What lies ahead as Centre mounts offensive against Maoists

Indian Express

2 days ago

On May 21, 2025, Indian security forces dealt a major blow to the Maoist insurgency by killing Nambala Keshav Rao, alias Basavaraju, the CPI (Maoist)'s General Secretary and key ideological strategist. The encounter took place in Narayanpur, Chhattisgarh, during a joint operation under Operation Black Forest, a coordinated offensive across Chhattisgarh, Telangana, and Maharashtra. Alongside Basavaraju, 27 Maoist cadres were killed. This was the most significant Maoist leadership loss since the inception of the insurgency.
Home Minister Amit Shah hailed it as a 'landmark achievement,' and the operation's aftermath – 54 arrests and 84 surrenders – further showed the dismantling of an insurgent network that had long evaded state control. For the government, this represents a significant moment in its declared aim of achieving a Maoist-free India by March 2026. Its strategy comprises a triad – military offensives, infrastructure-led development, and intensified tribal engagement.
Whether this represents an end or a strategic retreat remains open to interpretation, but the political scenario of the conflict has undeniably shifted. Before we delve into the emergence, rise and downfall of the group, let's understand the key terms, i.e. Maoism, Naxalism, and Left-Wing Extremism (LWE).
While often conflated, Maoism, Naxalism, and Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) have distinct origins. Maoism is based on Mao Zedong's doctrine of agrarian revolution and guerrilla warfare. Its Indian variant emerged with the 1967 Naxalbari uprising, leading to the broader Naxalite movement.
Over decades, this transformed itself into factions, with the CPI (Maoist) becoming the dominant group in 2004 through the merger of the People's War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). LWE is the term used by the Indian state to categorise such insurgencies within a national security framework.
By contrast, 'Urban Naxal' is often used to refer to supporters of Naxalims, including intellectual and financial support.
The Maoist insurgency traces its roots to the CPI(Marxist-Leninist) founded by Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal. The movement fractured during the 1970s–90s into numerous groups, many of which operated in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Odisha, and Chhattisgarh. The 2004 unification of PWG and MCC marked a turning point, resulting in a stronger organisational base and the creation of the PLGA (People's Liberation Guerrilla Army), aimed at expanding Maoist control in India's central tribal belt.
Between 2004 and March 31, 2025, LWE violence claimed 8,895 lives in different parts of the country. Tragically, the primary victims have been tribal civilians – the very population the Maoists claim to represent. Branded as 'police informers', many have been abducted and killed. The movement, far from being a revolutionary emancipator, has often replicated violence against the most marginalised as well as the security forces.
Before 2000, government responses alternated between repression and limited reform, lacking strategic coherence. States like Andhra Pradesh experimented with negotiations in the early 2000s, but talks collapsed amid resumed police encounters. Some state-backed vigilante operations further vitiated the space between enforcement and civil liberties. The centre, meanwhile, deferred to state governments without crafting a unified response. That changed gradually post-2004, with the rise of centralised counterinsurgency frameworks.
Since 2004, the CPI (Maoist) has led a persistent insurgency in the mineral-rich forests of central and eastern India. Violence peaked in 2010 with 1,005 deaths and 1,936 incidents, but by 2024, these had declined to 150 deaths and 374 incidents, an 85% and 81% drop, respectively.
As of early 2025, 91% of LWE incidents were confined to just 25 districts, down from 76 in 2013, and the affected area shrank from 18,000 sq km to 4,200 sq km between 2014-24, owing to sustained military operations, intelligence-led policing, and development interventions.
Under the UPA (2004–2014), operations like 'Green Hunt' and schemes such as the Backward Regions Grant Fund and Integrated Action Plan were launched but criticised for poor tribal outreach. In contrast, since 2014, the NDA has adopted a dual strategy under the National Policy and Action Plan (2015) – zero tolerance for violence and development-led governance.
From 2017–18 to early 2025, Rs 3,260.37 crore was released under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme. Fortified police stations rose from 66 to 612; 280 security camps, 68 helipads, and 15 joint task forces were added. CRPF deployments increased. Financial networks supporting Maoists were targeted through coordinated National Investigation Agency and Enforcement Directorate actions, resulting in large-scale seizures.
Intelligence capabilities expanded through Multi Agency Centres (MAC), State MACs, and new Joint Command and Control Centres in Jagdalpur and Gaya. In 2024, 290 Maoists were killed, 1,090 arrested, and 881 surrendered. In Chhattisgarh alone (Jan 2024–Mar 2025), 237 were killed, 812 arrested, and 723 surrendered, indicating operational success and reduced recruitment.
Tribal communities remain the social base of the Maoist insurgency. Persistent issues, such as displacement, land alienation, lack of healthcare, education, and justice, continue to fuel discontent. Therefore, the government focussed on development issues evident in schemes like the Special Central Assistance (SCA), Civic Action Programme (CAP), and the Dharti Aaba Janjatiya Gram Utkarsh Abhiyan, which aim at inclusive development.
