Did the U.S. Really Destroy Iran's Nuclear Program?
Many in the world woke to the news on 22 June that the United States had bombed nuclear sites in Iran, with the goal of destroying the nation's ability to produce nuclear weapons. The raids targeted Iran's uranium-enrichment facilities in Fordow and Natanz, and its nuclear research centre in Isfahan, using stealth bombers to drop massive 'bunker-busters', and cruise missiles.
Although Iran says its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes, experts have long assessed that Iran was close to having the capability of building nuclear weapons if it chose to do so. The US attacks followed a bombing campaign by Israel, which has since carried out further attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. On 23 June, the International Atomic Energy Agency reported that "very significant damage is expected to have occurred" at the underground Fordow site.
Researchers at academic institutions and think tanks are also assessing the potential impacts of the attacks on Iran's nuclear capabilities. Analysts have said that the attacks probably set the nuclear programme back substantially, but not permanently. In particular, Iran could have moved stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium, and perhaps some enrichment centrifuges, elsewhere. David Albright, a nuclear policy specialist and president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington DC, spoke to Nature about what researchers know.
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How do you assess the impact of the bombings on Iran's nuclear capabilities?
There aren't many researchers who are able to assess the impact of the bombings. We have decades of experience with the Iranian nuclear programme, so we know their facilities and activities very well. And we have great access to satellite imagery — which we have to buy. We try to buy some every day. And we utilize analysts who have decades of experience to analyze these images. We also have lots of contacts with governments, and we have colleagues who also have contacts with governments.
A lot of the damage is on the surface, so it's a question of knowing what the building did [in terms of its role in the nuclear program]. We rely on our repository of information about the sites that are attacked. So it's pretty straightforward.
Obviously, more problematic is the underground sites. When we initially assessed Israel's bombing of Natanz, three days later I saw a very small crater above the underground hall. I could work out and link it to a type of Earth-penetrator weapon that Israel is known to have. It would leave a really small crater when it went in, and the damage would be underground. The United States bombed it with a much more powerful Earth penetrator. So damage is probably more extensive.
How and when will we know for sure the extent of the damage?
As nuclear experts, we'd like to see this done with diplomatic agreements, where Iran would allow intrusive inspections into its programme. If that does not happen, then it's the job of US and Israeli intelligence to assess the damage. They're looking at communications intercepts, or trying to recruit people on the inside to reveal information.
Would there be radioactive materials detected outside Natanz, Esfahan and Fordow if the attacks were successful?
So far, the IAEA reports no such leaks. And it appears that Iran had moved the enriched uranium stockpiles in the days before the bombings. The United States has said that the target of its bombings was the facilities, so they understand they are not getting at the nuclear material.
Can shockwaves damage enrichment facilities even without a direct hit?
Shockwaves can cause a lot of damage. They will push against the centrifuges, and if they're spinning, it can cause the rotor inside to crash against the wall. It's anyone's guess how much is destroyed without additional information. But the idea of the US bombing was that Israel may not have done enough damage.
Would it pose more serious environmental risks if Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant were bombed?
Israel has said it will not attack nuclear reactors. And Israel negotiated with Russia not to attack the Russians who operate Bushehr. But yes, it really could be disastrous. The decay products of uranium fission that accumulate inside a reactor are much more dangerous than the uranium itself. That's why you don't want to have a nuclear reactor involved in a war.
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Washington Post
28 minutes ago
- Washington Post
What's making some countries daydream about nukes again?
