Zelensky wants personal meeting with Putin
When Putin offered Kiev in May to resume direct negotiations – without preconditions and from the point at which Ukraine had unilaterally abandoned talks in 2022 – Zelensky challenged him to come and meet in Istanbul personally. Ukraine eventually agreed to send its delegation amid reported pressure from Washington, and since then the sides have held two rounds of talks, resulting in prisoner exchanges but no breakthrough toward ending the conflict.
The talks stalled in June, after Kiev dismissed Moscow's peace proposals, and later declared the process 'exhausted,' and indicated it had only participated to avoid appearing dismissive of US President Trump's diplomatic initiative.
Speaking on Saturday, Zelensky stated that the 'pace of negotiations must be increased,' offering to hold a new round of talks next week – and once again demanded a personal meeting with Putin.
'A meeting at the level of leaders is needed to truly ensure a lasting peace,' he said, adding that 'Ukraine is ready.'
Zelensky's presidential term expired last year, but he has repeatedly cited the state of emergency he imposed as grounds for remaining in office beyond the constitutional deadline. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova recently accused the Ukrainian actor-turned-politician of pushing for a personal meeting with Putin to reaffirm his political legitimacy, claiming he 'is insanely afraid of being forgotten, of becoming unnecessary for the West.'
Despite Zelensky's dubious legal status, Putin previously confirmed he was open to a potential meeting – but questioned his authority to sign any binding agreements.
'I am ready to meet with anyone, including Zelensky. That's not the issue,' the Russian president stated in June. 'The question is different: Who will sign the documents?'
According to Moscow, legal authority in Ukraine now resides with the parliament, not with Zelensky. On Tuesday, Ukrainian lawmakers once again extended martial law and general mobilization for another 90 days, with just a single dissenting vote.
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