Japan buys Russian crude oil for first time in over 2 years
Data from Kpler, a ship tracking specialist, showed that the sanctioned vessel, Voyager, discharged its load at a refinery owned by Taiyo Oil on June 8. The company has confirmed the purchase of the Russian crude.
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The Diplomat
9 hours ago
- The Diplomat
Can India Survive the Trade War?
Trump's tariff onslaught has forced India into a precarious position, and New Delhi is employing three strategies in tandem to get out of it. New Delhi has been blindsided by U.S. President Donald Trump's recent tariff temper tantrums. While Indian policymakers anticipated some trade tensions with the United States during Trump's second term, they hoped that Prime Minister Narendra Modi's strong rapport with Trump, along with the geostrategic importance of the India-U.S. partnership, would spare them from the worst of Washington's protectionist impulses. Indeed, until recently, India-U.S. trade ties seemed to be heading in a positive direction. Trump and Modi agreed to increase bilateral trade to $500 billion by 2030 during their meeting in February. Earlier this summer, India and the United States seemed on the verge of clinching a trade deal. In a dizzying reversal, on August 7, India found itself with a 25 percent tariff on most products it sells to the U.S., its largest export market. This tariff rate is set to increase by an additional 25 percent on August 27, a punishment for India's purchases of Russian oil and gas. India also faces the looming threats of indirect tariffs, including steep tariffs on pharmaceuticals and semiconductors and a 10 percent tariff on goods from countries that are members of the 'anti-American' BRICS organization. Trump's tariff onslaught has forced India into a precarious position, and New Delhi is employing three strategies in tandem to get out of it. First, New Delhi is confronted with the daunting task of securing a deal with Washington, without violating any key redlines that would jeopardize Modi's domestic support. India is also attempting to delicately manage its geoeconomic relationship with China, cooling tensions with Beijing without ignoring preexisting military and economic security concerns. While hedging between the two great powers, India is also seeking to advance its geopolitical ambitions of assuming great power status by diversifying its economy to alternative partners. Managing Trump's Tariff Pressures Faced with a barrage of tariff threats, New Delhi has sought to strike a deal with Washington without compromising its key interests. India has refused to rush into an unfavorable agreement, unlike other major U.S. trading partners. While having drawn a clear redline at exposing its agriculture and dairy sectors to competition from U.S. exports, in the hopes of securing a deal, India has offered a range of limited and strategic concessions, including reducing tariffs on 55 percent of U.S. exports and increasing purchases of American defense and energy products. Thus far, India has refrained from retaliating, aiming to avoid escalation that would jeopardize the prospect of a deal that might ease existing retaliatory tariffs and the impending 25 percent secondary tariff related to India's purchases of Russian oil. Indian officials are reportedly exploring what concessions can be offered at negotiations with the U.S. later this month, including tariff reductions on a limited range of agricultural products, namely cheese and almonds, that would have minimal impacts on domestic producers. While some Indian oil refiners have decreased their purchases of Russian oil, New Delhi has remained adamant that it will continue imports of Russian oil that are legally permissible under the G-7 price cap. As a clear signal of resolve and as part of a broader effort to hedge against the U.S., India has simultaneously moved to bolster its historically strong economic and defense ties with Russia. New Delhi's firm stance reflects domestic political pressures. Modi has touted India as an emerging great power destined to play a key role in the future geopolitical and economic order and he cannot afford to be seen as appeasing Trump's whims. Concessions to the United States that undermine the standing of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with Indian farmers, especially tenuous since the farmer protests that swept the country a few years ago, would be political suicide. Other factors also reduce India's incentive to rush into a deal: the legality of Trump's tariffs is being openly challenged, and India has no guarantee that Trump would not backtrack on any deal that is reached between them. This approach is, however, not without risks. Trump has seemingly run out of patience and has already imposed tariffs on India for its refusal to make a deal once. While negotiations have stalled, Southeast Asian economies, including Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines have all secured lower tariff rates that make them more competitive in the U.S. market than India. India's exports to the U.S. accounted for 2 percent of its GDP last year. Goldman Sachs has suggested that the 25 percent tariff would cut India's economic growth by 0.3 percentage points, with this doubling if the additional secondary tariff goes into effect. Prolonged trade tensions also risk exacerbating the already notable deterioration in India-U.S. relations, fueled not only by economic disputes but also by Trump's budding friendship with Pakistan's military chief and talks of the U.S. purchasing Pakistani oil. Continued strains on India-U.S. relations are certainly in neither New Delhi nor Washington's geostrategic interests, particularly if they remain committed to countering China's political and economic influence. These tensions could potentially jeopardize this year's Quad leaders summit in India, and even the broader future of the Quad partnership. While Modi needs to signal resolve for his domestic political audience, his advisers should also find ways to keep the doors open to negotiations and consider concessions they could feasibly make when U.S. trade negotiators visit India later this month. Can India Count on China? Increased trade with China could help stabilize India's economy amid tariff threats from Washington, especially if it can increase its raw materials exports to China. India has deep-seated security concerns over its border dispute with China. The border dispute extends back as far as