Abdel Halim Hafez's family objects to Mawazine Festival's hologram concert
A dispute has erupted between the organizers of the Mawazine Festival and the family of the late Egyptian singer Abdel Halim Hafez following the announcement of a hologram concert featuring the « Dark-Skinned Nightingale» at the festival's sixth edition.
The family accused the organizers of proceeding without obtaining prior permission, insisting that the artist's artistic and literary rights are exclusively theirs and cannot be used without consent. Meanwhile, the organizing company stated that the concert is being held under a legal agreement with producer Mohsen Jaber, who they claim holds the rights to exploit Abdel Halim's songs.
In response, Mohamed Shabana, the artist's nephew, denied Jaber's ownership of these rights and affirmed that the family plans to take legal action in several countries to protect Abdel Halim's legacy, especially after previous incidents they believe have harmed the artist's image.
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Ya Biladi
2 days ago
- Ya Biladi
Abdel Halim Hafez's family objects to Mawazine Festival's hologram concert
A dispute has erupted between the organizers of the Mawazine Festival and the family of the late Egyptian singer Abdel Halim Hafez following the announcement of a hologram concert featuring the « Dark-Skinned Nightingale» at the festival's sixth edition. The family accused the organizers of proceeding without obtaining prior permission, insisting that the artist's artistic and literary rights are exclusively theirs and cannot be used without consent. Meanwhile, the organizing company stated that the concert is being held under a legal agreement with producer Mohsen Jaber, who they claim holds the rights to exploit Abdel Halim's songs. In response, Mohamed Shabana, the artist's nephew, denied Jaber's ownership of these rights and affirmed that the family plans to take legal action in several countries to protect Abdel Halim's legacy, especially after previous incidents they believe have harmed the artist's image.
Morocco World
22-04-2025
- Morocco World
Diplomatic Stubbornness and Sudden Death
All forms of stubbornness, which combine the ingredients of blind pride and impotence, are deadly. However, diplomatic stubbornness is by far the one that causes sudden death. In the Egyptian film وحدة بوحدة (1984), which can be translated as 'You can't lose anything by waiting', Sahah Fouad (Adel Imam), who works for an advertising agency, launches a hoax to the representative of a rival agency, Maïssa (Merivet Amine). He pretends that his agency is going to launch a new product called الفنكوش. The agency's CEO (Gamil Rateb), who lacks skills in business management, is jealous of Salah Fouad's performance. He hates his unorthodox manners of striking tricky deals. The CEO takes the initiative to order the filming of commercials on this allegedly fetish product. He didn't care to inform Salah. . This move proves to be a disaster, because there is no such product available. With no options at their hands, the Agency's team invents a product based on a combination of weird substances thanks to the creativity of an extravagant chemist. The latter then produces cookies with a high concentrated alcohol. The success is beyond all expectations. The agency's team has to meet another challenge, which is to keep the product alive as a means of putting pressure on other agencies. The tragedy is that Salah thinks he could use this type of subterfuge indefinitely. This option proves to a waste of time and effort, because the importers of the fine alcohol exert pressure and make a good offer to Salah, which he accepts without even frowning. The lie fizzles out. The reference to this story reflects an indirect link with the adage that says that people invent lies, convey them and end up believing that they are presenting the truth. This brings me to the subject of this paper: STUBBORNNESS. Stubbornness in politics is a defect that, by dint of perpetuating itself, ends up destroying the person who makes it his or her rule to fool people. It does not allow for negotiation to find common ground. It brings about some sort of intellectual castration. It increases tides of adversity. And, ironically, it ends up terminating the actors who misuse it. Safe Haven Space, Cemetery Space Stubbornness is much more dangerous whenever it is associated with diplomatic myopia. The misreading of the geopolitical chessboard is based on outdated parameters that make actors believe that this chessboard is static and that the movements or agitations that occur here and there only might be an optical effect. Such behavior might be the result of several factors. First, the overestimation by the state actor of its role on multiple chessboards. He might have no idea about how the modus operandi works. He doesn't include the impact of its role in the required levels of analysis. These levels of analysis are rooted in the multiplication of forms of intervention on multiple fronts that vary in terms of tension, scope and duration over time. Secondly, the approximate reading of the situation. The