What to Expect From Trump's Visit to the Middle East
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Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer plans political retirement, senior officials say
Government officials reported that while Ron Dermer has not set a departure date, he might stay on for a few short-term diplomatic efforts before officially resigning. Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer, who has led Israel's negotiating team in hostage deal talks, intends to retire from politics in the coming months, senior government officials told Israel Hayom on Monday. The officials reported that while Dermer has not set a departure date, he might stay on for a few short-term diplomatic efforts before officially resigning. It's also possible that he could resign sooner. During Israel's Security Cabinet meeting on Thursday evening, where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's proposal to occupy Gaza City was approved, Dermer told ministers that Washington's position on a hostage deal, as conveyed by US special envoy Steve Witkoff to the families of hostages, was "all or nothing," Ynet reported. He emphasized that this stance remained the same, asserting that securing a comprehensive deal, which would ensure the release of all 50 hostages, both living and deceased, was the best option. Dermer further mentioned that while mediators might present a partial deal for negotiations, there was little time for such a compromise. 'We don't have all the time in the world, and not from [US President Donald] Trump's perspective either. He can't allow the war to drag on,' Dermer said, as quoted by Ynet. 'If talks continue for too long, we can't afford a partial deal. After a 60-day pause, we may lose the political capital needed to resume fighting.' Praise and criticism for Dermer In June, Shas chairman Arye Deri praised Dermer for his critical role in the joint Israel-US strike on Iran's nuclear program. 'I saw what he did. He has been focused on the Iranian issue for 25 years. From the moment Donald Trump was elected, he felt a mission,' Deri said. 'He worked with Steve Witkoff, Senator Marco Rubio, the president, the vice president; everyone respects him. Ron Dermer is God's messenger.' However, not all have been supportive. In May, families of the hostages called for Dermer's resignation as head of the negotiating team, citing the lack of progress in securing the release of any more hostages. '100 days, 0 hostages released, families of the hostages demand the resignation of Minister Dermer from the head of the negotiation team,' their letter read. Solve the daily Crossword
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Turkey to provide Syria with weapon systems, equipment under new accord
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Sharaa's Islamist army fuels Syria's descent into sectarian slaughter
BEHIND THE LINES: In just eight months of Sunni Islamist rule in Syria, already three large-scale incidents of sectarian violence have taken place. Footage has emerged this week showing the killing of a volunteer paramedic at a hospital in Sweida, Syria, by armed men affiliated with the Syrian government of interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa. The killing was recorded by CCTV at the hospital and released on Sunday by the local Suweida 24 outlet. The footage indicates that the killing took place during a rampage by the government-affiliated fighters through Sweida's main hospital. The entry of the government's men into the medical facility took place in the context of the violence between Bedouin tribesmen and Druze Syrians, which erupted on July 13. The government fighters had been dispatched to the area to separate the clashing sides. Once there, however, they began to target the Druze. The shared Sunni sectarian loyalties were the decisive element. Ninety bodies were later discovered on the hospital grounds. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that 1,400 people lost their lives during the July fighting, many of them Druze civilians. The July incidents in Syria were the third instance of large-scale sectarian bloodletting in the country since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. The first major eruption was in March, when Islamist gunmen affiliated with the government descended on the western coastal area, after a government checkpoint was attacked by gunmen loyal to the old regime. The coastal area and Latakia province are the heartland of the Alawi community, from which the Assads hail. Over 1,000 people were butchered in what followed. In the subsequent months, there have been a series of reports indicating that ongoing abductions of young Alawi women have been taking place. The authorities of the new government are slow to investigate these occurrences. The second series of incidents took place in April, after a forged message supposedly of a Druze cleric insulting Muhammed, the prophet of Islam, was circulated. Around 100 people lost their lives in the fighting that followed, as Sunni Islamist fighters affiliated with the government attacked the Druze-majority Damascus suburbs of Jaramana and Ashrafieh. So, in just eight months of Sunni Islamist rule in Syria, already three large-scale incidents of sectarian violence have taken