The hazards of going global on India-Pakistan issues

The Hindu

a day ago

Operation Sindoor and subsequent events thereafter have, once again, highlighted the futility of bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in resolving differences between India and Pakistan. An entangled web of frozen ideas has enveloped the situation making it impossible to separate the different strands. The developments following the Second World War and the evolution of the Cold War have also impacted heavily on the situation. Thus, any initiative, however sincere and logical it may be, will be hampered by the existing literature formulated by the United Nations and other international bodies, not to speak of Pakistan's stubborn position that Kashmir is the core issue. It is for this reason that Pakistan finds the smokescreen of resolutions and concepts relating to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), terrorism, self-determination, non-proliferation and peaceful settlement of disputes spread over the last 70 years or more.
For instance, in the briefing given to India's seven teams of special envoys sent out to various countries after Operation Sindoor, the very first point they were asked to assert was that J&K is an integral part of India. Most countries, particularly those which do not follow developments closely, would look up the literature and the UN maps and find that there is an inscription on UN maps depicting the India-Pakistan border, particularly in the region of J&K. The inscription says, 'Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties.' Sometimes, there is a more general disclaimer regarding boundaries on the map such as: 'the boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.' Therefore, most countries would not make a commitment on the question of borders. At best, they would tell us that a bilateral solution, as envisaged in the Simla Agreement, would be desirable.
India's stand on terror
Equally complex is India's position on terrorism. More than 30 years ago, India introduced in the UN General Assembly, a draft for a Comprehensive Convention against Terrorism, which was dismissed as an anti-Pakistan move in which others were not interested. A one man department against terrorism in Vienna was nothing more than a research post. It did not even define terrorism because of the dictum that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. The support that India had given to fighters in Africa and Sri Lanka was pointed out as an example of the difficulty in defining terrorism. The only thing that the UN could do was to keep the definition of terrorism as vague as possible.
The shocking events of 9/11 (2001) brought terrorism, which was considered to be confined to West Asia and South Asia, centre stage in the United States and Europe and it appeared that decisive action would be taken to deal with the menace globally. But after hectic activity in the political and legal bodies of the UN to finalise binding laws, the focus shifted to U.S. military action in Afghanistan, which resulted in the ouster of the Taliban government. The war in Afghanistan was meant to root out terrorism, but after decades of conflict, the U.S. fled the country, leaving the Taliban in power.
The UN's approach
The UN Security Council has established several mechanisms to combat international terrorism, that are primarily centred around the various resolutions. Under these all member-states are obliged to take various economic and security measures to prevent the commission of terrorist acts. The Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council was authorised to monitor the implementation of the overall plan. As for action against terrorists, this can be covered under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which recognises the inherent right of self defence if an armed attack occurs against a member-state. Though the application of this right in the case of terrorist attacks is complicated, it can provide a basis for a state to take action against terrorist groups that have attacked it. India's position about surgical strikes on terrorist infrastructure will be judged as to whether such action is proportionate and in accordance with international humanitarian law.
The Security Council's approach to counter-terrorism recognises that it requires a comprehensive 'whole-of-society' approach that respects human rights and the rule of law. It emphasises international cooperation, the importance of addressing the conditions conducive to terrorism, and the need to prevent and counter violent extremism. In these circumstances, it will be hard for India to get a clear endorsement of its actions against terrorism. India does bring up terrorist attacks to the Security Council, but the Counter Terrorism Committee has not taken a clear position on the right of nations to treat a terrorist attack as an act of war — the new doctrine advanced by India.
The ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) and India's restraint in crossing the LoC even in conflict situations are the other factors which are likely to come into play in any discussion in the Security Council or other international fora on India's strategic strikes. India's special envoys may have faced these questions in discussions even with friendly countries.
The issue of hyphenation
When India took the issue of Pakistan's invasion of Kashmir to the UN, it was a pure case of aggression which should have been considered under Chapter VII of the Charter. But as it happened , the issue was discussed under Article VI on Pacific Settlement of Disputes. Consequently, several extraneous ideas were incorporated in the agenda. leading to western countries hyphenating India and Pakistan on every issue. When Pakistan and India acquired nuclear weapons, Kashmir was considered a nuclear hot spot. India has a non-first use doctrine, while Pakistan threatens to multiply its conventional military capability.
India has an established position that any bilateral discussion would only be on terrorism and the status of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Therefore, diplomacy at the bilateral level or multilateral level is unlikely to be effective. Pakistan will continue to internationalise the Kashmir issue, but India should refrain from seeking international intervention or support. The reports of the special envoys will indicate, if anything, that such efforts are futile, given the history of the evolution of 'the India-Pakistan question' in the Security Council.
India has nothing to gain by raising its concerns internationally as its narrative has got entangled in several controversial concepts in the UN. India's only option is to ensure its security by appropriate military action as long as Pakistan continues its policy of inflicting a thousand cuts on India to gain Indian territory.
T.P. Sreenivasan is a former Ambassador of India, who has specialised in multilateral diplomacy. He is the only Indian diplomat who has served at the Ambassadorial level at the United Nations in New York, Vienna and Nairobi and headed the UN Division in Ministry of External Affairs