context is either ignored or not read at its true value. The resulting bungling surprises the adversaries, annoys them and, in the end, pushes them to organize the response with full knowledge of the issue in progress. Thirdly, the state actor is subject to several forms of pressure. This forces him to look for the most available option to deal with it in the hope of gaining time and increasing his bargaining power. In most cases, to him, the easiest solution is the projection of an image riddled with prejudices and amalgams. For better or worse, he resorts to bluffing to season the dish he prefers the most. This might include putting spells on rivals and poisoning their own dishes. Fourthly, the state actor walls himself up in a virtual citadel and makes up an imaginary golden past. He may blindly resort to the method of appropriating the cultural and civilizational symbols of others, especially those of his neighbors. Psychiatrists refer to cases alike as a dissonance caused by a jerk of dangerous denial. From then on, the theft of symbols belonging to others is maintained by a deliberately amnesiac memory. To use a candid metaphor, one might assume that the outcome is that even the imagination catches cold and dissociates itself from the ritual cold showers to which the incriminated actor is subject all day long. How can we support this reading, concretely speaking? Citadels are built to defend against foreign aggression. They are accompanied by the installation of barriers to stop the advance of the opponents in the event of an attack. Between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahara has played the role of a natural barrier. However, it was a space for exchange of all kinds. It is well known that colonial powers used this space for hegemonic purposes. By theoretically leaving this space, in the aftermath of the wave of independences between the end of the 1950s and the 1980s, the colonial powers bequeathed a heavy responsibility to the newly independent states. The handover would have taken place in conditions where vassalage would not have been definitively buried. More concretely, an area as vast as the Sahel and the Sahara would have been entrusted to intermediary powers. The latter were authorized to hire minor state actors to manage the security aspects determined according to an obligation of bringing results and getting the job done at any expense. The division of labor has been skillfully thought out. This means that the minor actors chosen were themselves newly born. Besides, they cannot present evidences of an undisputed historical past as independent entities before the colonial conquest. The choice was not innocent. Countries such as Libya and Algeria have been co-opted to take on these roles. This is how Muammar Gaddafi of Libya had, since 1969, the date of the overthrow of the Senussi monarchy, no dream other than to build what he called 'The United States of the Sahara'. This project dates back to the colonial period during which the idea of creating a Saharan space, the cradle of the 'Tuareg nation', was considered. Gaddafi's ambitions had dangled the idea of becoming king of African kings, to use his own pictorial expression. Algeria, for its part, has used this space both as a barrier and as a strategic retreat. Being itself vulnerable and a target of Tuareg separatism as promoted by Gaddafi and the proponents of the idea of 'divide and rule,' Algeria has been part of a hegemonic vision that was maintained, more concretely, during the 1970s. Indeed, during these years, the principle of the inviolability of borders that it enjoyed in the aftermath of its independence began to be challenged. The major concern of Algerian decision-makers was that the territories their country inherited could never be claimed by neighboring countries. The agreements that Algeria concluded with Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Niger in 1983 were part of this vision. Let's take the case of Mali. The situation, as a Malian diplomat told me, has been that the various Malian governments, since the overthrow of Modibo Keita (1960–1969), have had the Algerian knife at their throats. And it is not for nothing that the revolt of the current Malian leaders is a testimony of their political, diplomatic and security fed up with Algeria, which feels that geopolitical ascendancy is slipping through its hands. The political, diplomatic and security fed-up of the Malian leaders is in line with their rejection of French policy in the region. And therefore, this culminated in the rejection of the geopolitical subcontracting that Algeria (and Libya under Gaddafi) has been implementing for at least four decades. One conclusion is necessary at this stage of the analysis: the Sahel, which was a safe haven for Algeria as a strategic intermittent worker, is becoming a cemetery for its hegemonic ambitions. During a friendly discussion with seasoned diplomats from West and Central African countries, an observation was made that the hegemonic temptation Algeria untiringly has shown has no other explanation than the headlong rush. A flight that paves the way for this