For 80 years, the United States has invested enormous effort in preventing countries from building nuclear arsenals. It has done so through lengthy negotiations, trade incentives, diplomatic engagement, treaties and, on rare occasions, military force. The recent U.S. attack on Iran's nuclear facilities was aimed at the same goal: stopping Iran from becoming the world's 10th nuclear power. Whether that goal was achieved will not be known for some time. But by bombing now, the United States might have brought about the very thing it was trying to prevent. It is possible the attack might induce Iran to capitulate and end its nuclear ambitions. It is far more likely, however, that the U.S. strike will convince Iranian leaders once and for all that acquiring nuclear capability is the best way to secure the regime's survival. Regardless of how the Iran situation turns out, the appeal of nuclear weapons is growing elsewhere. Today, nine nations possess nuclear weapons, a fraction of the several dozen that are technically advanced enough to build them. In the worst case, the number of states with nuclear weapons could more than double in the next two decades. It is hard to overstate the negative consequences of wider nuclear proliferation. Every nuclear arsenal multiplies the risks: deliberate or accidental use, theft and diversion, loss of control, regional tension and escalation. The new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Dan Caine, recently made clear the dangers: 'Nuclear proliferation, even among Allies, significantly limits U.S. ability to manage escalation risk,' he wrote. 'It could trigger further acceleration of adversary efforts to modernize and expand their nuclear arsenals. Additionally, it would irreparably erode the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and could encourage proliferation around the world.' The next nuclear age This is the fourth article in a series by experts from the Federation of American Scientists examining why today's global nuclear landscape is far more complicated and, in many ways, more precarious than during the Cold War. Read part one, part two and part three. Previous Next Seeing two countries that have nuclear weapons — Israel and the U.S. — attack Iran, a country that does not, is likely to create even greater interest among some vulnerable states to consider pursuing their own nuclear programs. The growing military ambitions of Russia and China, plus the uncertainty surrounding America's commitments to its allies, all add up to a potential surge of new nuclear-armed countries. The United States started to worry about Iran's nuclear ambitions in the late 1980s, about the same time it became known that North Korea was developing its own nuclear facilities. Since then, much of the U.S. focus has been on preventing potential adversaries, or so-called rogue states, from going nuclear. Yet the majority of nations that might decide to go nuclear are not rogue states, but U.S. allies and partners. They have some or all of the necessary technical, economic and intellectual capabilities. In Europe, they include Poland, Turkey and Germany; in Asia, South Korea, Japan and even Taiwan. If these states were to go nuclear, others might follow. In the past, proliferation has driven more proliferation. Will the U.S. strike against Iran reassure allies that the U.S. will take action to protect their security and interests? Some maintain that it will, but it is hard to see how one attack can undo the increasingly isolationist tendencies of the United States or reverse President Donald Trump's skepticism of international alliances. It is far too soon to tell what lessons other countries will draw from it. Story continues below advertisement Advertisement Why aren't there more nuclear states? A man stands atop his damaged home after Pakistan launched missiles in the disputed Kashmir region on May 14. (Money Sharma/AFP/Getty Images) One factor that has slowed the spread of nuclear weapons for eight decades is that they remain expensive and challenging to build — and the nation doing so takes on new risks, including accidents and unwanted escalation. One longtime government official has called this 'nonproliferation inertia.' Fortunately, it is not getting much easier to build an atomic bomb. Obtaining a supply of highly enriched uranium or plutonium is still a complex, costly and highly visible undertaking. But, sadly, it is getting easier to doubt the United States' commitment to defend allies that refrain from building their own nuclear weapons. Deterrence and reassurance depend on both military capability and political credibility. The credibility of a promise to protect is the fragile part of the calculus. Who among U.S. allies now being hit with massive tariffs on their exports or called 'freeloaders' by Trump officials believes the United States will go to war in their defense should they face attack from Russia or China? Indeed, Trump has said that Russia can do 'whatever the hell they want' to U.S. allies who don't spend what he deems enough on their own defense. In this environment, it is hard to see how U.S. allies and partners can have high confidence that Trump might put Seattle at risk for Seoul, or Boston for Berlin. And one increasingly likely response to this growing unease is that worst-case planning can take hold, driving nations to seek safety by building their own nuclear