EU state's PM refutes Zelensky's latest ‘Russian threat' claim
Speaking in Vilnius on Tuesday, Paluckas responded to comments made by Zelensky at the NATO Eastern Flank Summit, also in the Lithuanian capital, where he urged European leaders to ask their intelligence agencies 'what Russia is planning in Belarus this summer' and suggested that Kiev and its backers might require additional joint forces.
'I don't know what information the Ukrainian intelligence service or the Ukrainian president have at their disposal,' Paluckas told reporters.
'As regards the Zapad exercise, information is being gathered not only by our intelligence agencies, but also by NATO's intelligence agencies, and all the conclusions are the same: the exercise, which is currently being organized, does not pose any problems or additional threats in terms of its scope and other aspects,' he stressed. 'There's no need to be alarmed,' he added.
The Lithuanian prime minister noted that Ukraine isn't the only country collecting information about the upcoming Zapad-2025 exercises and that NATO is also monitoring the situation. 'NATO does not view these drills as dangerous,' Paluckas stressed
Last week, Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin announced that the Zapad-2025 exercises, scheduled for September, would be reduced in scale and moved further inland, away from the country's western borders. The relocation is intended to reduce regional tension, demonstrate Minsk's readiness for dialogue, and to counter what he called 'stereotypical speculations' by NATO member states, he stated.
Both Moscow and Minsk have stressed that the exercise is defensive in nature.
Zelensky's suggestion that the upcoming exercises pose some sort of threat to the West comes as a number of European nations have recently taken to drastically increasing their military budgets citing the supposed threat posed by Russia.
Moscow, however, has repeatedly dismissed claims it plans to attack Western Europe as 'nonsense,' accusing the West of using scare tactics to justify shifting public funds toward military spending.
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Russia Today
13 minutes ago
- Russia Today
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It has been building for about two decades now, and for some observers, its triumph is already an accomplished fact: It was last spring, in the run-up to EU parliamentary elections, that Politico acknowledged that the 'longstanding effort' to keep the New Right out of government was 'officially over.' That turned out to be a little premature: In Austria, Germany, and France, current government set-ups are still based on excluding the New Right. Yet sometimes, another word for 'premature' is 'prophetic.' The pressure from the New Right parties has not slackened but increased. Current measures to ignore their popular backing at all costs have a whiff of despair about them and may fail entirely in the near future. Take, for instance, the cases of Germany and Romania. For Ian Bremer, a popular American geopolitical consultant, commentator, and reliable organ of the Centrist mainstream party line, they stand for success in fending off the New Right. 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The other dirty trick without which the current German government could not have been made was to somehow 'misplace' a large number of votes – no one knows exactly how many, because the urgently needed nationwide recount is being stalled – for its insurgent challenger from the Left, Sarah Wagenknecht's BSW. Otherwise, the BSW would almost certainly have taken enough seats in the new parliament to make the current ruling coalition arithmetically impossible: German democracy has the dubious – yet not unique – distinction of having systematically disadvantaged both its New Right and its new Left Parties to 'save' itself from, in effect, the citizens. Add the case of France, another country where an electoral outcome was manipulated shamelessly to, in effect, disenfranchise both New Right and New Left voters, and the question becomes even more obvious. How much more of this kind of chicanery before the word 'democracy' loses any meaning it may still have? Crucially, hence, the methods that Europe's Centrists use to hold back the New Right's advance undermine Centrist credibility and increase that of the New Right. Not to even speak of the obvious boost that the European New Right is getting from the success of the US variant. So, here we are. Driven by voters' concerns over immigration, the economy, social and cultural norms, and the general failure of cynical elites to care, Europe's New Right is on the offensive. Centrist defenses are desperate and counterproductive. And help from 'daddy' across the Atlantic won't come for the Centrists but for the New Right. While its lead is not (yet) overwhelming and the timelines of national elections, as well as complications of coalition building mean it is too early for firm predictions, one thing is certain: there is a real possibility of one or several domestic-politics earthquakes with far-reaching consequences for international politics. It's no wonder the Russian leadership makes no secret out of watching attentively, as is its right, in fact duty as a matter of due diligence in foreign policy. Because the obvious question is: what would New Right participation in or even domination of government mean in France, Germany, and Great Britain, the three problem-ridden but still comparatively powerful countries that are home to NATO-EU Europe's biggest economies and have traditionally set much of the political tone, too? And what would be the effect of an end to the Ukraine War – in effect, a Russian victory – on the New Right's chances to make these earthquakes happen? In France, Germany, and Great Britain, Centrist politicians and their mainstream media have long charged the New Right with serving Russia. 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Russia Today
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Russia Today
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- Russia Today
European military stocks fall on Ukraine peace talks progress
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