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Time Magazine
13 minutes ago
- Time Magazine
The Violent Gaza-ification of the West Bank
With all eyes on Gaza and on the fallout from Israel's war on five other fronts—Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Iranian militias in Syria and Iraq, as well as Iran itself—few have noted the unprecedented uptick in violence in the West Bank. Even the murder earlier in July of Saif Musallet, an American citizen, and the attack on CNN's Jeremy Diamond as he was on his way to visit the family of the slain American—both by violent West Bank settlers—did little to attract attention to what is an increasingly unstable tinderbox, fanned by convergence of troubling factors Although President Donald Trump's early January decision to lift sanctions on settlers sent the wrong message, a series of significant developments on the ground have triggered the dramatic increase in West Bank violence: Israeli extremists seizing what they see as an opportunity; their leaders using government platforms to provide support; the IDF looking the other way; and many Palestinian youth becoming radicalized. Looming over it all is the shadow of two of the most extreme leaders of the annexationist minority in Israel, entrusted, since late 2022, by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with portfolios directly relevant to West Bank policies. One, Itamar Ben Gvir, a self-proclaimed Jewish Supremacist, controls the national police force. Since entering office, he has enacted a 'hands of' policy concerning Jewish settler terrorists, relaxed the prerequisites for owning weapons and, prioritizing West Bank settlers, launched a campaign for Israelis to arm themselves. The other, Bezalel Smotrich, employs his dual position as minister of finance and as a minister in the ministry of defense in the service of his three publicly declared objectives: rapid expansion of Jewish settlements, increase pressure on Palestinians to emigrate, and financially choking the Palestinian Authority to bring about its collapse. A third, Minister of Defense Israel Katz, added fuel to the fire on Nov. 22, 2024, by depriving the Shin Bet (Israel's Internal Security Agency) of a vital instrument in dealing with Jewish detainees: administrative detention. With settlers following legal advice not to cooperate with investigators and as evidence obtained by clandestine means cannot be used in an open court lest it exposes sources, court-supervised administrative detention has long proved essential in fighting terrorism—from extreme settlers or otherwise. Emboldened by their leaders' serving in such powerful positions, extremist settlers—by now organized and armed—have made the most of the situation as the Israeli public and the world at large focuses on Gaza. The result: The number of incidents involving armed settlers assaulting Palestinian villages has increased dramatically over the past three years, doubling during the first half of 2025 as compared to the same period the previous year. An additional factor relates to the IDF. Its manpower stretched to the limit, and the top brass consumed by tending to simultaneous challenges from several fronts, lower-rank commanders of units deployed to the West Bank are often reluctant to confront violent settlers, primarily because of the support they enjoy from senior government circles. Last, but hardly least: With West Bank Palestinians harassed by settlers day and night, Palestinian youth, who are being put at risk, find neither the IDF nor the nearly bankrupt Palestinian Authority protecting their families. Images of the endless suffering of Gazans add to the combustible mix. With no hope for a better future, certainly not independence—which the current Israeli government vehemently opposes—their elders, scarred by the pains of the Second Intifada, have no persuasive argument to dissuade them from repeating what the elders have long concluded was a mistake: armed resistance. Consequently, young West Bank Palestinians are increasingly inclined to join militant groups or form their own, and take to arms. Thus, Israeli extremists and radicalized Palestinians feed on each other, using each other to justify violence, killing innocents, vandalizing property, and risking a major conflagration in the process. 'Terrorism is terrorism, regardless of religion, race, or gender,' declared a recent urgent letter to Israel's Minister of Defense. Sent on behalf of Commanders for Israel's Security (CIS)—Israel's largest group of retired generals and diplomats, of which I am a member, it alerted the Minister to the dire consequences of 'organized Jewish groups…setting the area ablaze.' 'Resources must be mobilized,' we urged, 'so that those guilty of terrorism are apprehended, investigated, and swiftly brought to justice.' Although even the murder of an American citizen did little to change the dynamics, recent settlers' assaults on IDF soldiers deployed to protect them, might have. Even those who shamefully looked the other way when the victims were Palestinians—PM Netanyahu included—suddenly realized that this lawlessness could not be tolerated. 'No civilized country can tolerate violent and anarchic acts of burning a military facility, damaging IDF property and attacking security personnel by citizens of the country,' said Netanyahu. In contrast, opposition leader Yair Lapid described the events as 'Jewish terrorists, gangs of criminals, who feel backed by the (governing) coalition.' Time will tell whether this wakeup call triggers effective measures to end Jewish terrorism, which is as immoral as any other kind of terrorism. It also undermines Israel's security and legitimacy. What is certain, from my vantage point, is this: if it does not spark those measures, this cycle of violence will only lead to the Gaza-ification of the West Bank, with tragic consequences for both peoples and further destabilizing effects well beyond the Israeli-Palestinian arena.