country to return to the museum of inglorious history. My interlocutors could not help but laugh at the Algerian Foreign Ministry's statement describing the Malian provisional government as a military junta with no political legitimacy and using terminology bordering on vulgarity. Algiers thus conveys a lesson in political morality marred by a sinuosity that produces incoherence and fails to clean up one's home beforehand. The explanation for such a behavior is that the country's decision-makers have missed the opportunity to be a unifying regional power. However, on the other side of the coin, to do so, it would have been compulsory to produce solid historical references. Algeria has none. The only ones it can boast of have been produced by neighbouring countries, which have an unchallenged political and diplomatic history. Insipid Narrative, Suicidal Denial Following the outbreak of the crisis between Mali and the vicissitudes that we know, going as far as the recall of ambassadors for consultation, the language used in certain press releases or media insertions in Algeria surprised experts familiar with African affairs. History teaches us that wise decision-makers who are forced to choose between Nero and Machiavelli choose the latter in order to gain time without losing out on the change. Political scientists and historians of political ideas refer to Nero to explain the policies used by those in power to escape popular vindictiveness and avoid being ejected. They opt for scorched earth. They do as Nero did. They burn the city and barricade themselves behind citadels of justifications without much conviction. They get burned in the ashes. Political scientists and historians of political ideas have a soft spot for Machiavelli, who proposed a paradigm that masterfully succeeds in combining cunning and political realism to win and neutralize the opponents of those in power. Indeed, Machiavelli warns against false pride, selfishness and blindness. The genius of leaders worthy of the name lies in their ability and intelligence to adapt to circumstances. Adaptation is important to allow them to redirect their compasses with full knowledge of the facts. This may be easier for an individual leader who makes decisions in an authoritarian manner and imposes them on other actors in a subordinate situation. However, adaptation is more difficult, if not impossible, when one finds ourselves faced with an oligarchic power whose actors play ping-pong to keep a certain distance between them in order to reach full ascendancy. The risk in this configuration is that, because power is compact, it becomes hermetic. The struggle within the decision-making system, where the oligarchy maintains confusion, causes the actors who are beginning to be dumped to adopt the Nero model: scorched earth and 'after me, the deluge.' There is also another option that can be summed up in the maxim of 'Leave time to time' (a line borrowed from Cervantes in Don Quixote of La Mancha, 1605 and 1615), without abandoning the realism option. The bet is played out on the immutable context and on the ability of actors to show resilience in defending what they consider to be the national interest of their country. History teaches us that seizing opportunities by enlightened policymakers is smart and beneficial behavior. However, it is often too late. Examples drawn from the Arab periphery's controversial history were legion during the 1990s and 2000s. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein, with the wind in his sails because of a confused reading of geopolitics during the 1980s and 1990s, was forced between 1991 and 1993, during the second Gulf War, and in 2003, on the eve of the third Gulf War, to make concessions. Time out. While it is true that he was aware that, even if he had accepted the first proposals for a resolution of the conflict with Kuwait, this would not have deterred the United States from invading the country, he was wrong not to give it a try. He chose Nero instead of Machiavelli. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi believed, at a certain point, that he had a sacred mission to restore order in the Maghreb and Middle East. In fact, he was assigned the role of bringing about a state of permanent political and diplomatic disorder. Once he realized that it had been used, as a kind of turkey in the stuffing, he wanted to compose. Too late. Time out. Because the geopolitics of the 2000s had changed. By seeking to bribe European leaders, and even to intervene in intra-national electoral processes, he put a bullet in his own head. Because he revealed his vulnerability and powerlessness. Over forty years he had based his power on a revolutionary discourse that he had quickly abandoned. Between Nero and Machiavelli, he finally chose Nero. He has been swallowed up in the ashes of his revolutionary pride, a stalk of reeds. In Syria, the desire to save an Alawite minority in power pushed the al-Assad family to play on ambivalence at the time when it has been entrusted with the mission of keeping divided Lebanon under its control. The controversial memory of Bilad as-Sham (The Great