Police given more time to question captain of North Sea crash ship
Police have been granted more time to question the captain of a container ship which crashed into a US oil tanker in the North Sea.
The 59-year-old Russian captain of Solong, which struck US tanker Stena Immaculate off the east coast of Yorkshire on Monday, will be detained for a further 36 hours, Humberside Police said.
He was arrested on Tuesday on suspicion of gross negligence manslaughter and taken into police custody.
Detective Chief Superintendent Craig Nicholson said: 'An extension has been granted by the magistrates' court to detain the man in custody for a further 36 hours.
'Detectives are continuing to question him following his arrest on suspicion of gross negligence manslaughter in connection with the collision.
'Extensive lines of inquiry by police into any potential criminal offences which arise from the collision between the two vessels are ongoing, whilst partner agencies continue their own assessments of the incident.'
Mr Nicholson said the force is supporting the family of a Solong crew member who went missing after the crash and is presumed dead.
Chief coastguard Paddy O'Callaghan said the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) 'continues to support the joint response to the collision between the Solong and the Stena Immaculate'.
He said: 'The Stena Immaculate remains at anchor. The Solong continues to be held in a safe location by tug.
'Small pockets of fire are still reported to be on the top deck of Solong and specialist vessels are supporting the firefighting efforts.
'Salvors will only board the vessels when it is safe to do so. Aerial surveillance flights will continue today to monitor the vessels.'
He said the counter pollution and salvage team has a response in place 'should it be required'.
Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer said on Thursday the situation was 'reasonably contained'.
'We're obviously monitoring it all of the time. In terms of the cause of it, that's yet to be determined', he said.
'There's a process now in place with an arrest. But we have to get to the bottom of it.
'But the immediate thing is to deal with the problem in front of us, which is the aftermath of the collision.'
He added: 'I'd just like to acknowledge the good work of those that are actually out there doing really hard work in very difficult circumstances, which they did not expect to be in.
'I pay tribute to them.'
Pressed on calls for a Cobra meeting to assess the potential environmental damage, he said: 'We are absolutely monitoring this 24/7 and I've got teams doing that and assuring me of what's going on.
'At the moment, the situation is reasonably contained. And, obviously, we will do whatever is necessary.'
US-based maritime news website gCaptain said it was told by a US official at the White House that foul play had not been ruled out.
Transport minister Mike Kane told MPs something went 'terribly wrong' for the crash to happen, but there was 'no evidence' of foul play.
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB), which will lead the safety probe into the incident, said the Solong 'altered course' at about 1.30am on Monday, as it passed to the east of Longstone lighthouse, on to 'a heading of approximately 150 degrees', which is a south-east direction.
The crash happened eight hours and 17 minutes later.
The ship was travelling at about 16.4 knots, the MAIB added, the equivalent land speed for which is 18.9mph.
Container ships typically travel at 16-24 knots.
A team of inspectors was immediately deployed, and inquiries have focused on gathering witness accounts and obtaining digital data, the MAIB said.
Solong frequently travelled between Grangemouth in Scotland and Rotterdam and regularly used the route it took on the day of the collision, a statement added.
'Thirty-six crew from both vessels were recovered but tragically one member of crew from Solong remains unaccounted for,' the MAIB said.
'As well as continuing to gather witness accounts, further investigation work will look to establish the navigational practices on board both vessels, the manning and fatigue management, the condition and maintenance of the vessels involved, and the environmental conditions at the time.'
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