weapons. Story continues below advertisement Advertisement A world filled with nuclear states is a more dangerous world. The United States and Soviet Union had multiple close calls during the Cold War: mistakes, escalation and technical glitches. We know that a world with many more nuclear states will be plagued in the same way. Any small clash could risk a wider nuclear conflict. It is a matter of hard work and luck that it hasn't happened already. Will the same hold true for the new nuclear-armed powers? One need look no farther than India and Pakistan to see that having nuclear weapons has neither kept the peace nor prevented escalation on a regular basis. The attacks and counterattacks in May reminded the world that escalation remains a constant risk when nuclear states clash. With nuclear weapons, leaders have to get every decision right all the time. The more countries that have nuclear weapons, the more our luck will be tested. The chain of global nuclear security is only as good as its weakest link. The United States has worked for many decades to help nations protect civilian research facilities with sensitive nuclear materials to avoid enriched uranium or plutonium from falling into the wrong hands. But more nuclear states will mean more targets for theft by bad actors — state and non-state — as well as by criminal networks and disgruntled employees. Even if one country manages its responsibilities well, a sudden change in government, coup or economic collapse can quickly turn a nuclear arsenal into an acute problem. Is the sky falling? The 18-nation conference gathers following the July 1, 1968, signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Switzerland. (Daily Express/Pictorial Parade/) The debate about whether nuclear weapons would inevitably spread or could be controlled and eliminated goes all the way back to the Manhattan Project. Some scientists, including J. Robert Oppenheimer, believed in creating a global system to control nuclear assets and eventually eliminate national control over nuclear weapons. Others thought the spread of nuclear technology was inevitable. It did spread at first, to U.S. friends such as Britain and France (with U.S. assistance), and adversaries such as the U.S.S.R. and China. But this slide toward a nuclear world was slowed. Remarkably, even among fierce adversaries, there was a consensus that a world filled with nuclear states would create unacceptably high risks of nuclear war. Thus, there is broad agreement on preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, even as there has been disagreement on the best way to achieve that outcome. After rejecting military action in 2011 and 2012, the United States in 2015 persuaded Iran, Russia, China and the European Union to join a diplomatic initiative to head off Iran's nuclear ambitions. At the time, President Barack Obama said the choice was between that deal and war. Trump pulled out of the agreement in 2018 and has now chosen war. This is not the first time the United States has used military means to address a nuclear danger. Although the U.S. has relied heavily on diplomatic efforts to stop proliferation in the past, it has also used military strikes to preempt or prevent adversaries from developing nuclear weapons. In 1991, the first U.S.-led war against Iraq (to liberate Kuwait) destroyed a previously unknown and surprisingly well-developed Iraqi nuclear program. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, famously justified on the basis of flawed and falsified information that Iraq was developing a nuclear weapon, is rightly considered a serious strategic mistake. Despite the sporadic use of military tools, the most successful efforts to prevent proliferation were achieved through diplomacy, incentives and global engagement. These efforts gave birth to an effective set of global agreements and norms, centered around the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968. Nearly all countries in the world, including Iran, are full members of the NPT, and the agreement is at the core of a system of overlapping norms, laws, technology controls, alliances and even verification regimes that have helped keep a lid on nuclear weapons. Story continues below advertisement Advertisement For more than 50 years, the U.S. has been the driver in these efforts. In East Asia, U.S. pressure was brought to bear on allies such as Taiwan and South Korea on several occasions to keep them from building independent nuclear programs. South Africa's apartheid regime eliminated its arsenal of six nuclear weapons as part of the process of reintegrating into the international community and having global sanctions lifted. These global tools also came into play after the Cold War when Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus, as newly independent states, inherited sizable nuclear arsenals from the former Soviet Union. Those nations debated for several years whether to keep them, and decided in the end, with U.S. support, to relinquish them back to Russia. (Russian nuclear weapons were recently redeployed to Belarus, now more fully under Moscow's influence.) At the time, these states determined that the burden of being a nuclear-armed state was not worth the payoff. But now the global consensus against nuclear arms is weakening. Who might go nuclear? Rocket trails are seen in the sky above the Israeli coastal city of Netanya amid