Russian presidential security official Shoigu arrives in North Korea, reports Tass
Russia's top presidential security adviser Sergei Shoigu was expected to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un after arriving in Pyongyang 'on special instructions' from President Vladimir Putin, Russia's Tass news agency reported on Tuesday.
Shoigu will hold talks with the North Korean 'leadership on implementing agreements' reached during his visit earlier this month under the comprehensive strategic partnership treaty signed by the two leaders last year, Tass reported.
It did not elaborate on the details of Shoigu's expected talks or Putin's instructions.
The visit by Shoigu is the third in nearly three months as the two countries rapidly advanced diplomatic and security ties in the past two years, including North Korea's military support for Russia in the war against Ukraine.
A Reuters investigation has found North Korea has supplied millions of artillery rounds and thousands of troops to Russia for fighting in Ukraine.
Kim has expressed 'unconditional support' for Russia's policies amid concerns by South Korean and Western officials that North Korea may be receiving Moscow's help with advanced military technology and economic assistance.
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