Canada condemns China's execution of 4 Canadians on drug charges
Melanie Joly, the Canadian minister, told reporters that she condemned the executions, and that the government would still seek clemency for others.
"We will continue to engage with China as we'll continue to not only strongly condemn but also ask for leniency for other Canadians that are facing similar situations,' Joly said.
The Chinese Embassy in Ottawa, Ontario, did not provide details on the executions but defended Beijing's strict penalties on drug-related crimes.
The executions were first reported by The Globe and Mail. The newspaper said that the executions had taken place this year, citing Canada's Department of Global Affairs as saying so Wednesday in response to a question from the news outlet.
Joly told reporters that she and the former prime minister, Justin Trudeau, had asked Beijing for leniency in recent months to try to prevent the executions. She said those involved were dual nationals of Canada and China. (China does not recognize dual citizenship.)
The Globe and Mail cited a statement from Ottawa condemning the killings as "inconsistent with basic human dignity.' The department did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
John Kamm, the founder of the Dui Hua Foundation, a human rights group in San Francisco that has campaigned for people on death row in China, said he had been helping to lobby China on behalf of the four individuals but was unable to share their details for privacy reasons.
He said that the four were men and that their cases were handled in the southern province of Guangdong. Kamm noted that it was "highly unusual' for China to execute four foreigners within a short time frame.
The four Canadians' cases had been under judicial review in China for two years before they were executed, Kamm said.
China has executed four Canadians in a development that threatens to worsen an already-tense relationship between the countries. |
bloomberg
Canada's relationship with China has deteriorated since late 2018, when the Chinese government jailed Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig, two Canadians in China. That move came after Canada arrested Meng Wanzhou, an executive at the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, in Vancouver, British Columbia, at the request of the U.S. government.
China's detention of Kovrig and Spavor was widely condemned in Canada as hostage diplomacy. In 2021, Spavor and Kovrig were released after Meng was allowed to return to China.
In recent years, the former prime minister, Trudeau, and senior members of his Cabinet increasingly criticized China publicly over human rights issues. Concerns have also grown over Chinese interference in Canadian affairs, including allegations that candidates in an election had received secret, illegal funding from China.
Joly had called China an "increasingly disruptive global power' and warned Canadian companies about the potential risks in doing business there.
More recently, Canada has faced growing concerns that Chinese goods were flooding into Canada. Trudeau announced last year that Ottowa would impose 100% tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, aligning Canada with the United States.
On Wednesday, Joly said that the details of the four Canadians who were executed were not being revealed at the request of their families. She said they had been facing criminal charges linked to drugs, according to China.
The Chinese Embassy, without providing details, said that the cases were handled according to law. "The facts of the crimes committed by the Canadian nationals involved in the cases are clear, and the evidence is solid and sufficient,' it said. The embassy urged Canada to respect China's judicial sovereignty and "stop making irresponsible remarks.'
At least one other Canadian faces the death penalty in China — Robert Lloyd Schellenberg, who has been convicted of drug trafficking. He had initially been sentenced to 15 years in prison. But in 2019 he was handed a death sentence in a one-day retrial, one month after the Canadian authorities arrested Meng.
"Foreigners, like every person in China, are at risk of all kinds of arbitrary detentions and unfair trials,' said Maya Wang, the associate China director at Human Rights Watch. "The universe of cases is really big and we only hear about some of them occasionally.'
After the release of Kovrig and Spavor, people had hoped for a thaw in relations, but that has not taken place on a substantive scale, said Lynette Ong, a professor in Chinese politics at the University of Toronto.
The timing of these executions is a way for Beijing to keep up the pressure and keep up the leverage over Canada in bilateral discussions, Ong said.
This article originally appeared in The New York Times © 2025 The New York Times Company
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