a fresh barrage of Iranian missile attacks on June 21. (Jack Guez/AFP/Getty Images) Iran now faces an immediate decision on whether to race to build a bomb, if it can. It is not clear where Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium is located, and it is reasonable to assume that some Iranian officials have planned for the possibility of a U.S. attack by rebuilding enrichment capabilities at some unknown location. But aside from the prospect of a crash Iranian program, new nuclear states are unlikely to appear overnight. It would take a country years and billions of dollars to become a fully fledged nuclear state. Some nations, including those facing direct security threats from Russia and China, are debating whether they need their own nuclear weapons. In Poland, this debate is very public, while in other states such as Germany and Finland, it is happening more discreetly. And the Baltic states — with long memories of life under Soviet occupation — might also reconsider their nonnuclear status even if they don't have immediate access to nuclear material. Security experts in these states have speculated about this option for decades but, until now, believed they could count on the United States to keep the lid on. Those beliefs are being tested as never before. In East Asia, South Korean national security officials have discussed nuclear options for many years, and public support for a nuclear program in the face of a nuclear North Korea remains strong. Japan, the only country to have suffered nuclear attacks, faces political barriers to going nuclear, but, in the face of an undependable U.S., a nuclear North Korea and an aggressive China, it is possible that public opinion will shift — and Japan is an advanced country with extensive nuclear capabilities. Taiwan remains another possible nuclear state — having actively pursued nuclear weapons in the late 1970s, only to have its program shut down by the United States. The material Taiwan was to use for its program was shipped to the U.S. in 1981, and its small research reactor was dismantled. It is not clear whether and how quickly Taiwan could advance a new program, but the knowledge and technical base are there. If Iran does go nuclear, other countries in and around the Middle East may well follow suit, including Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Saudi leader Mohammed bin Salman told Fox News in 2023 that his country would 'have to get' a nuclear weapon if Iran did so. Story continues below advertisement Advertisement The third group of countries that might consider going nuclear is states immediately affected by the first two. In the past, states that went nuclear sparked nuclear interest in at least one other state. Fear (unwarranted, as it turned out) that Nazi Germany was ahead in a race for a nuclear bomb was a major factor in the U.S. launching the Manhattan Project. That caused the Soviet Union to follow suit. That led to China, which led to India, which led to Pakistan. If multiple states in the Middle East, Europe and Asia go nuclear, then the prospects of slowing further proliferation are remote at best. Faced with the prospect of multiple U.S. allies going nuclear, Washington might decide it is better to keep such nuclear friends inside a tent than force them out into the cold. Long opposed to India's nuclear program, the U.S. eventually embraced India as a strategic competitor to China and agreed to sell peaceful nuclear technology to India. Pakistan's nuclear program was overlooked for years when the United States needed Pakistan's help in fighting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. A similar dynamic could easily emerge in Europe, and even more so in Asia, where some might welcome a nuclear South Korea to further challenge China's strategic position. How much time do we have? Despite Trump's now-disputed claim that Iran's nuclear facilities were 'totally obliterated,' the United States still faces a worst-case scenario: that Iran could become a nuclear state in short order. Beyond that, a few countries, most notably Japan, could produce a basic nuclear device fairly quickly if they diverted civilian plutonium or dedicated civilian uranium enrichment for a crash nuclear program. But most states do not have a ready source of such material — a feature, not a bug, of past nonproliferation efforts. It still requires a large, expensive industrial program to enrich uranium or produce and purify plutonium — as well as to build actual weapons and their delivery systems. In addition to the time it would take to produce these weapons, most states would also have to undo the legal and institutional constraints that exist on their nuclear capabilities. Assuming they choose not to violate international law, members of the NPT must provide 90 days' notice of a decision to withdraw from it. If they do, their nuclear partners have the right to request that all imported nuclear materials and technology be returned. Besides that, any European states that pursue nuclear weapons are subject to multilateral agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect all of their nuclear facilities to ensure all activities are peaceful and accounted for. These agreements would also have to be abrogated. And in Europe, members of the European Union are also bound by E.U. law and E.U.