Fast Company
42 minutes ago
- Fast Company
Trump is caught in an Epstein web of his own making
What happens when you spend decades seeding salacious stories about evil lurking in the halls of power, demanding evidence to prove basic truths, and questioning the veracity of that evidence once it's presented? Donald Trump is finding out. Over the last week, the president has been trying to fight his way out of a web of his own creation, as some of his truest followers in MAGA world call for the full release of the government's investigative files concerning convicted child sex offender Jeffrey Epstein. The outcry from Trump acolytes comes after the Department of Justice published a two-page memo earlier this month, stating that Epstein's supposed 'client list,' which Attorney General Pam Bondi previously said was on her desk, didn't actually exist. Following a weeklong uproar from both the left and right, Trump finally called on a federal court judge to unseal the grand jury testimony related to Epstein's case. The Justice Department has also subpoenaed Epstein's associate, Ghislaine Maxwell, who is serving her own 20-year sentence for sex trafficking. But the moves have done little to quell the outrage from the right, particularly after House Speaker Mike Johnson sent the chamber into summer recess early this week to head off a vote on releasing the files. The move prompted fury from the party's MAGA wing. 'Crimes have been committed,' Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene of Georgia told reporters. 'If there's no justice and no accountability, people are going to get sick of it.' As all this has played out, Trump has cast about for someone to blame, pointing the finger at Democrats and his 'PAST supporters' for stoking the scandal. In truth, it's Trump who is uniquely responsible for cultivating the culture of conspiracy in which he's now floundering. Credit where it's due: Trump's long and well-documented history of conspiracy-mongering has been perhaps one of his greatest skills and has almost always worked out in his favor. His constant questioning of President Obama's birthplace was so successful that it transformed Trump, then a reality star and real estate mogul, into a cable news fixture. Later on, his success at convincing nearly three-quarters of Republicans that the 2020 election was stolen played no small role in securing his 2024 election victory. Even the speculation about which other A-listers were in Epstein's orbit were often fair game for Trump. In 2019, Trump fed rumors that the Clintons were somehow involved in Epstein's death by suicide in prison. 'Did Bill Clinton go to the island? That's the question,' Trump said at the time. Nevermind that Trump and Epstein were close friends or that he once told New York magazine that Epstein 'likes beautiful women as much as I do, and many of them are on the younger side.' Trump is a devoted student of the 'I'm rubber, you're glue' school of politics—and for the most part, it's worked. But now it's Trump who's found himself stuck to Epstein, and he has no one to blame but himself. After all, it was Trump who taught his followers not to trust the abridged version of a story (see: Trump's campaign to secure Obama's long-form birth certificate in 2011). Now, it stands to reason those same people want more than a two-page summary of the DOJ's Epstein investigation. And it was Trump who convinced a certain subset of the American electorate to scour video evidence for alleged election night aberrations in 2020. Is it any wonder they're now spiraling over the missing minute (or minutes, according to Wired) in the video footage the government released of the night Epstein died? Meanwhile, the stories linking Trump to Epstein just keep growing. On Monday, The New York Times reported that one of Epstein's accusers encouraged the FBI to look into Trump as early as 1996. And The Wall Street Journal reported last week that Trump once sent Epstein a lewd birthday card, featuring a hand-drawn outline of a naked woman and allusions to their shared secrets. The Journal reported that the card is among the documents DOJ officials reviewed as part of the Epstein investigation. Trump has denied the story, calling the article 'fake news' and has since sued the Journal for defamation. That controversy prompted some conservatives who'd been critical of the Trump administration's approach to Epstein to leap to the president's defense. But that reprieve may be short-lived. As one Trump ally, Mike Benz, said on Steve Bannon's podcast over the weekend, 'You trained us to go after this issue.'
