Dismantling DPP: a risky gamble with Pakistan's food security

Business Recorder

24-07-2025

The recent restructuring of Pakistan's agricultural regulatory framework under the National Agri-Trade and Food Safety Authority (NAFSA) Ordinance 2025 has created widespread confusion, institutional uncertainty, and serious operational disruptions.
Intended as a reform to modernize and streamline food safety and agri-trade functions, the implementation of this ordinance — particularly the dissolution of core functions of the Department of Plant Protection (DPP) — has proven technically inconsistent and strategically misaligned.
For decades, the DPP functioned as Pakistan's National Plant Protection Organisation (NPPO) under the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) and FAO. It was not merely a plant quarantine body — it managed pesticide regulation, led the country's desert locust control program, conducted aerial pest control operations, and maintained critical international partnerships with bodies like the FAO and regional surveillance networks, including neighbor countries.
However, the new NAFSA framework has thrown the future of these vital functions into uncertainty. The situation worsened on July 3, 2025, when the Federal Secretary of the Ministry of National Food Security and Research (MNFS&R) approved the transfer of 282 - technical and supporting regular staff members (BPS 01 to 19)—key to desert locust operations—to the federal government's Establishment Division's surplus pool. This move effectively dismantles nearly half of DPP's core team and put the last nail in its coffin. Alarmingly, there's no clarity on whether more staff will be added to this list in subsequent phases or not.
Adding to the contradiction, the same ministry/department has reportedly hired 50–100 contract entomologists under the guise of a desert locust project—only to reassign them to plant quarantine functions. These bureaucratic inconsistencies raise serious concerns about decision-making within the ministry. Such actions appear to prioritize administrative face-saving over food security, ignoring the looming threat of desert locust infestations, which could lead to devastating consequences for crops and national food supplies.
In response to the earlier article, the Federal Secretary for MNFS&R, Waseem Ajmal Chaudhry, clarified that the DPP would retain its desert locust control mandate. He said, 'The new authority will not do the locust control function. That is why it is not part of the new law… DPP is not being completely disbanded. In fact, it would be a dedicated organization for locust control at the federal level.'
While this statement provided partial relief, it also exposed the structural disorder at play. If DPP will continue to function for locust control, then what happens to its other mandates and no official notification has addressed these core responsibilities.
Contradictions continue to emerge. In a recent meeting with the Russian Ambassador, Federal Minister Rana Tanveer Hussain acknowledged DPP's ongoing role in fruit fly surveillance to support export standards. Meanwhile, industry bodies like the Pakistan Crop Protection Association (PCPA) continue to engage with DPP on matters like pesticide registration — indicating that DPP's functions remain active despite the formal creation of NAFSA.
This hybrid status—where DPP is simultaneously being phased out and still actively functioning — raises major compliance concerns under international agreements like the IPPC. According to IPPC standards, an NPPO must be a recognised government body, not a semi-autonomous or undefined entity. Countries like India, Kenya, and Australia retain their NPPOs directly under agricultural ministries to ensure policy alignment and international credibility. Pakistan's ambiguous model threatens its compliance status and could undermine agricultural exports.
The core issue stems from how the restructuring was executed: with minimal input from domain experts and heavy reliance on bureaucratic decisions. This exclusion of technical professionals has led to flawed policies, unclear jurisdictional boundaries, and a total lack of transition planning—leaving exporters, provincial departments, and global partners unsure of whom to approach for certifications, risk assessments, and phytosanitary assurances.
A more effective approach would have been a phased transition plan, involving stakeholders and domain professionals from the outset. Instead, what exists now is a disjointed system marked by overlapping mandates, legal ambiguity, and operational paralysis.
Despite reassurances from officials like Mr. Chaudhry, key questions remain unanswered:
Who will now serve as Pakistan's legally designated NPPO under the IPPC and desert locust coordination and control organisation?
Will NAFSA be recognized in that role internationally—and under what legal framework?
How will essential services like pesticide registration, pest surveillance including cross boundary insects, and export certifications continue without disruption?
Until these questions are resolved through formal legal instruments, transparent policy declarations, and the appointment of competent technical professionals, the restructuring cannot be considered complete or credible.
As Pakistan moves through the critical kharif season, these unresolved issues carry significant economic and diplomatic risks. Immediate action is needed to restore institutional continuity, define clear mandates, and ensure that experienced professionals are empowered to safeguard the country's agricultural and phytosanitary systems.
The DPP has historically acted as Pakistan's first line of defence against invasive insect pests and crop diseases. It was structured like a paramilitary organisation, designed to address pest threats across three seasonal breeding zones: summer, winter, and spring. Its headquarters in Karachi — once a full-fledged base—along with regional hubs in all four provinces, included aerial control infrastructure, landing strips, operational vehicles, and field outposts in key locations like Mirpur Khas, Sukkur, Bhitshah and Qambar Bakrani in Sindh, while Quetta, Khuzdar, Uthal, Panjgur, Pasni, Chaman, Taftan, Turbatetc in Balochistan, similarly Rahimyar Khan, Bahawalpur, Lahore, Rawalpindi in Punjab and Peshawar and Mardanin KP with two hangars Karachi and Walton Lahore. Hence, it was once a huge organization with no comparison in the region. However, the head office's land is allocated and given to different 'orphan' departments like FSC&RD, PARC and Animal Quarantine.
It also housed technical workshops, maintenance facilities, spare parts depots, and fleets of pest control vehicles. The department was capable of mounting rapid locust surveillance and aerial spray operations, backed by trained engineers and entomologists.
Now, this robust infrastructure is being broken up — its land repurposed, its teams disbanded, and its mandate diluted. Without strategic foresight, Pakistan risks losing a vital institution that has protected its crops, supported its exports, and fulfilled international commitments for decades.
The path forward must prioritize clarity, expertise, and legal coherence. Otherwise, this reform may ultimately prove to be a self-inflicted wound to Pakistan's agricultural/food security and global credibility.
Copyright Business Recorder, 2025