The Dharti Aaba Janjatiya Gram Utkarsh Abhiyan, for instance, was launched to deliver amenities to 1.5 crore beneficiaries in 15,000 tribal villages, stressing the '3Cs' – connectivity by road, mobile, and finance. Moreover, Rs 3,724.95 crore was disbursed under the Special Central Assistance scheme. Welfare initiatives included Rs 196.23 crore for the Civic Action Programme and Rs 52.52 crore for media outreach.
Additionally, the government set up 48 Industrial Training Institutes, 61 Skill Development Centres, and 178 Eklavya schools. Financial inclusion expanded via 1,007 bank branches, 937 ATMs, and 5,731 post offices. In terms of infrastructural development, over 9,500 km of roads were built, and 7,777 mobile towers installed.
However, some experts argued that many of these initiatives are top-down and security-driven, undermining tribal autonomy and constitutional safeguards like PESA and the Forest Rights Act (FRA). Resultantly, despite infrastructure growth, the disconnect between policy and reality is there. Schools lack teachers, health centres are under-resourced, and local governance is often overshadowed by militarised state presence.
The Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA), which promises decentralised tribal governance, remains poorly implemented. Gram Sabhas are frequently bypassed during land acquisitions for mining and industrial projects, eroding trust. Development, in many regions, is synonymous with police stations and camps rather than empowerment.
Participatory planning is weak, often dominated by local elites or bureaucratic priorities. The marginalisation of Gram Sabhas as forums for deliberation has left tribal populations exposed to both state control and Maoist influence.
Joint operations in Narayanpur and Bijapur reflect improved coordination between central and state forces. Real-time intelligence sharing via MAC and SMACs, and new Joint Command Centres in Jagdalpur and Gaya, have enhanced operational success. Inputs from surrendered cadres and local informants have yielded significant results.
The killing of Basavaraju may disrupt the CPI (Maoist)'s strategic core. While the government resists unconditional talks, civil society and regional leaders continue advocating for dialogue. Telangana has pushed for ceasefire talks, echoing failed past efforts in Andhra Pradesh (2004) and by Swami Agnivesh (2010). Sustainable peace may still require a shift from military victory to political reconciliation.
India's prolonged encounter with Maoist insurgency offers a compelling lesson drawn from history: no violent struggle has ever delivered enduring justice or structural transformation. While Maoist violence was born from grievances such as land alienation, tribal exploitation, and state apathy, their armed path has ultimately yielded destruction, not dignity. The deaths of nearly 9,000 people since 2004, many of them poor tribal civilians, expose the tragic cost of a politics that mistakes the gun for liberation.
The killing of top Maoist leaders and cadres and the steady rollback of insurgent zones, demonstrate the limits of revolutionary violence in the face of a constitutional state. Yet this military success should not obscure the more fundamental truth – even just causes are discredited when pursued through undemocratic means. Violence may disrupt, but it cannot reform. It can dismantle structures, but it cannot build trust or institutional legitimacy.
India's fight against Maoism emphasises that only democratic engagement – however slow, imperfect, or frustrating – is capable of transforming social contradictions into political dialogue. The tribal regions, long denied their rightful place in the Republic, do not need guerrillas; they need schools, hospitals, land rights, and functioning Gram Sabhas. Laws like PESA and the Forest Rights Act offer a democratic framework for justice, but only if implemented with sincerity and accountability.
A Maoist-free India by 2026 may be militarily plausible, but a just India is only possible through democratic inclusion. The real challenge is not in eliminating armed insurgents, but in rebuilding a social contract where every citizen, including the most marginalised, feels heard, seen, and protected. History affirms it. Violence radicalises societies but never redeems them. Only democracy delivers the promise of justice.
Based on the three-pronged strategy – military offensives, development, and intensified tribal engagement – the government has declared the goal of achieving Maoist-free India by March 2026. Evaluate.
Naxalism is a social, economic, and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security threat. In this context, discuss the emerging issues and suggest a multilayered strategy to tackle the menace of Naxalism.
What factors have contributed to the sharp decline in Maoist violence and territorial influence between 2010 and 2024?
How impactful have initiatives like the Dharti Aaba Janjatiya Gram Utkarsh Abhiyan and Special Central Assistance been in addressing core tribal grievances?
Does the focus on infrastructure and financial inclusion sufficiently address the deeper social and historical roots of tribal discontent?
(K.M. Seethi is the Director of Inter University Centre for Social Science Research and Extension (IUCSSRE), Mahatma Gandhi University (MGU), Kerala, and former Senior Professor of International Relations at the same university.)
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