Water — not a bargaining chip

Express Tribune

20-06-2025

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In international diplomacy, some agreements are too foundational to tamper with. The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), signed in 1960, is one such rare pillar of stability between Pakistan and India. It has stood wars, diplomatic tensions and political changes. Now, however, with an alarming twist, India has unilaterally "held it in abeyance", an expression of elasticity with potentially disastrous results. This is not just a bureaucratic manoeuvre. It is an affront to legal norms, a threat to regional peace, and most gravely, a dangerous suggestion that water, the source of life, is now a bargaining chip.
Water is not optional for Pakistan. With more than 80% of its agricultural output relying on the Indus River system, and with already dwindling per capita water availability, any disruption to this flow is an existential threat. The provinces of Punjab and Sindh, which form the country's breadbasket, would face drought, economic paralysis and civil unrest. The consequences would not be limited to economic losses as it would increase inequalities, fuel provincial tensions and make an already unstable situation in the political arena much more complex.
The legal basis of the Indian claim of the treaty being in abeyance is weak and the first in history. There is no provision in the IWT allowing a suspension and anyway what due process has been adopted by India in its regard under the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties. Under Article 57 of the Convention, a treaty may be suspended only by mutual consent or within the framework of the treaty itself and neither of these applies here. Article 60 does allow for suspension if a material breach occurs which India has no proof of. In essence, India has invented a legal grey area to justify a political decision. It is a breach not only of treaty obligations but of the basic principles of international law.
To turn water into a pressure tactic is to reduce a humanitarian and ecological concern into a geopolitical lever. And once that precedent is set, it becomes dangerously difficult to undo. If water is fair game in power politics, what comes next?
This is why the global community cannot afford to stay neutral. South Asia is already one of the most water-stressed regions. Climate change is causing shrinking glaciers and monsoons slackening, and has been speeding the dearth of platforms. The IWT despite all its shortcomings was a paradigm of collaboration on common resources. Such an undermining not only destabilises Pakistan, but also sends the signal to other riparian basins in Africa, Latin America and Central Asia that a unilateral weaponisation of water security is possible.
Pakistan must act, but not recklessly. Although there is nothing wrong with citing India's shift as a possible casus belli, it has to first make all the diplomatic attempts. That involves appealing to the Security Council of the UN under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that specifically provides the possibility of interfering when there is a threat of peace.
Water, especially when controlled by one nuclear power over another, constitutes exactly that kind of threat. The P5 states must be reminded of their 1998 commitment to intervene if South Asia's stability is at risk. That moment is now.
This is not merely about sovereignty or national pride. It is about redefining what should be off-limits in conflict. Civilian water access cannot be a pawn in strategic calculus. Pakistan's response must reinforce this principle, legally and morally. Because if this treaty falls, the damage will go far beyond the Indus Basin — it will corrode the very idea of principled diplomacy.
Water sustains life; it should never be used to choke it. The IWT is not a perfect document, but it is a symbol of what diplomacy can achieve even between enemies. To treat it as a bargaining chip is to abandon that legacy and to gamble with peace itself.