How India's New FTAs Reflect a Particular Geopolitical Vision

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How India's New FTAs Reflect a Particular Geopolitical Vision
Sharmila Kantha
3 minutes ago
As India inks a landmark trade deal with the UK, it's clear: a decisive pivot is underway. FTAs are no longer just economic instruments – they're now central to India's global power play.
Representative image. Photo: www.facebook.com/DeptofCommerceIndia.
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India is according a ' high degree of urgency ' to entering into free trade agreements (FTAs) with the United States, the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom and other advanced nations, which are seen as complementary, more competitive and open-market economies with conducive business environments. The process of negotiations has gained intensity since US President Trump's announcements on 'reciprocal tariffs' to be imposed on all its trading partners. While the stated additional tariffs of 26% on Indian goods have been deferred by 90 days as with other countries, during Prime Minister Modi's visit to the US in February 2025, India and the US had already decided to finalise the first phase of a Bilateral Trade Agreement by the fourth quarter of 2025. They further agreed upon the terms of reference for the negotiations during US Vice President Vance's visit to India in April 2025.
The renewed focus on FTAs with developed countries is part of a shift in India's global economic strategy over the last few years, where it has prioritised leveraging its own large market for better access to partner markets with transparent trading mechanisms. Accordingly, trade and economic agreements have been inked with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), United Arab Emirates, Australia, and Mauritius over the last five years. The India-UK FTA was concluded this month, with the text of the many chapters yet to be finalised. In addition, negotiations are ongoing with New Zealand, Qatar, and Oman.
Act East policy and the evolution of India's trade agreements
India's first economic agreement took place with Sri Lanka in 1999, followed up with a spate of pacts with Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Singapore, and others. While some of the agreements were comprehensive in scope, covering trade in goods and services and investments, others related to preferential trade agreements with limited concessions on both sides. Agreements with both developed and middle-income countries to the east of India were aimed at enhancing India's participation in global value chains, lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers in rapidly growing markets, and building strategic partnerships beyond trade. For example, the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement came into force on 1 January 2010, followed by the ASEAN-India Trade in Services Agreement and the ASEAN-India Investment Agreement, both signed in November 2014. These pacts solidified India's 'Look East' policy, which was later upgraded to the 'Act East' policy.
At the same time, many rounds of discussions were held, including with the EU, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Australia, and New Zealand, which did not yield outcomes and were shelved. Thus, there was a gap of several years before India revisited its FTA policy (Kumar 2025).
India's trade performance with major partners
This gap arose as data on existing agreements revealed that India's imports from its FTA partners rose at a faster pace than its exports, leading to growing trade deficits with these countries (Srivastava 2025).
Over a longer term, it has been found that the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of India's imports and exports for the period 2009-10 to 2023-24 has varied greatly, and within this, trade with FTA partners has been relatively subdued as compared to trade with other major partners.
Table 1. India's imports and exports with select economies, 2009-10 and 2023-24, in US$ million
Imports Exports
Country/Region 2009-10 2023-24 CAGR % 2009-10 2023-24 CAGR %
EU 34 61.5 4.3 29.9 75.9 6.9 ^
EFTA 15.6 22 2.5 0.8 1.9 6.2
UK* 4.5 8.4 4.6 6.2 13 5.4
US 17 42.2 6.7 19.5 77.5 10.4 ^
Australia* 12.4 16.2 1.9 1.3 7.9 13.3 ^
ASEAN # 25.8 79.7 8.4 18.1 41.2 6.1
Indonesia # 8.7 23.4 7.4 3.1 6 4.9
Malaysia # 5.2 12.8 6.7 2.8 7.2 7 ^
Singapore # 6.5 21.2 8.9 7.6 14.4 4.7
Thailand # 2.9 9.9 9.1 1.7 5 7.9 ^
Vietnam # 0.5 9.3 22.9 1.8 5.5 8.1 ^
GCC 53.5 105.5 5 30.8 56.3 4.5
China 30.8 101.7 8.9 11.6 16.7 2.6
Japan # 6.7 17.7 7.1 3.6 5.2 2.5
South Korea # 8.6 21.1 6.7 3.4 6.4 4.6
SAARC 1.7 5.2 8.5 8.4 25.6 8.3 ^
India's Total 288.4 678.2 6.3 178.8 437.1 6.6
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Department of Commerce, Government of India.
