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Arab News
4 hours ago
- Arab News
UK shift on Palestine reinforces a historical fact
The UK recently departed from decades of foreign policy, announcing plans to recognize Palestinian statehood unless Israel takes immediate action to address the crisis in Gaza. This announcement, coming alongside France and Canada's similar moves, marks a growing shift in international support for Palestine as the UN General Assembly approaches in September. The UK's announcement, while following France and Canada's lead, is notably different in its conditional nature. The Starmer government made it clear that it would proceed with recognizing Palestine as a state only if Israel agrees to a series of significant actions. These include a ceasefire in Gaza, a commitment not to annex the West Bank, and a pledge to work toward a credible, long-term peace process aimed at achieving a two-state solution. This move has been welcomed by many in the international community, yet it has also faced significant criticism, particularly given the UK's historical role in shaping the very conditions that have led to the conflict. Before British rule, the region now known as Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire, specifically the Mutasarrifate of Jerusalem, reorganized in 1872. This area was part of the larger Ottoman province of Syria, but was granted a special administrative status. It was only with the establishment of the British Mandate for Palestine in 1920 that the term 'Palestine' began to take on its modern political meaning. Under British administration, the land was known as Mandate Palestine, with Britain trying to balance its dual commitment to both the Zionist movement and the local Arab population. The 1917 Balfour Declaration, issued by the British foreign secretary at the time, expressed 'support for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine,' leaving a historical record of British diplomatic recognition of a territory named Palestine. Despite its longstanding presence in the region, Britain has never officially recognized Palestine as a state — until now. This shift is significant, but it comes with a complex legacy. During the First World War, Britain entered into negotiations with Sharif Hussein, the leader of the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire. In exchange for Arab support, Britain promised Arab independence, a commitment later known as the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence. Though the specific interpretation of Palestine's status in this agreement has been a point of contention, this is another colonial-era record of official British utilization of the term, Palestine. While Arabs saw it as a promise for the independence of Palestine, Britain later argued that Palestine was excluded from this promise due to its strategic importance and other conflicting commitments, such as the Balfour Declaration. These historical British footnotes regarding Palestine statehood have shaped the Palestinian cause just as they have defined the very recognition of the territory itself. During the British Mandate for Palestine, Britain assumed administrative control with the aim of helping the region transition toward self-governance. One of the notable steps taken by the British was the establishment of the Palestinian passport system, which formally recognized Palestinians as residents of the Mandate, though not as a sovereign nation. These passports, issued under the Passports and Immigration Regulations, granted Palestinians some travel and residency rights, but they did not recognize Palestine as a distinct nation-state. In the first decade of the Mandate alone, about 70,000 of these documents were issued. In the context of Palestine's century-long struggle, the issuance of these documents supports one more time British utilization of the term Palestine. While the UK's announcement to recognize Palestine is a significant diplomatic step, it must be understood within the context of Britain's historical involvement in shaping the region's political landscape. Besides, this recognition carries significant geopolitical and diplomatic implications. Both the UK and Canada have tied their recognition of Palestine to specific actions from Israel or the Palestinian Authority, such as halting the expansion of Israeli settlements and agreeing to a ceasefire in Gaza. In doing so, they are responding to the urgent need for change in the region, while at the same time pushing for conditions that reflect their vision of a lasting, sustainable two-state solution. The UK's recognition, in particular, carries considerable diplomatic weight as one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. If the UK follows through, it will join France, Canada, and several other nations in formally recognizing Palestinian statehood as the world gathers in New York this September. For the Palestinian Authority, this recognition is particularly pertinent as it legitimizes the organization's aspirations for a sovereign state and enhances its standing on the international stage. UK recognition carries considerable diplomatic weight. Zaid M. Belbagi In addition to this diplomatic shift, the UK has committed significant resources to alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The UK government pledged £60 million ($80 million) in humanitarian aid in July 2025 alone, focusing on healthcare, food, water, shelter, and emergency services. This includes funding for UK-Med field hospitals, which have treated over 500,000 people during the conflict. The UK has coupled its recent diplomatic overture with a continued program of humanitarian assistance. However, this diplomatic announcement raises questions about the future of UK-Israel relations. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reacted strongly to the announcement, accusing the UK of rewarding 'Hamas' monstrous terrorism,' which signals potential strain in the longstanding bilateral relationship between the two nations, historically tied by economic, political, and diplomatic agreements. By the end of Q1 2025, total trade between the UK and Israel reached £5.8 billion, with Israeli investment in the UK contributing an additional £1 billion in gross value and creating about 16,000 British jobs. With an updated free trade agreement expected following the launch of talks in 2022, the UK's shift in policy could challenge the foundation of this economic partnership. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has made the UK's recognition of Palestine conditional, requiring Israel to take substantive steps to end the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, agree to a ceasefire, allow UN aid, halt annexations in the West Bank, and commit to a sustainable peace process aimed at reviving the two-state solution. The British government has made it clear that recognition will be upheld if these conditions are not met. However, given the current stance of Netanyahu's government, it seems unlikely that these conditions will be accepted, making the recognition of Palestine increasingly probable in the coming months. As such, the UK's recognition of Palestine before September seems all but certain, confirming what has been a historical fact.