Levant) weighed in the balance. The counterpart would have been, initially, to be part of the geopolitics of compromises as initiated in the aftermath of the conclusion of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in 1978. The quid pro quo would have been, in a second step, to jump on the bandwagon in the broader Middle East peace process resulting from a jerky processes of peace talks and negotiations. First through the Madrid conference of 1991, the Oslo Accords between the Palestinian National Authority and Israel in 1993, and last through the Wadi Araba peace agreement between Jordan and Israel in 1994. The future of the Golan Heights was at the center of negotiations on a multi-stage compromise. Secret negotiations between Syria and Israel had taken place, but the ambivalence referred to above was the driving force behind the Syrian strategy. A waste of time and opportunity, some seasoned diplomats would come to that conclusion. Nero or Machiavelli? Neither under Hafez al-Assad, rather a political naivety cultivated by an alliance with Iran and its military arms in the region. With Bashar al-Assad, Nero was resurrected, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. A strategy that ended up bringing down the regime. In Egypt, the country's historical frame of reference and its strategic geographical position were both a blessing and a curse. Several wars and incidents (1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973) have left their mark. However, there came a time when it was necessary to get in tune with the reality on the ground. Anwar al-Sadat did so in the aftermath of the October War against Israel in 1973. Between Nero and Machiavelli, unlike his predecessor Gamal Abdel Nasser, Sadat chose the latter. He concluded a peace treaty with Israel, recovered Sinai and paved the way for other diplomatic and security arrangements. Realism, idealism or betrayal, in politics only facts and achievements count. Between Nero and Machiavelli, there is a third option, which is that of 'giving time to time' and playing both on one's own assets and on the strengths of the opponents. Morocco did it respectively with the late King Mohammed V, the late King Hassan II and, even better, with King Mohammed VI. The principle is not to close the door to dialogue and negotiations, but to stick to a soft firmness. Break the ice, reach out one hand, but keep the other hand on the trigger. Like Egypt, Morocco's strategic position cultivates covetousness and stirs up rivalries. It therefore requires flexibility and permanent vigilance to adapt and organize defense. Morocco has been able, despite adversity on all sides, to make use of what Joseph Nye sometimes calls soft power , sometimes smart power . Finally, Morocco is winning the battle against a set of proxy actors, both state and non-state. With dedication and belief in the righteousness of its cause, it traces a success story that increases its bargaining power in a shaky geopolitical space. Morocco does, while making sure not to push it to sink into false pride or give in to the temptation of becoming an asymmetrical strategic intermittent. Proxy State Actors Hiring Non-State Proxies Actors Since the end of the Second World War, the refocusing of international alliances has promoted studies relating to the determinants of power, the conception and implementation of the foreign policy of states. Other studies have been devoted to the designation of the actors who incept and promote the decision at the national and international levels. This practice was more or less clear insofar as the classification between friends and opponents was crystal clear. The concept of friends and foes then evolved to build a concept that has become a pillar of certain military doctrines, based on the idea of the actor-proxy in its dual role as a state proxy and as a proxy hiring proxies. To better play this role, the promoters of this paradigm believe that it is necessary to keep fragile geopolitical spaces in a state of permanent instability. This is what African and Arab actors have been doing for more than four decades without being aware of it. These proxies have been given limited leeway, but enough room to be in the spotlight and sow disorder. To take the examples of some of them already cited, we can mention the case of Saddam Hussein who was used between 1980 and 1988 to go to war against Iran, which became an Islamic Republic in 1979. Iran, itself, under the Pahlavi dynasty, was used to playing the role of the West's policeman in the Middle East before being swept away by a revolution orchestrated from the outside to weaken the Gulf monarchies and maintain the grip on the wealth that abounds in their subsoils. Libya is worth mentioning too. Muammar Gaddafi was used to get rid of the Senussi monarchy, which was less flexible to the demands of Western oil companies. Gaddafi's rise to power in 1969 was an American project. In Syria, Hafez al-Assad had been used to maintain fratricidal ideological struggles, not only against Iraq but also against Egypt. It was a diversionary policy well-orchestrated by the heirs of Lawrence of