Note:
* denotes countries with recent agreements
# denotes countries/regions with which FTAs have been in place for several years
^ denotes countries with which India has a higher export CAGR than its overall export CAGR
India's export CAGR for 2009-10 to 2023-24 was 6.6%. In Table 1, it may be seen that the pace of India's exports has been particularly brisk for countries/regions with which India does not yet have an FTA. For example, exports to the US grew by over 10% CAGR during the period 2009-10 to 2023-24. In Australia, where the FTA was not implemented until the end of December 2022, the CAGR stood at over 13%.
A significant concern is the poor growth in exports to Japan and South Korea at a rate of just 2.5% and 4.6% respectively, far below India's overall CAGR. Despite a comprehensive agreement in place with South Korea since 2010 and with Japan since 2011, exports to these countries have been slow to grow, even for goods where India has a comparative advantage, such as garments and pharmaceuticals. However, both countries have preferred the investment route in economic engagement with India and have seen high success in manufacturing in India across sectors such as consumer durables and automobiles. Storied brands operating in the country, including Suzuki, Toyota, Samsung and LG, among many others, have also built significant exports from India.
Trade with SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) countries, where the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) is in place, expanded significantly faster than India's overall trade, for both exports and imports, although the trade balance is overwhelmingly in India's favour. As a large economy of the region, it should attempt to build and diversify its imports from these countries to address the trade imbalance as well as to build its own regional value chains with its friendly neighbours. The fact that the CAGR for India's imports is a little higher than the CAGR for exports to these countries is encouraging, with Bangladesh seeing a CAGR of 15% and Sri Lanka at close to 10%, although the value is below US$ 2 billion for each.
On the import side, India's imports from its FTA partners have certainly grown faster than its exports to these countries and also faster than its total imports. The five large ASEAN economies were particularly successful in addressing the Indian market, especially Vietnam, from where imports increased almost 18 times during the period. The non-FTA partner countries with which imports grew faster than total imports include China and the US.
Barriers to trade and the way forward
India is currently reviewing the older FTAs with its Act East partners, ASEAN, Japan and South Korea. However, the negotiations have not concluded even after several years of discussions. In most cases, the non-tariff barriers that India faces vis-à-vis these partners relate to standards and certifications which apply to their imports from all their source partners, and it is unlikely that these would be scaled down for India. In addition, some of the countries export primary or intermediate goods to India, which are needed for its manufacturing sector. Further, India's tariffs were higher at the outset than the tariffs prevalent in these partner countries, and hence the concessions were deeper, encouraging faster growth in imports from these countries.
The discussions with the US and the EU, which are keenly eyeing the large and growing Indian market, are also posing certain challenges, which are present in the India-UK FTA as well. First, the FTAs necessitate deeper tariff cuts from India as the tariff rates in these economies are already quite low (before the US reciprocal tariffs take effect).
Two, India faces stringent non-tariff measures and non-trade-related issues in these countries. For instance, India has stressed that the EU's carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) go beyond trade, and if the EU continues to insist on these issues, an FTA would be difficult to finalise.
Three, sectors such as dairy products, agricultural goods, automobiles, and alcohol are also sticking points in these negotiations. Again, the India-UK FTA will set a precedent in these sectors.
Finally, the Western countries are keen to include issues such as labour, intellectual property, sustainability, and data management, among others, that could be onerous for India to meet (Kumar 2025). Carbon tax, immigration, and investment regulations were issues of fervent discussions with the UK, and several of the chapters included in the agreement such as government procurement, anti-corruption, and gender equity are a first for India. The extent to which India cedes policy space in these areas will be known only after the legal texts are finalised.
Thus, there could be a repeat of the earlier experience of FTAs with low utilisation rates by Indian exporters (Choudhury 2023). Following the US tariff shock, there may be a softening of stance in these partners as well as in India's position. However, the new FTAs are likely to be more complex and demanding for India, and their optimal utilisation will depend largely on India's own internal reforms.
While India intensifies its FTA negotiations with Western countries, its Act East policy must also remain proactive to enhance the country's strategic presence in its proximate neighborhood. Among the Asian economies, Japan and South Korea have been staunch partners for India's growth, and other economies continue to grow rapidly and deepen their integration into global value chains. As global trade shifts, India needs to be strongly linked to these value chains. Deeper economic engagement with these countries will help strengthen the gains of the decades-long policy. In a changing global trade regime, India must tread with care to balance the markets to its West and East and align its geopolitical and geo-economic objectives.
Sharmila Kantha is an industrial policy specialist with Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). Associated with Indian industry for over 20 years, she has worked extensively on issues relating to economic policy and India's international economic engagement. She is the author of three books on Indian business history and her articles have been published on several websites.
This article was originally published on Ideas for India.
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