Al Arabiya
6 hours ago
- Al Arabiya
Germany plans to cut benefits for newly arrived Ukrainian refugees, draft law shows
Germany's coalition government plans to cut state benefits for newly-arrived Ukrainian refugees, a draft law seen by Reuters showed on Wednesday, which could result in 100 euros ($116) less per month per refugee, according to estimates. Ukrainian refugees arriving in Germany benefit from the European Union's Temporary Protection Directive, which enables them to directly claim welfare benefits without going through the asylum process. Under the draft bill, Ukrainians arriving in Germany from April 1, 2025, would no longer receive Citizen's Allowance but instead receive benefits under the Asylum Seekers' Benefits Act, which are lower. There are around 1.25 million refugees from Ukraine living in Germany, and around 21,000 entered the country for the first time in connection with the Russian invasion between April 1 and June 30, 2025, according to government figures. The draft law requires cabinet and upper house of parliament approval before coming into effect by the end of the year. Germany has long been debating what level of support Ukrainian refugees should receive, as it struggles to make savings on welfare spending, with Bavarian Premier Markus Soeder on Sunday calling for all Ukrainian refugees, not just new arrivals, to be excluded from the higher benefits. Approximately 64.1 percent of the labor agency registered Ukrainian nationals in July 2025 were not employed, including those jobless, in courses, or receiving employment-related support.
Al Arabiya
9 hours ago
- Al Arabiya
From strength to survival: Iran's weakened position in EU nuclear talks
Iran and the EU-3 – composed of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany – have resumed high-stakes diplomatic talks amid growing urgency over the fate of the United Nations 'snapback' sanctions mechanism. At the center of the current discussions is one critical question: Will the EU trigger the reimposition of sweeping UN sanctions on Iran by the fast-approaching October 18 deadline, or will it strike a deal to avert that outcome? The answer may shape the future of Iran's nuclear ambitions, the security of the broader Middle East, and the survival of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). While the talks are ongoing, the clock is ticking – and the EU must weigh its leverage, political calculations, and the window of opportunity before it loses the snapback option for good. For all the latest headlines, follow our Google News channel online or via the app. The snapback mechanism is not merely symbolic. It carries immense legal and political weight. Embedded within UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, the snapback provision allows any participant of the deal to unilaterally reimpose all prior UN sanctions if Iran is found to be in significant noncompliance. Crucially, no permanent member of the Security Council can veto this reimposition once triggered. If the mechanism is invoked, it sets off a 30-day process, after which the sanctions automatically return unless a resolution to the contrary is adopted – which is effectively impossible, given the veto rights of permanent members. This means that the EU-3 can, on their own, restore sanctions targeting Iran's arms imports and exports, financial networks, missile activity, nuclear program, and senior officials. The impact would be catastrophic for Iran's already reeling economy. However, if the EU fails to trigger snapback before October 18, the legal window for doing so permanently closes, stripping Europe of one of its last pieces of meaningful leverage. To assess whether a deal is possible and what it may look like, it is essential to understand the current position of both parties – their interests, their leverage, and their political will. On the Iranian side, the calculus has changed drastically since the 12-day war in June. That short but destructive conflict, which involved Israeli airstrikes and coordinated US cyber and kinetic operations, dealt a punishing blow to Iran's military and nuclear infrastructure. Critical facilities at Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan were targeted and damaged, setting back the country's nuclear program by years. In the past, Iran came to the negotiating table from a position of strength, with its uranium enrichment close to weapons-grade levels and its regional proxies exerting significant pressure on Western allies. Today, the picture is far bleaker for Tehran. By initiating talks with the West so soon after a humiliating strategic setback, the Iranian government has made clear that it is under serious internal and external pressure. Indeed, Tehran's desperation is palpable. Iranian leaders are acutely aware that if negotiations fail and the EU triggers snapback, the resulting sanctions will cripple an economy already grappling with inflation, currency collapse, and chronic unemployment. Moreover, Iran's global diplomatic isolation would deepen, its regional posture would further erode, and its leaders would risk heightened domestic dissent at a precarious time. In this context, the government is