the 1960s and has flared up multiple times, particularly in 2020 when clashes in the Galwan Valley resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers. The two Asian giants have also competed to position themselves as leaders of the Global South for decades. However, New Delhi is tentatively seeking to thaw ties with Beijing, hoping to avoid having tensions with both great powers at once. Defense Minister Rajnath Singh's visit to Shanghai in June marked the first visit by a senior Indian government official to China since 2020. Modi is also expected to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit at the end of August, marking his first visit to China since 2018. Beijing has also shown willingness to improve bilateral relations, having eased export controls on urea, of which India is the world's largest importer. However, New Delhi's deep-rooted concerns about the challenges Beijing poses to India's economic and national security mean that cooperation will remain limited. Last year, India ran a massive $99.21 billion trade deficit with China, which includes imports in a variety of sectors that are critical to the Indian economy, such as electronics, textiles, and manufacturing. Too much economic cooperation with China could very well result in the Indian market being flooded with Chinese imports. Additionally, China may not seek to cooperate with India given its ambitions to play a greater role in manufacturing and supply chains, in which China currently dominates. Whether China will play ball with India depends on decisions made in Beijing, which are highly strategic and often only made in their own best interest. While working to foster better ties with China, India must carefully consider the broader geopolitical implications of its actions. On one hand, thawing relations with China while keeping its head above water with the U.S. will position India well in the event of a China-U.S. grand bargain. On the other hand, making concessions to China while Beijing maintains an aggressive stance toward their disputed borders would make Modi look weak and invite opposition criticism. India's Diversification Efforts Given the risks associated with further economic integration with the United States and China, might India be able to forge meaningful trade ties with alternative partners? New Delhi embarked on a flurry of trade negotiations between 2021 and 2022 as part of a broader effort to reduce India's economic exposure to China; this campaign lost momentum between 2023 and 2024 as concerns over protecting key domestic industries and contentious issues like rules of origin and data regulation stalled negotiations with several partners. However, the onslaught of U.S. tariffs has re-energized India's interest in diversifying its trade relationships to reduce its vulnerability to economic coercion from both Washington and Beijing. New Delhi has recently finalized a free trade agreement with the U.K. and has accelerated or revived trade negotiations with the EU, New Zealand, Peru, and Oman, while working to deepen existing agreements with Chile and Australia. India has also sought to strengthen ties with other members of the BRICS bloc, agreeing to boost bilateral trade with Brazil and resuming talks with South Africa. However, considering that about 18 percent of India's exports go to the U.S. and about 15 percent of India's imports come from China, such efforts may not significantly reduce dependence on the two great powers. New Delhi has a prime opportunity to capitalize on a moment when many countries are seeking alternatives to both the U.S. and China to attract greater foreign investment and strengthen trade ties with countries that occupy strategic positions in critical supply chains. This, in turn, would bolster India's role in global manufacturing and advance India's economic influence and geopolitical ambitions. The opportunity for India is particularly evident in sectors like pharmaceuticals – where it has long been seen as an alternative manufacturing hub to China – and semiconductors, where the government has launched ambitious domestic initiatives and forged partnerships with South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan to fuel its ambitions to rise as a semiconductor manufacturing power. India's efforts to diversify are not without potential pitfalls. Trade liberalization has proven to be slow and politically contentious within India, and attracting sustained foreign investment will require structural reforms that the government may be unwilling or unable to implement. Major substantive disagreements between India and key partners persist and will remain challenging to resolve. India's ambitions to bolster its role in global manufacturing and trade also face several challenges. Indian exports face stiff competition from China and emerging Southeast Asian economies, which are also diversifying away from the U.S. market. India will struggle to match China's manufacturing scale, and Indian exports may struggle to compete in developed markets – such as the EU and Canada – that already have FTAs with India's Southeast Asian competitors. Trump's recent warnings to Apple CEO Tim Cook against expanding manufacturing operations in India also suggest that he will not respond favorably to any efforts by. U.S. firms to shift manufacturing to India. Conclusion New Delhi's efforts to strategically hedge and diversify are a significant geopolitical and economic gamble. India has little choice but to try to soothe simmering trade tensions with the U.S. without abandoning its redlines, while carefully managing the implications of increased cooperation with China, and expanding its network of trade ties beyond the two great powers. Imminent pressure from Washington and Beijing could render this gamble a failure for New Delhi, resulting in long-term economic turmoil and political grievances that could end Modi's career. However, if successfully implemented, India could find itself in a geopolitical sweet spot, capitalizing on many countries' desires to reduce their exposure to U.S. and Chinese trade policies to garner greater economic and geopolitical clout. India's long history of strategic autonomy may mean that it will find it easier than many others to adapt in an international system that is rapidly dissolving into chaotic transactionalism. Still, it faces many stumbling blocks, including the uncertainty of U.S. economic statecraft, in its efforts to claim great power status in a fracturing world.
