St. Petersburg child agency requires foster parents to prove they haven't ‘changed their sex' — Novaya Gazeta Europe
Child protection services in St. Petersburg now require individuals seeking to adopt or arrange custody over children to certify that they have not ever 'changed their sex', investigative media outlet IStories reported on Friday, citing prospective foster parents and employees from the organisation.
According to IStories, St. Petersburg guardianship offices began to require such certification in 2024, despite national legislation not listing it as an official requirement for adoption.
In July 2023, the Russian State Duma passed a widely criticised 'sex change' law, which bans gender-affirming surgery, forbids transgender people from changing their gender in official documents and prevents them from adopting children.
One woman who applied for guardianship of a child in summer 2024 told IStories that she was asked by the agency to obtain a birth certificate from the civil registry office to 'prove' her sex and gender.
'The guardianship officer told me, 'We're embarrassed ourselves to ask for a certificate that you haven't changed gender. We even ask elderly people who are applying for guardianship over incapacitated children'', she said.
'Their explanation was that they'd get in trouble if they accepted the documents without this certificate. I found it ridiculous … I have given birth to five children. What doubts could there possibly be in my case?' she added.
Lawyers interviewed by IStories say that child protection services cannot legitimately require potential foster parents to provide such information, as it is not an official requirement for Russian citizens residing in the country, according to federal law.
Though the 2023 anti-trans law does prohibit transgender people from adopting children, only foreign, stateless, or Russian individuals that permanently live abroad are legally obligated to sign a document testifying that they have never undergone a 'sex change' when seeking to become foster parents, the lawyers told IStories.
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He holds an LL.M. in Global Environment and Climate Change Law from the University of Edinburgh, a Double Master's in European Studies (Euroculture) from Uppsala and Jagiellonian universities, and Bachelor's and Specialist degrees in International Law and International Relations from Kyiv National Taras Shevchenko University. New Eastern Europe is a reader supported publication. Please support us and help us reach our goal of $10,000! We are nearly there. Donate by clicking on the button below. Baltic Sea, Eastern flank, hybrid threats, infrastructure, Nordic countries, Northern Europe, Scandinavia, sea cables, shadow fleet
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