willing to talk – not because it seeks reconciliation with the West, but because it has no viable alternative. Refusing to engage would all but guarantee a return to international isolation and severe multilateral sanctions. As such, Iranian officials most likely view these talks not as an opportunity but as a necessity for survival. Even more importantly, Iran now has little to lose by accepting constraints on its nuclear program. In earlier rounds of diplomacy, its nuclear advances gave it bargaining power – and a real incentive to preserve those gains through concessions. Today, after Israeli sabotage, US strikes, and internal setbacks, Iran's nuclear infrastructure is in disrepair. Large portions of its advanced centrifuges have been destroyed or disabled, and its stockpile of highly enriched uranium has been diminished. With the program stalled, agreeing to rollbacks or inspections may offer Iran more diplomatic gains than operational losses. In short, from Tehran's perspective, a deal is a net benefit – or at least a damage-control strategy. Had its program remained intact and close to threshold status, Iran might have resisted constraints. But in the current landscape, there is little strategic value in clinging to a weakened position. This reality shifts the balance of leverage sharply in favor of the EU-3. In past negotiations, Iran approached the table from a position of confidence, buoyed by advances in its enrichment and military capabilities. Now, its ability to pressure the West is severely curtailed. The loss of military credibility following the 12-day war, the exposure of vulnerabilities in Iran's missile defense systems, and the visible degradation of its proxy networks in Lebanon and Iraq have all undercut Iran's posture as a formidable regional actor. In the current talks, Tehran lacks the nuclear, economic, and geopolitical tools it once relied on. The EU, on the other hand, holds perhaps its final card: The snapback mechanism. This is a rare moment when Europe has significant leverage – and it knows it. Given that leverage, the EU is unlikely to settle for superficial concessions. First and foremost, they would more likely want Iran to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), grant unfettered access to nuclear sites, and resolve longstanding questions about undeclared uranium traces and unreported activities. These issues have stalled inspections for years and undermined global confidence in Iran's compliance. More likely, the EU will push for a return to the JCPOA framework: Strict caps on enrichment levels, limited stockpiles, and comprehensive inspections. This aligns with the legal structure of snapback, which is embedded in the JCPOA, and allows the EU to act within a familiar and internationally recognized system. There is also the issue of timing. Even if both sides want a deal, hammering out the details – especially on IAEA access, enrichment caps, and verification protocols – will require time. To account for this, the EU may offer Iran a provisional extension: A pause on snapback proceedings in exchange for immediate, verifiable actions from Tehran. These could include reinstallation of monitoring equipment, restoration of IAEA access, and a written commitment to return to JCPOA limitations. Such a move would allow the EU to retain its leverage while giving diplomats room to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement. The extension would not be indefinite; it would likely come with a clear deadline and explicit conditions. But it could serve as a bridge to avoid an October collapse in diplomacy. However, European leaders must be wary of Iran's potential strategy: to offer just enough cooperation to let the snapback deadline pass, and then walk away from further commitments. If October 18 arrives without snapback being triggered, the legal authority to reimpose these UN sanctions vanishes – possibly forever. After that, any effort to replicate such sanctions would require a full Security Council resolution, which China and Russia would almost certainly veto. That dynamic has already played out before when the arms embargo on Iran expired in 2020. The EU cannot afford to repeat that mistake. If it allows the snapback deadline to lapse based on vague or reversible Iranian pledges, it may find itself permanently disarmed in future negotiations. In conclusion, a deal between Iran and the EU-3 to prevent the reimposition of snapback sanctions remains within reach — but only if Europe uses its leverage wisely and Iran shows real, verifiable steps toward compliance. Tehran is politically isolated, economically battered, and militarily weakened after a devastating war. Its nuclear program is in disarray, and its traditional tools of pressure are largely ineffective. For Iran, agreeing to inspections and returning to JCPOA limits may be the only path to survival. The EU, for its part, has a rare moment of strategic advantage, holding the key to sanctions that could cripple Iran's economy. But that leverage will evaporate after October 18. The ball is in Europe's court. Whether it acts decisively or hesitates will determine the future of nuclear diplomacy in the Middle East.
