Chinese ring suspected of using cryptocurrency to launder ¥50 billion in fraud proceeds
According to police, Lin Mingwang, 38, and his accomplices allegedly laundered 80 million yen at the request of an investment fraud group based in Thailand and Vietnam, converted the money into cryptocurrency and then returned it to the fraud group.
Police did not reveal whether the suspects admit to violating the Organized Crime Punishment Act.
Police believe the group made it difficult to trace the funds by passing them through multiple corporate accounts, as well as cryptocurrency and overseas accounts. Lin Mingwang (X)
Lin who is an executive at a real estate company in Adachi Ward. He is said to be the ringleader. Another suspect, 45-year-old Qu Sihao, lives in Kyoto City, Kyot Prefecture.
In one case, the suspects received funds into their account from a man in his 70s from Nara City, Nara Prefecture. The man had been swindled on social media by one of the aforementioned investment fraud groups.
Lin's ring is believed to have managed approximately 300 corporate accounts. Some of these accounts were provided by Qu.
The total amount of funds transferred between the accounts was approximately 50 billion yen.
Police are continuing the investigation.
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According to Qiushi, the CCP's authoritative theory journal, a maritime power can 'exert its great comprehensive power to develop, utilize, protect, manage, and control oceans.' China is not such a power because it does not yet control all its maritime claims. Accordingly, China is rapidly modernizing its military and paramilitary forces to equip the country with a 'powerful' navy and an 'advanced' maritime law enforcement fleet that can – and will – secure China's territorial claims against a 'strong enemy.' Relatedly, the CCP in 2012 created the 'Central Maritime Rights Protection Leading Small Group' to coordinate policy related to maritime claims, demonstrating long-term institutional focus on this issue. Finally, China's conception of its 'core interests' includes the country's maritime claims, indicating Beijing will not relinquish them. 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Manila's toleration of Beijing's illegal intrusions in this period cemented a troubling status quo: sea-grabbing for peace and economic benefit. Marcos, Duterte's successor, reversed this approach, directly confronting China over its illegal presence and aggression in Philippine waters. After taking office in 2022, his government has sought to rebuff China in the diplomatic, military, legal, and information sectors. Diplomatically, the Philippines has bolstered its bilateral and multilateral relationships with like-minded countries like Japan and Australia and deepened its alliance with the United States, including by providing Washington access to more bases under the countries' Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Militarily, Manila has hosted U.S. missile systems that threaten Chinese assets in the South China Sea, bolstered military and surveillance infrastructure on its main archipelago and on its Spratly outposts, and reinforced its presence around maritime flashpoints contested by China – including Scarborough Shoal. Legally, the government ratified domestic law that outlines Manila's territorial waters as provided by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). And in the information domain, the Philippines has operated a documentation-and-exposure campaign against Chinese aggression through journalists embarked on PCG ships. This approach has largely deterred Beijing from expanding its control of Philippine waters, even while China continuously operates in this territory. Of course, China could leverage its overwhelming military and paramilitary advantages over the Philippines to destroy any Philippine forces in its path. Beijing has refused this option because it remains unwilling to bear the consequences of escalating to lethal force – namely, debilitating reputational costs and a potential military clash with the United States. That said, the incident on August 11 is not the first time that China's aggression has come dangerously close to killing Philippine personnel. In June 2024, CCG sailors boarded Philippine Navy rigid-hulled inflatable boats attempting to resupply Manila's garrison on Second Thomas Shoal. The CCG personnel threatened the Philippine servicemen with bladed weapons and illegally towed several Philippine vessels away from the maritime feature. During the incident, two ships crushed a Philippine sailor's hand, severing his thumb. China and the Philippines concluded an opaque 'provisional agreement' shortly after, and Beijing has not attempted to interrupt any Second Thomas resupply mission since. Beijing likely judged that further escalation could lead to death, which would significantly complicate China's strategic position. Indeed, at a forum in April 2024, Marcos asserted that any Chinese action that killed a Philippine servicemember would be grounds to invoke the MDT with the United States. 'As long as they have actually caused casualties, and it has killed the serviceman… whatever their designation are… That is an attack to the Philippines by a foreign power,' he said. Just before the June 2024 incident, Marcos reiterated this red line at the Shangri-La Dialogue. He stated that if a Philippine serviceman were killed in a 'willful act,' it would come 'very, very close to what we define as an act of war,' adding that his 'treaty partners also hold that same standard.' For Washington's part, a readout of a January 2025 call between U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo stated that Rubio 'underscored the United States' ironclad commitments to the Philippines under our Mutual Defense Treaty.' This statement mirrors language from the Biden Administration, demonstrating Washington's bipartisan commitment to its ally. Escalation Risk Remains High Neither Beijing nor Manila is likely to cede their overlapping claims going forward. China will keep acting aggressively to press its claims, and the Philippines will keep defending its EEZ. These diametrically-opposed positions create an unsustainable escalation risk that could yield great power conflict. Of course, the arbitral tribunal has already rejected China's claims as unlawful under UNCLOS. But appealing to norms and international law has proven ineffective. Since Beijing responds to power, Washington and Manila must demonstrate it through concrete actions that raise the cost for Chinese aggression. First, Washington and Manila must organize industrial, military, and economic initiatives with themselves and other partners to develop hard power capabilities that qualitatively and quantitatively best those of China. Intermittent capacity purchases and transfers, like the kind the Philippines concluded with India and France, are not nearly enough to address China's formidable maritime forces and missile arsenal. The United States' significant investments into Philippine maritime and defense capacity over the past four years is a good start, but the partners must now deepen multilateral cooperation of the same type. The U.S.-Philippines-Japan-Australia multilateral and the U.S.-Philippines-Japan trilateral should pour more resources into existing capacity-building programs to field multilateral capabilities – including maritime domain awareness systems and attritable autonomous platforms – that negate China's maritime advantages. Second, Washington, Manila, and their partners should apply this power superiority to build influence structures that shape China's maritime behavior away from aggression. This involves proactively altering China's strategic environment through measures like permanently expanded military operations, missile system rotations, and multilateral drills to complicate Beijing's operations. The allies should also formulate comprehensive trade agreements and capital alternatives to dilute China's economic coercive potential, while launching diplomatic and legal challenges to damage China's global reputation. The allies should also apply immediate and automatic countermeasures in reaction to Chinese aggression or violations of Philippine sovereignty. These should include multilateral exercises in sensitive areas on short notice, deployment of additional military articles like missile systems, sanctions and tariffs on involved Chinese persons and entities, offensive cyber operations against Chinese persons and government agencies involved in maritime disputes, and legal challenges in relevant courts and institutions. The combination of altering China's strategic environment and punishing each transgression will compel China to decrease, and over time, cease its South China Sea aggression. However, this approach will be expensive, coordination-intensive, and carries short-term escalation risks. China at first will likely respond with its own countermeasures, requiring sustained multilateral commitment and careful escalation management. To lower escalation risks, the allies should maintain diplomatic channels to prevent miscalculation and provide China with face-saving alternatives, even while committing to their strategy. The hardened positions of China and the Philippines constitute a strategic powder keg ready to burst. These proposed recommendations will be expensive and require unprecedented multilateral coordination. But implementing them will convince China that it no longer enjoys 'strategic opportunities' in the South China Sea, forcing Beijing to back down by raising the costs for its maritime aggression.
