US to leave UN cultural agency again, only 2 years after rejoining
This decision comes only two years after the United States rejoined UNESCO after leaving in 2018, during U.S. President Donald Trump's first administration.
State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce said the withdrawal was linked to UNESCO's perceived agenda to "advance divisive social and cultural causes."
She added in a statement that UNESCO's decision "to admit the 'State of Palestine' as a Member State is highly problematic, contrary to U.S. policy, and contributed to the proliferation of anti-Israel rhetoric within the organization."
The decision, first reported by the New York Post, will take effect at the end of December 2026.
This will be the third time that the United States has left UNESCO, which is based in Paris, and the second time during a Trump administration. It last rejoined the agency in 2023, under the Biden administration.
UNESCO Director-General Audrey Azoulay said she "deeply" regrets the U.S. decision but insisted that it was expected, and that the agency "has prepared for it." She also denied accusations of anti-Israel bias.
"These claims ... contradict the reality of UNESCO's efforts, particularly in the field of Holocaust education and the fight against antisemitism," she said.
The Trump administration in 2017 announced that the U.S. would withdraw from UNESCO, citing anti-Israel bias. That decision took effect a year later. The U.S. and Israel stopped financing UNESCO after it voted to include Palestine as a member state in 2011.
"The reasons put forward by the United States of America are the same as seven years ago, even though the situation has changed profoundly, political tensions have receded and UNESCO today constitutes a rare forum for consensus on concrete and action-oriented multilateralism," Azoulay added.
The decision came as no surprise to UNESCO officials, who had anticipated such a move following the specific review ordered by the Trump administration earlier this year. They also expected that Trump would pull out again since the return of the U.S. in 2023 had been promoted by a political rival, former President Joe Biden.
The U.S. withdrawal is likely to affect UNESCO because the U.S. provides a notable share of the agency's budget. But the organization should be able to cope. UNESCO has diversified its funding sources in recent years and the U.S. contribution has decreased, representing only 8% of the agency's total budget.
Azoulay pledged that UNESCO will carry out its missions despite "inevitably reduced resources." The agency is not considering any staff layoffs at this stage.
"UNESCO's purpose is to welcome all the nations of the world, and the United States of America is and always will be welcome," she said. "We will continue to work hand in hand with all our American partners in the private sector, academia and nonprofit organizations, and will pursue our political dialogue with the U.S. administration and Congress."
The United States previously pulled out of UNESCO under the Reagan administration in 1984 because it viewed the agency as mismanaged, corrupt and used to advance the interests of the Soviet Union. It rejoined in 2003 during George W. Bush's presidency.
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