court said. Thus, the High Court not only enhanced the period of 'no arrest' to two months but also enlarged the scope of inquiry into complaints as in Rajesh, the SC had said that 'these directions will not apply to the offences involving tangible physical injuries or death'. Thus, the directions issued by the SC in Shivangi Bansal (supra) case are in contravention to the SC judgment in Social Action Forum case. It is also a settled principle of law that misuse of law by itself cannot be a ground to repeal a penal provision or take away its teeth. With regard to arrest, the CrPC and BNSS clearly state that the police shall record reasons for effecting arrest. The arrest should not be effected in a routine manner without doing some investigation, as to the genuineness of a complaint. Differentiating between the power to arrest and justification for the exercise of it, the SC in Arnesh Kumar versus State of Bihar and another (2014) held that the reasons and materials which necessitate arrest must be forwarded to the magistrate. In Lalita Kumari versus Government of Uttar Pradesh and others (2014), the Constitution Bench of the SC permitted to conduct preliminary inquiry in cases of matrimonial disputes to ascertain whether the complaint reveals any cognisable offence. The purpose is to see that there is no over implication of accused persons and the law abused. The Law Commission of India in its 243rd report recommended to make the offence under Section 498A, compoundable with the permission of court. But the Central Government did not make any changes in the provisions related to cruelty. Section 85 of the BNS is pari materia to Section 498A of the IPC. This article is authored by RK Vij, former IPS officer.
The Hindu
14 minutes ago
- The Hindu
Supreme Court agrees to hear pleas on the status of Rohingyas as ‘refugees', their deportation
The Supreme Court decided on Thursday (July 31, 2025) to hear in detail the question of whether the Rohingyas can be treated as 'refugees', or if they are illegal immigrants. A three-judge Bench headed by Justice Surya Kant said it would devote three days to hear the case extensively, saying once this question was answered authoritatively, the consequences would flow automatically. The primary questions recorded by the Court, as raised by petitioners who are Rohingya people living in camps in the national capital, represented by advocate Prashant Bhushan and senior advocate Colin Gonsalves, include protections available to the Rohingyas in India if they were entitled to be declared as refugees. Or, on the other hand, if they were not refugees but illegal immigrants, whether the action of the government in deporting them was justified. Mr. Bhushan said the petitions, some of which dated back to 2013, had also highlighted the prolonged detention suffered by persons, including Rohingyas, after being declared as foreigners in States such as Assam. The Bench agreed to hear arguments on whether persons, including illegal entrants to India, could be detained indefinitely. The Court said it would also hear submissions on the living conditions and availability of basic amenities in Rohingya camps. 'The first issue is whether they are refugees or illegal immigrants. Rest is consequential,' Justice Kant remarked. In an earlier hearing in May, the apex court had observed that if the Rohingyas were found to be 'foreigners' under the Foreigners Act, they would be dealt with by the Centre in accordance with law. The petitioners have challenged the Centre's power to deport Rohingyas. They argued that the Rohingyas had been identified as 'refugees' by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). They had constitutional protection against deportation to Myanmar. The petitioners claimed non-refoulement, saying the Rohingyas would be tortured and killed if they were deported to Myanmar, which had anyway declared them 'stateless'. Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, for the Centre, had submitted that India was not a signatory to the UN Convention on Refugees. He had referred to an interim order passed by the Supreme Court that the government's power under Section 3 of the Foreigners Act to issue orders to 'prohibit, regulate, restrict entry or departure of foreigners' was absolute and unlimited, especially when national security concerns were in play. Mr. Mehta said Article 51(c), which emphasises respect for international law, could be pressed by the petitioners as long as they were in consonance with the domestic law.