Time Magazine
43 minutes ago
- Time Magazine
How Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Consolidated Power
An old newsroom quip has it that every story about the Middle East for the past 50 years could open with, 'The region is, as ever, at a critical moment.' Few journalists have witnessed more of those moments than Karen Elliott House, whom I worked with for many years at The Wall Street Journal, where she was a correspondent, editor and publisher. House has covered the Middle East since the 1970s, earning a reputation as one of the best-connected and most incisive observers of Saudi Arabia, which in the current 'critical moment' has emerged as the region's indispensable player. With Iran and its proxies diminished and Gulf states anxious to diversify their economies, any prospect for broader peace and normalization runs through Riyadh. That makes The Man Who Would Be King: Mohammed bin Salman and the Transformation of Saudi Arabia, House's new book about Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler, Mohammed bin Salman, essential reading. Chronicling both his ruthless consolidation of power and his vision of economic transformation, it's a sequel of sorts to House's 2012 On Saudi Arabia, which explored the internal dysfunction, oil dependency and sclerotic bureaucracy that MBS has now inherited. Our conversation has been edited and condensed for clarity. TIME: Let's start in the headlines. Our former WSJ colleague Bret Stephens recently wrote a column that says recent decisive moves on the battlefield have created 'diplomatic openings that have been out of reach for decades.' Do you agree? House: There are opportunities now that haven't existed for a long time because of Israel having almost eliminated Iran's proxies. But I remain a pessimist about the Middle East. There's no end to the ability of people in the region to blow opportunity. I became diplomatic correspondent for The Wall Street Journal right after [Anwar] Sadat had been to Jerusalem. That was in everyone's mind a history opportunity. And we did get Israeli-Egyptian peace, which is significant, but far from Middle East peace. The possibility is to get to a Saudi-Israeli peace. But the difficulty is that the Crown Prince does need something on the Palestinian issue, and I don't see Israel being willing to give it. The war in Gaza has raised [the level of] what he needs to be able to recognize Israel, and it has vastly raised Israel's determination to avoid any kind of Palestinian state unless the Palestinians are willing to have Israel in charge of security. TIME: What would it take to make a compromise happen? House: Trump now has more leverage over both MBS and Israel, and the Palestinians have been through so much that they might be willing to have some kind of coexistence where they have no military. It's not that the Palestinian people themselves in my view are so eager to do away with Israel. It's that the militants in the Arab world and Iran as the greatest militant in the region take the view that Israel must be destroyed. The Crown Prince with his Saudi-first doctrine is not willing forever to put off relations that allow for a security and a commercial relationship that protects Saudi Arabia and advances [his aspiration for] a new Silicon Valley in the northwest with Israeli technology and Saudi money. There's so much he can gain from that. TIME: Transitioning to your reporting for the book, what was it like going from interviewing elderly, opaque, distant Saudi royals as you have done so often over the years to the Crown Prince in his Yeezys? House: [In the past], it was like interviewing somebody from on high. You couldn't even make much eye contact because there were all these people around pouring coffee, bringing papers, doing other things. They had no interest really in conveying information. It was a kind of almost meet-and-greet, a formality, not an interview. MBS from the first time I met him in January of 2016 – well, I had met him before that actually with his father in 2010 – but when I met him as Deputy Crown Prince, you sit down, and the translator and the press minder are far away. As I say in the book, he doesn't need the airs of power because he's got the real stuff. He doesn't try to act like a potentate. TIME: Is he cultivating the image of informality, or is it real? House: He is a modern informal person. He still plays video games every morning. He goes to the Formula One race and poses for selfies with people. He rode his dirt bike up the hills at Al Ula, this place they're turning into a tourist site. And when the people on the other side saw that it was Mohammed bin Salman, they were totally shocked because again royal rulers don't ride dirt bikes. TIME: You write about his growing-up, that he was not his father's favorite, that he had fewer privileges than many of his cousins. House: There is a chip-on-the-shoulder quality. He is the first of his mother's sons. She's the third wife. His mother told him don't be an also-ran to the first wife's sons. You have to get out there and