India's TeamLease posts quarterly profit rise on higher staffing demand
Consolidated net profit rose to 265.4 million rupees ($3.03 million) for the three-month period ended June 30, from 207.9 million rupees a year earlier.
Revenue from the general staffing business - which contributes more than 92% to the total - rose 11%. The division provides contractual roles across non-IT sectors including manufacturing, retail and telecom.
Revenue from the specialised staffing division - its second-largest vertical - rose 22%, driven by robust demand from global capability centres (GCCs), which offer software, finance, and R&D support to their global parent firms.
This lifted total revenue by 12.1% to 28.91 billion rupees.
"Resilient demand from enterprise clients and tech profiles in non-tech companies and global capability centers, have helped sustain the growth momentum," said Managing Director Ashok Reddy.
Still, Reddy noted that "persistent" macro headwinds in banking and software sectors hurt overall demand in the first quarter amid hiring freezes and layoffs at major tech firms.
Earlier this week, peer Quess Corp (QUEC.NS), opens new tab clocked a 4% growth in quarterly profit.
TeamLease's shares closed 2.4% lower ahead of its results on Thursday and are down 38% so far this year.
($1 = 87.5930 Indian rupees)
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