Iran fires missiles at US air base in Qatar
Iran fires missiles at US air base in Qatar
An interceptor missile seen in Qatar after Iran's armed forces say they targeted the al-Udeid US base. Photo: Reuters
Iran's military said it carried out a missile attack on the al-Udeid US air base in Qatar on Monday.
Explosions were heard across the Qatari capital following Tehran's threat to retaliate for the American air strikes on its nuclear sites.
The Iranian military said the attack was "devastating and powerful".
US officials said no US personnel were killed or injured in the attack on the air base, the largest US military installation in the Middle East.
Iran, which had been warned by Washington not to retaliate or face massive US military action, had informed the US via two diplomatic channels hours ahead of the attack, as well as Qatari authorities, a senior regional source told Reuters.
Qatar's defence minister told Al Jazeera its air defences had intercepted missiles directed at the Al Udeid air base.
Iran had issued threats to retaliate against the United States after US bombers dropped 30,000-pound bunker-busters on Iranian underground nuclear facilities at the weekend, joining Israel's air war against Tehran.
The US al-Asad air base in Iraq had activated its air defence system out of concern of a potential attack, military sources told Reuters.
Iran's state media IRNA reported that Tehran had launched missiles at US military bases in Qatar and Iraq, but a US military official told Reuters there was no Iranian attack detected at any US military base other than in Qatar.
Kuwait and Bahrain have shut down its airspace starting Monday after Iran's strikes. (Reuters)
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Al Udeid houses not only the US Air Force's Central Command operations but also thousands of American personnel. It has long been a logistical hub for operations in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. Iran's ability to strike it, even symbolically, reveals the limits of missile defense and the new reality: Tehran can reach even the most fortified American positions. President Trump dismissed the strike as a 'very weak' response. He emphasized that no Americans or Qataris were harmed. But this rhetoric, aimed at projecting dominance, risks alienating U.S. allies, as, from Qatar's perspective, having 14 missiles rain down on its territory, including one that evaded interception, is anything but trivial. Trump's framing may suggest to Gulf states that their suffering matters less than American casualties. That could undermine faith in US. protection. 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