make something of yourself. TIME: Take us from that observation to his role in the most visible family contest, the Ritz lockup and purge that followed. House: I think it had two purposes—at least, maybe more—but one was to consolidate his power by removing from potential competition the sons of King Abdullah. Prince Mitteb was the head of the National Guard, and he was one of the first people called to the Ritz Carlton. Then his brother Turki. When I wrote my first book, people in the royal family and in the government said at least 30% of the government budget every year was simply siphoned off to this royal and that one, and this businessman and that one. Corruption was simply an accepted way of life. [MBS] wanted to modernize the economy and get people off of dependence on government handouts. They had to wring some of the corruption out to make young people think the playing field was level—if you weren't a royal or you weren't the child of one of the dozen biggest businessmen in Saudi Arabia. And he succeeded. Prince Turki is still in prison. Prince Miteb, in essence, is under house arrest. He can't fly. Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, the famous businessman who owns part of various banks in New York and the Four Seasons Hotel, etc.—he was one of those arrested. And he says, 'It's all in the family. We have forgiven everything. I mean, I'm content with this.' And he's back in his business empire. TIME: How do you reconcile the ruthlessness and the charm, the lock-up and purge against the selfie-posing, video game playing, informality? House: That's a very interesting question. As I write in the book, Peter the Great was a similar kind of person to MBS. He was prepared to be ruthless. He killed his own son, whom he thought had betrayed him. But as a young man, he was determined to be a modernizer. He went to Europe, learned how to build ships. He thought he knew how to be a doctor—he would operate on people. He clearly had an engaging charm. He was a big beer drinker with his workers, but he had this brutality of, 'I'm in charge, and I know what needs to be done.' Napoleon also could be a very engaging man and also a very ruthless man. I cite [Singapore's] Lee Kuan Yew as a latter-day kind of example. I knew Lee well, and he was the smartest man I've ever met. He didn't have a frivolous, video game-playing side—he was all serious—but he had that perspective that MBS [has], which is ' I can step on anyone's human rights or individual rights, but I'm busy trying to do what's good for the country.' TIME: You call out the Khashoggi murder as the grotesque crime it was but also call it a disaster for MBS and his global ambitions. I gather you believe that MBS is too strategic to have intended it to play out the way it did. House: My view is that it was a rendition gone wrong—that they intended to pick him up and bring him back to Saudi Arabia. Because once somebody is in the kingdom, things can happen to them, and the Western press doesn't really know. They had a prince who was lured onto a plane by the same man—[Saud al-] Qahtani, who was the leader of the Khashoggi operation. He had been the press officer at the royal court and had kind of made himself the crown prince's—or MBS's—number-one enforcer of no-opposition, suppressing or dealing with anybody that opposed him. TIME: You write about several friends of yours who've literally disappeared under MBS's rule. How did that shape your reporting? House: I didn't realize at first that two men I knew were among those detained. One was Mohammed al-Qahtani, who had been arrested under King Abdullah for criticizing the lack of judicial independence. That was considered treasonous, and he was sentenced to 10 years. But in 2023, he wasn't released, which obviously caused consternation with his family. I pursued what happened, and I was told on my last visit, in March 2025, that he's now out of prison—he's in an apartment in Riyadh with his family but saying nothing. And I believe that to be the case. I don't think they've killed him. Abdullah al-Shammari, my translator, wasn't a democracy activist in any way. I never heard him say anything critical about the Crown Prince. I used to see him every time I went back, but he stopped responding on WhatsApp in 2021, and when I've asked about him, I've gotten vague answers. The Saudi Press Agency carried a story a year ago that listed him as arrested and executed along with others for 'criminal acts that entail betrayal' of the country. I haven't been able to confirm any of it, but it's obviously deeply troubling. So I don't know. It's a huge mystery. Khashoggi was, of course, a known figure in Saudi Arabia. He had worked in the media, for King Abdullah, and was often put forward to speak with foreign journalists. He had visibility. I saw him about nine months before he left for Washington. We had lunch, and he was antsy, frustrated—he said he'd essentially been banned from writing by MBS. He said to me at the time, 'I would prefer democracy, but at least we have KPIs [key performance indicators] for