The Diplomat
a day ago
- The Diplomat
Trump Is Pushing India-US Ties to the Brink for Personal Gain
U.S. President Donald Trump shakes hands with India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi as he is introduced to the podium at a rally in honor of Modi at NRG Stadium in Houston, Texas, Sep. 22, 2019. U.S. President Donald Trump has almost single-handedly brought the India-U.S. partnership to its lowest point in two decades. On August 6, Trump signed an executive order imposing an additional 25 percent tariff on Indian goods in a bid to punish India for its continued purchase of Russian oil. The move came a few days after he reported his displeasure over India's trade with Russia, claiming that he would substantially raise tariffs on India. This brings the total duty on India to 50 percent. Adding insult to injury, Trump offended many in India with his remarks, saying, 'I don't care what India does with Russia. They can take their dead economies down together, for all I care.' This trade spat has roiled the India-U.S. relationship, which is arguably at its lowest point thus far in the 21st century. The current tensions appear surprising to many because of the positive trajectory of the India-U.S. partnership in the last couple of decades. However, the relationship is laden with significant fault lines, the chief one being India's ties with Russia. Trump is compounding this fault line for political gain. For Washington, a stronger partnership with India rested on the rationale of leveraging India as a counter to China's rise, and because of that, the divergence on Russia was largely kept aside for a long time. However, the United States today is distracted by the conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. Consequently, countering China in the Indo-Pacific is not the U.S. foreign policy's most predominant and pressing objective for now. If 'countering China,' is not a priority for Washington, then India is not an important partner for the United States. India is neither a critical nor a major trading partner of the U.S., unlike China, which dominates the critical minerals sector. This explains why China has been given a 90-day extension for tariff negotiations, even though it is the largest buyer of Russian oil and gas. Realizing that China has emerged unscathed from Trump's tariffs while the U.S. is heavily dependent on China for critical minerals, the Trump administration has been trying to reach an accommodation with China. Therefore, Chinese containment in the Indo-Pacific appears to be fading away for now – and with it, the need for a robust partnership with India. Due to this, Trump has targeted tariffs on India alone for the purchase of Russian oil and gas. For its part, India has asserted that the demand to halt trade with Russia remains totally unjustified and unreasonable. In 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, the United States itself encouraged India's energy purchases, India's Ministry of External Affairs said in a statement, 'because traditional supplies were diverted to Europe after the outbreak of the conflict.' Even today, the U.S. still continues to import fertilizers, chemicals and uranium and palladium from Russia, the MEA pointed out. On the other hand, India has drastically increased its energy purchases from the United States, with crude oil imports surging 51 percent in the first half of 2025. India's liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports from the U.S. have nearly doubled from $1.41 billion in FY2023-24 to $2.46 billion in FY2024-25. In February, Prime Minister Narendra Modi pledged to boost U.S. energy imports to $25 billion from $15 billion in 2024 – and thus reduce the trade deficit, which is a constant concern for Trump. In accordance with that, Indian oil and gas companies are discussing long-term purchases of U.S. oil and gas with their U.S. counterparts. India has been endeavoring to reduce its reliance on Russian energy purchases by increasing its U.S. energy imports. Why, then, did Trump decide to hit India with 50 percent tariffs over the issue of Russian oil? Trump is clearly frustrated that he has been unable to achieve his promise of striking a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. The tariffs on India for Russian oil and gas purchases thus look more like a personalistic attack – Trump's way of acting out his frustration over not achieving his geopolitical goal of halting the Russia-Ukraine war. Indeed, Trump's beloved self-image as the world's biggest dealmaker underlies the current tensions with India. He has made repeated public claims about brokering the India-Pakistan ceasefire post-Operation Sindoor – a claim that India has vehemently denied at all official levels, including Modi himself. Therefore, tariffs may also have an element of punishing India for denying his claims of brokering the ceasefire. On the other hand, Pakistan – which embraced Trump's claim of mediation, even nominating him for the Nobel Peace Prize – is enjoying a renewed warmth in its relationship with Washington. The United States has not reached an agreement with India even after five rounds of trade negotiations, despite India's reported willingness to make substantial trade concessions. This suggests that the tariffs were political – or personal, in Trump's case – retaliation rather than economic. India is not the only country to be hit with high tariffs due to Trump's personal grievances. He imposed 50 percent levy on Brazil because of judicial proceedings in the Brazilian Supreme Court in which Trump's ally, former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, was charged with staging a coup against current President Lula. Trump has not shied away from threatening tariffs if he finds any country's actions, policies, and statements unacceptable. If compelling India to move away from the purchase of Russian oil and gas was one of the aims of the tariffs, it is unlikely to achieve this. Instead, India is going to double down on its multialignment foreign policy in light of the increased distrust towards the United States. Modi's planned visit to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit at the end of August, and the upcoming visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to India for the annual India-Russia summit at the end of the year, reflect that. The current trade tensions are expected to instill and intensify India's distrust toward the United States. It remains to be seen whether India and the U.S. will be able to contain and then repair the damage inflicted by Trump; trust is hard to build, harder to sustain, and hardest to rebuild once it evaporates.