-IAEA agreements. States would have to renegotiate their E.U. memberships or be forced to withdraw from the E.U. itself, a long and complex process. Similarly, the civilian nuclear programs in Japan and South Korea are the result of extensive nuclear cooperation with the United States and Europe — agreements based on the nonnuclear status of those states. Should that change, the U.S. and France retain the right to both shut down joint nuclear facilities and demand the return of materials produced with jointly owned or developed technology. Polish soldiers take part in a military parade in Warsaw on Aug. 15, 2023. (Wojtek Radwanski/AFP/Getty Images) These entanglements are a design feature of the global nonproliferation norm, intended to provide notice should a state pursue nuclear weapons, thus giving others time to respond. The question is what nations will do with that time and information. In Europe, with NATO states having relied on U.S. nuclear-extended deterrence for so long, French and British experts and officials are considering whether, and how, their military and nuclear arsenals can be used to discourage the potential demand for new independent nuclear arsenals. President Emmanuel Macron suggested in May that France might be willing to deploy its nuclear weapons outside French territory, something unthinkable in years past. It remains far from clear how this would work. Nor is it clear that British or French nuclear guarantees would deter Russia or reassure states feeling insecure because of Trump's actions and a weakened NATO. France is clearly trying to consider such options, with the French ambassador to Sweden stating clearly that France's nuclear 'umbrella' could be applied to NATO states. The question is whether French or British commitments to protect European allies are seen as credible. France had promised to protect Poland before World War II, but that vow failed to shield Poland from either Germany or the Soviet Union. In part because of this history, a discussion has been taking place in Poland for more than a decade about how to deter Russian aggression. While the country has invested robustly in a conventional military buildup, nuclear sharing and even national nuclear options are increasingly being considered. As Poland's prime minister, Donald Tusk, has made clear, 'At the moment — I say this with full responsibility — purchases of conventional weapons, the most traditional ones, are not enough.' He cited a 'profound change of American geopolitics.' And in East Asia, if states such as Japan, South Korea or Taiwan decide they need new nuclear protection, developing their own national programs might be their only practical option. Story continues below advertisement Advertisement Underpinning all of these nuclear instincts, however, is the myth that having nuclear weapons makes a country secure. Nuclear weapons did not discourage the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Israel's nuclear weapons did not deter Hamas from the Oct. 7 massacre. India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed, have found neither peace nor stability. While nuclear weapons may force states to act more cautiously, they also create pressures where states may act rashly for fear of falling victim to a first strike. The period in between decisions by states to go nuclear and their reaching nuclear capability would be one of great instability and risk. How would Russia respond if Poland withdrew from the E.U. and began to build nuclear weapons? Would China stand by if Taiwan moved in the same direction? Would North Korea sit back if South Korea said it intended to go nuclear? In fact, reaching for the nuclear option could bring about the very conflict states seek to deter. People at the Seoul Railway Station watch a TV showing a North Korean missile launch on May 7, 2022. (Ahn Young-Joon/AP) In the past, when the world has faced these risky possibilities, the U.S. and other countries have worked hard to reinforce the global regime to prevent proliferation. But after two Trump presidencies, it is unlikely that U.S. credibility will ever again be as strong as it has been in the past. This does not mean that the U.S. is powerless, however. U.S. alliances have broad domestic political support, including from Congress. Still, there's no question that countries in Europe and East Asia are being pressed to do more to provide for their own security. A simple analysis of the cost and benefits of producing nuclear weapons suggests that the time and money spent to go nuclear would be far better invested in acquiring advanced conventional capabilities, which can serve as an effective deterrent. This also goes for the United States, now slated to spend almost $1 trillion on nuclear weapons in the next decade. The solution to both protecting allies and deterring adversaries must include military components, but 'soft power' is just as critical: diplomacy as well as economic and political engagement. The most dire predictions of nuclear proliferation have never come to pass. That has enabled us to survive all manner of conflicts, misunderstandings and accidents without a nuclear catastrophe. The question is whether the United States and other countries will see the danger of this potential tidal wave in time and head to higher ground. The realization must hit that a world filled with nuclear weapons is one where humanity is at greater risk, and our survival in the past is no guarantee for the future.