place. The three incidents have several factors in common: In all cases, the violence was directed by Sunni Islamists against one of Syria's minority communities. And, perhaps yet more significantly, in all cases, the perpetrators were linked, directly or tangentially, to the current ruling authorities in Damascus. Lessons learned from eight months of Sunni Islamist rule in Syria CAN LESSONS and patterns be learned and discerned from these events? If so, what do these imply for the likely future direction of dam? Most obviously, we can confidently lay to rest the assertion that Sharaa and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) represented something entirely new in the annals of Sunni political Islam. Sharaa's career has certainly been extraordinary. In less than two decades, he went from the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda and an American prison cell, to the presidential palace in Damascus. He and his organization have demonstrated a tactical flexibility and shrewdness hitherto unseen in the ranks of the Salafi jihadi Islamism, from which they emerged. Previously, Salafi jihadi efforts at governance – such as the short-lived ISIS caliphate of 2014 to 2019 – have tended to disappear in fire and smoke as a result of an inability to make tactical alliances. HTS was different. Its ability to cut off and crush more extreme elements opposing its path, and then to form its crucial alliance with Turkey, made possible the slow buildup of forces that eventually led to the fateful march on Damascus in late November 2024. But subsequent evidence suggests that the differences between the HTS regime in Damascus and earlier experiments in Salafi-jihadi governance may be more a matter of tactics than strategy. There are two separate elements to the picture that deserve closer consideration. HTS has grown since entering Damascus It's important to remember that HTS was a relatively small organization when it entered Damascus in late 2024. At that time, it probably numbered around 45,000 fighters. This is obviously nowhere near enough to administer a large area containing over 15 million people. HTS, inevitably, found itself reliant on other Sunni Islamist elements to help provide 'security' in the area it controls (the 70% of Syria's territory located west of the Euphrates River). Some of these elements, in particular groups associated with the Turkish-supported 'Syrian National Army,' had a well-earned reputation for sectarian slaughter. These elements appear to have been disproportionately responsible for the massacre of Alawis in March. Still, the Sunni Islamists only entered the area after there were calls in official channels for 'popular participation' in government efforts against the Alawis. Part of the picture of the sectarian atrocities since November 2024 can be attributed to the general commonality that exists between HTS and other less disciplined, and more murderous Sunni Islamist forces, and HTS's own limited strength. But it is clear that something more systematic is under way: the now well-ordered and long-term incorporation by HTS of a variety of these Islamist and Sunni jihadi forces into the new security forces and army that it is building. Unsurprisingly, the Sunni Islamist rulers of Syria are building an army resting on Sunni Islamist and jihadi commanders. That army, again unsurprisingly, behaves in the way that would generally be associated with Sunni Islamists when faced with non-Muslim populations. THE INCORPORATION of jihadis with a long record of sectarian attacks on civilians has been apparent for a while. Muhammed al-Jassim, for example, a well-known Islamist commander from northern Syria, guilty of numerous well-documented crimes against the Kurdish population in northwest Syria (recorded by this newspaper), has now been appointed the commander of the 25th division in the new Syrian army. His colleague, Saif Abu Bakr, with a similarly rich combat record against defenseless non-Arab or non-Muslim civilians, now heads the 76th division of the same new army. A recent report by the Alma research center details the names of 22 officials with verified Sunni jihadi backgrounds who hold senior positions in the emergent military structures of the new regime. These include 'the defense minister, deputy defense minister, army chief of staff, commander of the Republican guard, air force commander, 14 division commanders, a deputy division commander, a division chief of staff, and a brigade commander.' Where may all this be heading? Last week, a conference was held in the city of Hasakah, east of the Euphrates, under the auspices of the Syrian Democratic Council. Hasakah is located in the 30% of Syria controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The conference was convened by Ilham Ahmed, SDC's foreign minister, and was attended by Druze leader Hikmat al Hijri and Alawi council head Ghazal Ghazal. There is no indication that this dialogue has any security or self-defense component. But if the emergent Sunni Islamist, jihadi army and regime in Damascus continues its practice of rebranding sectarian killers as 'division commanders,' and engaging in periodic acts of slaughter against non-Muslim or non-Arab populations, it is very likely that such a counter-arrangement will eventually emerge.