all the ministers.' His point was: there is some accountability. He would've preferred democracy, but KPIs were something. His prominence made him more vulnerable. TIME: Let's move to the economy and Vision 2030. Your 2012 book, On Saudi Arabia, was really about the deep internal challenges—oil dependency, gerontocracy—that you argued were more threatening in the long-run to the country than external ones. Did you see the path that emerged with MBS as a likely outcome of that predicament? Or was it a shock? House: No, it was a surprise. I described, I think very accurately, the country he is trying to now remake. Young Saudis and poor Saudis were frustrated. There was so much corruption, so much hypocrisy. The government forced people to follow the religious rules, but the royal family didn't live by them. At the end of that book, I warned that the risk was Saudi Arabia becoming like the old Soviet Union–one old man after another ruling until a Gorbachev came along, but too late. I used the analogy of a 747: the cockpit full of geriatrics, First Class full of princes who would be king, and Economy full of ordinary Saudis and terrorists. I said there were some young men who could do a good job, and I named a few, but [MBS] wasn't one of them. When the book came out, he was 27—off the radar. I had met him but didn't pick him out as the next leader. So yes, when he appeared, it was a shock—not just to me but to many Saudis. People said, 'Where did he come from?' Nobody expected the sixth son of Salman to rise. But the generational change was the good part. Instead of continuing on with 77- and 80-year-olds with no ideas and no runway to act, they got someone with a vision and time to execute it. TIME: Still, even after 10 years of his rule, the country is highly dependent on oil. House: Yes. But at least they're taking steps—tourism, minerals. They're on a path that, if pursued intelligently and consistently, could leave the country in a much better place. Otherwise, they were on a glide path to becoming a poor Arab country. Not as poor as Egypt, maybe, but declining, because they were using more and more oil domestically, leaving less to sell. TIME: Vision 2030 requires a modern, tech-oriented economy. Is that the core of the strategy, and how would you grade where they are? House: He gets an A for understanding the need for that transition. But probably a C for execution so far. It's still a long road. To build the tech corridor he envisions, he believes he needs a relationship with Israel. His hope is that with Saudi Arabia's low energy costs, it becomes attractive for AI data centers, which are energy-intensive. But it's a big task, and he's competing with Dubai and others who offer a more Western lifestyle to foreign talent. TIME: He needs foreigners to want to live and work there. House: Yes. One reason he's liberalizing society is not just to give young Saudis entertainment in exchange for work, but to make Saudi Arabia livable for foreigners who bring money and know-how. That's always been the model since King Faisal: importing foreigners to do what was necessary. In the past, Saudis checked into a kind of four-star hotel at birth—government job, room service, little accountability. Egyptians and others did the work. Now, he needs Saudis to think and act for themselves. But even today, more foreigners are in the workforce than Saudis. TIME: Let's circle back to where we started. What's the broader role MBS is seeking in the global order? Regional hegemon? A player in a broader multipolar world? House: He sees Saudi Arabia as the most influential of the so-called 'middle powers,' a player not just in the Middle East, but in the global economy. He wants Saudi Arabia to be among the countries putting people on the moon or Mars. His ambitions are very big. He doesn't want to be a U.S. puppet. He partners with Russia to control oil output and prices. China is his biggest oil customer—and he wants China to influence Iran toward stability. He's using money and economic clout to push a Saudi-first agenda: What's good for Saudi Arabia? What can we get? I think he's doing a decent job at that. But my doubt is: can you play all sides against the middle forever? He wanted a U.S. security treaty tied to recognition of Israel, but he probably can't get enough votes in the U.S. Senate. And he's going to have to be more overt, more public about what he's offering and what he wants. The Israelis don't fear Saudi Arabia. But they need help solving their security problems. He doesn't want to push Iran too hard. He's made peace with the Houthis. He doesn't like Hamas, but he's not going to shout it from the rooftops either. TIME: So he's still being too subtle? House: Yes. If he wants to be a leader, he needs to advocate more publicly—not just say what he wants, but sell it. I think he could. My first impression of him was: he's a born marketer. He believes so strongly in what he says, he wants you to see it too. He'll repeat it if needed. He could take a more public role—but so far, I don't think he's doing it.