USA Today
29 minutes ago
- USA Today
Timeline: See how 70 years of history led to the U.S. bombing in Iran
The bellicose saga between Iran and the United States goes back seven decades and 13 presidents, a relationship that broke down after the people of Iran rose up against a regime the United States helped install 1953. While President Donald Trump's decision to bomb the country's nuclear sites has Americans on edge, the United States has a long history of punishing Iran's government, most often through sanctions. At the center of it all is the state of Israel, the United States' key ally in the region — one that consistently finds itself at war with Iran or with the Islamic extremist groups that are proxies for Iran's interests. Some key moments in the relationship between the U.S. and Iran. Can't see the above timeline? Click here to reload the page. 1953: Coup d'etat | The United States and United Kingdom back a coup d'etat in what is then called the Imperial State of Iran. The aim is to stop the Iranian parliament's attempt to nationalize the country's lucrative oil industry. The prime minister is replaced, and the autocratic monarch Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, known as the shah, increases his power. 1957: Atoms for Peace | U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Iran sign an agreement allowing the developing country to participate in the 'Atoms for Peace' program. The United States provided materials and training to Iran, and essentially kicked off its modern nuclear program. 1978-1979: Iranian Revolution | After Pahlavi attempts to remove Ruhollah Khomeini, a high-ranking religious leader known as an ayatollah, Iranians grow fed up with the shah's massive power. The people stage a revolution to end the same monarchy that the United States had strengthened. A constitution for the Islamic Republic of Iran is established, and Khomeini becomes Supreme Leader a religious-political position more powerful than the role of president. The new regime is markedly anti-Israel, a stance that contributes to 50 years of tense United States-Iran relations. 1979-1981: Iran hostage crisis | Pahlavi is in exile, but U.S. President Jimmy Carter allows him to come to New York for cancer treatment. As retaliation, Iranian militants take over the U.S. embassy in Tehran and take hostages. Carter issues a series of sanctions that freeze billions of dollars in Iranian government assets and block trade between the two countries. More than 50 people are held for more than 400 days and finally released just after Carter leaves office. 1980-88: Iran-Iraq War | Iraq invades Iran, and the United States, under President Ronald Reagan, eventually sides with Iraq and its leader Saddam Hussein. The war lasts for eight years, and hundreds of thousands of people die. More than a decade after the war ends, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright will call the United States' policies 'regrettably shortsighted.' 1984: State sponsor of terrorism | The U.S. Department of State declares Iran a state sponsor of terrorism and imposes new sanctions. The designation continues until this day. 1989: A new supreme leader | Ali Khamenei succeeds Khomeini as supreme leader of Iran. Now in his 80s, Khamenei has stayed in the position for nearly 36 years. 1992-1997: More sanctions | Congress passes laws and President Bill Clinton signs executive orders that sanction Iran. The policies begin with attempts to stop the country from getting chemical or nuclear weapons, crippling its oil industry, and harming its general economy. They culminate with a near-embargo on goods and services traded between the United States and Iran. 2002: Axis of Evil | U.S. President George W. Bush, in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, identifies three countries — Iran, Iraq and North Korea — as an 'Axis of Evil' that threaten American security. 'Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom,' Bush says. Later that year, the world learns that Iran has been enriching uranium, a key step toward building a nuclear bomb. 2007-2010: Stuxnet | The Bush administration deploys a cyber weapon called Stuxnet that sabotages the computers Iran uses in its nuclear program while making users believe everything is running as usual. The public learns about the program, built in conjunction with Israel, in 2010, after U.S. President Barack Obama's administration also uses it. 2011-2013: Obama-era sanctions | U.S. President Barack Obama issues a series of sanctions designed to harm Iran's ability to move money around the international banking system and profit off its oil industry. 2013: Preliminary nuclear deal | Obama announces a temporary deal between U.S., its allies, and Iran. The deal requires Iran to limit its nuclear program for six months in exchange for reducing sanctions that have been harming the country's economy. 2015: Final nuclear deal | Obama — along with leaders of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the European Union — reaches a deal with Iran to put significant restrictions on its nuclear program. The terms include limits on enriched uranium, and inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. While defending the deal from critics, Obama says the only other alternative is war. 2016: Sanctions end | Obama signs an executive order revoking sanctions against Iran that were originally designed as consequences for its nuclear weapons program. The order says there has been a 'fundamental shift in circumstances with respect to Iran's nuclear program.' 