Kyodo News
2 days ago
- Kyodo News
Kyodo News Digest: Aug. 14, 2025
TOKYO - The following is the latest list of selected news summaries by Kyodo News. ---------- Japan eyes exporting used destroyers to Southeast Asia TOKYO - Japan is considering the export of used Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers to Southeast Asia, government sources said Wednesday, in an effort to strengthen security ties with countries in the region where key sea lanes are located. Japan has been studying the export of Abukuma-class ships to the Philippines following a June meeting in Singapore where the countries' defense ministers discussed the matter. ---------- Japan calls for "forward-looking" Russian action over Ukraine war TOKYO - Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba called Wednesday for "forward-looking" action from Russia over the Ukraine war as he met virtually with other leaders of the so-called Coalition of the Willing ahead of planned U.S.-Russian summit talks in Alaska, the Foreign Ministry said. Welcoming U.S. President Donald Trump's efforts toward achieving a cease-fire in the war between the two neighboring countries, among other goals, the Japanese leader strongly called for Moscow to take positive action during Friday's meeting between Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. ---------- Osaka expo opening delayed to 10 a.m. after subway disruption OSAKA - The World Exposition in Osaka will open one hour later than usual at 10 a.m. on Thursday, following disruptions to the local metro service that left large numbers of visitors stranded in the area well into the night. The Osaka Metro's Chuo Line, which offers sole direct train access from the city center to the expo site on Yumeshima, an artificial island, resumed at around 5:25 a.m. after a power failure hit the line at 9:30 p.m. Wednesday. ---------- Japan to begin anti-dumping probe into China, S. Korea steel products TOKYO - The government vowed Wednesday to investigate allegations that steel products from China and South Korea have been imported into Japan at below-market prices, after receiving a request from four major domestic producers. The Japanese finance and trade ministries said they will decide whether to impose anti-dumping duties on imports of hot-dipped galvanized steel coil, sheet and strip, which are mainly used in construction for guardrails and fencing. ---------- Record 1 ton of cannabis, worth $35 mil., seized in Japan TOKYO - Japanese narcotics agents said Wednesday they have seized 1.046 tons of cannabis worth about 5.2 billion yen ($35 million) on the street, marking Japan's largest-ever single-raid illegal drug haul. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare's Narcotics Control Department has arrested three Vietnamese nationals for allegedly smuggling the cannabis hidden in a shipping container and possessing it at a material yard in Tochigi Prefecture, north of Tokyo, it said. ---------- S. Korea's president Lee to visit Japan Aug. 23-24 to meet PM Ishiba TOKYO - South Korean President Lee Jae Myung will make a two-day visit to Japan starting Aug. 23 to meet with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, the Japanese government said Wednesday. Lee is set to visit Japan with his wife in his first trip to the neighboring nation since his inauguration in June. He took office following the ouster of his predecessor Yoon Suk Yeol, whose short-lived imposition of martial law last December led to his downfall. ---------- Former Japanese idol convicted of molesting interpreter in H.K. HONG KONG - A former Japanese pop idol was found guilty of molesting a female interpreter and making unwelcome advances after a fan event in Hong Kong earlier this year, a court ruled on Wednesday. Kenshin Kamimura, a former member of J-pop band One N' Only, was convicted of indecent assault and slapped with a HK$15,000 ($1,910) fine, with the presiding magistrate saying his behavior was "patently a disrespect of women." ---------- Gravel transport vessel, sailboat collide off Japan, 1 dead OITA, Japan - A 492-ton gravel transport vessel and a sailboat collided Wednesday morning in waters about 2 kilometers northeast of an island in Oita Prefecture, southwestern Japan, leaving one man dead, the coast guard said. Makoto Yamamoto, a 70-year-old doctor and the sole person aboard the sailboat, was found in nearby waters but was later declared dead following the collision, which occurred at around 8:15 a.m. There were no injuries aboard the transport vessel, according to the local coast guard. ---------- VIDEO: "Awaodori" dance festival in Tokushima
