Turkey ready to undertake duty for observing potential ceasefire in Ukraine, source says
(Reuters) - Turkey is ready to undertake the duty to observe a possible ceasefire in Ukraine, its foreign minister said during a "coalition of the willing" call with Kyiv's partners on Saturday, a Turkish foreign ministry source said.
The leaders of Britain, France, Germany, Poland -the so-called "coalition of the willing"- and Ukraine have met in Kyiv on Saturday. They agreed to an unconditional 30-day ceasefire on May 12 with the backing of U.S. President Donald Trump, threatening President Vladimir Putin with new "massive" sanctions if he failed to comply.
Turkey's Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan joined the coalition of the willing call and emphasised Turkey's commitment to Ukraine's territorial integrity, the Turkish foreign ministry source, speaking on condition of anonymity, said.
Fidan voiced Ankara's support for the efforts for the unconditional ceasefire and added that Turkey was ready to undertake the duty for observing the ceasefire in Ukraine if it is established, the source also said.
NATO member Turkey has maintained cordial ties with both Kyiv and Moscow since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. It has voiced support for Ukraine's territorial integrity and provided it with military help, while opposing sanctions on Russia.
In March, Turkey's defence ministry said that it could contribute to a potential peacekeeping mission in Ukraine if a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia is declared. Last month, Ukrainian, British, French and Turkish military representatives met in Turkey to discuss Black Sea security after a possible ceasefire is agreed between Ukraine and Russia.
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