2017: Axis of Evil 2.0 | Fifteen years after Bush, President Donald Trump identifies a new 'Axis of Evil' that includes Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela.2018: Trump reverses course | Trump withdraws the United States from the Iran nuclear deal and instead renews sanctions on Iran. The administration says the campaign, called 'maximum pressure,' devastates Iran's economy and oil revenue. 2020: Soleimani assassination | Trump orders a drone strike in Iraq that assassinates Qasem Soleimani, an influential Iranian military leader. Iran threatens revenge, and international experts and policymakers warn that the United States may have started an unwinnable war. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu praises Trump for 'acting swiftly, forcefully, decisively,' and says Israel stands with the United States in its 'just struggle for peace, security and self-defense.' 2022: Jerusalem Declaration | U.S. President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid meet in Jerusalem to sign a declaration reaffirming the 'unshakeable' alliance between the two countries. 'The United States stresses that integral to this pledge is the commitment never to allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon, and that it is prepared to use all elements of its national power to ensure that outcome,' the pledge says. 2023-2024: Tensions rise | Israel goes to war in Gaza, following a brutal terrorist attack by Hamas that galvanizes the nation. The Iran-backed militant Houthis in Yemen attack ships in the Red Sea. The conflict expands when Israel conducts a first-of-its-kind attack on Iran-backed Hezbollah, detonating explosives hidden inside their handheld communication devices. The following month, Iran fires nearly 200 missiles at Israel, which intercepts most of them, but promises revenge. March 2025: U.S. takes on Houthi rebels | In March, the United States bombs the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen, a now-notorious attack that officials discussed it on Signal. June 2025: Israel-Iran war | Israel launches airstrikes on Iran, killing top military leaders and damaging nuclear technology. Iran counters with its own missile attacks on Israel. The United States bombs Iran's nuclear facilities days later. The Western intervention escalates the war and stokes fears of a wider global conflict. Contributing: Shawn J. Sullivan More visual stories explaining the Iran conflict: Current conflict timeline: From Israeli attack to Iran's retaliation, US bombing and ceasefire How Operation Midnight Hammer unfolded: Details of US bombing in Iran How does a bunker-buster bomb work? A closer look at the GBU-57 Iran fires missiles at U.S. base in Qatar. Where else could it strike? Live updates: Ceasefire in place, but Iran nuclear program may have survived
Business Insider
37 minutes ago
- Business Insider
Iran has been hurt but is still a 'considerable' threat to US forces in the Middle East, says US admiral
Iran still poses a "considerable" tactical threat to US forces in the Middle East despite strikes on its nuclear and military sites by Israel and the US, a top admiral told Congress on Tuesday. "At the tactical level, I think they've been degraded," Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, deputy commander of US Central Command, said at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. "I think the degree to which that degradation has taken place, particularly in the last 12 days, is best discussed in a classified forum," he added. But he said that Iran possesses "considerable tactical capability," one element of which was visible in the missile attack on the US military base of Al Udeid on Monday. Iran attacked the base, located in Qatar and the US's largest in the region, with missiles that were foiled by Qatari air defenses and caused no deaths or injuries. The attack came a day after the US launched a major strike on Iranian facilities linked to its nuclear program, using GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs for the first time in combat. In a press briefing Sunday, Gen. Dan Caine, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said US forces fired around 75 precision-guided weapons in total during the operation, which targeted facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. President Donald Trump said the strikes had destroyed the nuclear facilities. The White House pushed back on reports on Tuesday that the sites were only damaged. A tentative ceasefire between Israel and Iran is currently in place, but there are concerns that it may not last, and that Iran could resort to other tactics to fight back. Iran retains a large ballistic missile stockpile, and Cooper said that while its proxies like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza have been reduced in strength, its network of regional militias remains a threat. "The thing I think we need to do right now and that we are doing, with clarity, is making sure our men and women are safe in the Middle East," he said. The US has around 40,000 military and civilian personnel in the region, and bolstered its military presence there with the deployment of the USS Nimitz. Cooper added that: "We've got to be in a three-point stance, ready to go every single day."