Arabia (Thomas E. Lawrence, 1888–1935), to which Hafez al-Assad had paid no attention. Egypt was used according to the same pattern. Gamal Abdel Nasser believed that he could shape the Arab world in his own way. He was not aware of the fact that the main objective behind Arab nationalism, supported behind the scenes by some decision-making centers in the West and the Soviet Union (thanks to the avowed Orientalists), was to revive the question of ethnic and religious minorities and that of the borders inherited from colonization. Algeria is by far the most edifying example in this respect. Having come into existence only in 1962, she has secured its existence with a number of concessions of which the public is now aware. One of the proxy roles she has been tasked with has been to keep the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa in a situation of chronic instability. The borders issues and the commitment to a policy of denigrating countries that enjoy a long tradition of statehood have been the spearhead of Algerian foreign policy, particularly since 1965, when Colonel Houari Boumediene overthrew President Ahmed Ben Bella. However, at the moment, Algeria, the proxy actor, has reached the age limit and must retire. The military establishment cannot accept this in any way. So, perhaps, the elements who pull the strings behind the scenes would try to be more convinced than Nero. They are aware that Algeria is more isolated than ever. Gone are the days when, unconsciously, part of the political elite considered Algeria to be an overseas department (OVD). This perception was based on the fact that it guaranteed privileges to people who had been given the leverage under the Evian Agreements and the additional agreements of 1968 and 1994. The issue of the Moroccan Sahara, which Algeria has made its Trojan horse, is in the process of being resolved on the basis of the Moroccan autonomy plan. An autonomy plan is part of the global policy of advanced regionalization in which Morocco has decided to seriously commit itself to close the loop. No, STUBBORNNESS. No, DENIAL. No, over my dead body. Or maybe, why not look for a loophole to buy time? Tunisia. Yes, Tunisia is the only country left for Algeria to make Algerians believe that it still has a say in the geopolitics of Africa and the Mediterranean. Tunisians are warning against a sordid plan that some decision-makers in Algeria have prepared to transfer populations from the Tindouf camps to Tunisia. These Sahrawi populations have Algerian passports and identity cards and they can easily obtain residence permits. There is confirmed information that two thousand people coming from the camps have already been allowed to settle in Tunisia. Because the same policy, which had been implemented with regard to Mauritania for four decades already, has not been able to help achieve the expected results. Indeed, many Polisario leaders obtained Mauritanian nationality following the signing of the peace agreement between Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla and the pseudo-Sadr in 1979. Similarly, the strategy of massively displacing a large part of the population from the Tindouf camps to northern Mauritania, which Algeria had attempted from 2020 onwards, has so far failed. Naturally, the abovementioned proxy actors have resorted to outsourcing and have either created or supported non-state proxies. Some of them have been the cause of the chaos that their countries are currently suffering. However, the time is long gone when the nirvana of virtual glory made ephemeral power hover over the skies and facilitate the maintenance of the politics of denial. In short, a policy that does not make projections and even less calls into question the policies followed so far is a sterile and dangerous policy. When a jerky of tiles falls on the heads of nonchalant decision-makers (or those who are overconfident in their country's bargaining capacity), they look to Nero instead of Machiavelli and consequently rule out the maxim of 'Leave time to time.' They are sucked into the quicksand of their STUBBORNNESS likely to cause their SUDDEN DEATH. Tags: Diplomacydiplomatic strategyDiplomatic StubbornnessMorocco diplomacy
Morocco World
18-04-2025
- Morocco World
Egyptian Comedic Genius Soliman Eid Dies at 64
Rabat – Egyptian actor Soliman Eid died today due to a sudden health crisis. The actor, 64, died shortly after he was transferred to the hospital, reports said. Eid was born on October 17, 1961, and started his acting career in the late eighties. He appeared in several iconic movies, including 'Terrorism and Kebab', featuring Yusra and Adel Imam. Several actors mo urned the death of their fellow colleague in the industry, including Karim Abdel Aziz. 'We lost a respected artist and human,' he said. Egyptian actress Bushra also paid her respects to the artist, describing him as the 'kindest colleague,' noting that his death surprised everyone. 'We worked together several times, but I never imagined that our last project would be the last time we'd meet.' Bushra and Eid worked together often, and were featured together in the 'Sidi Nass' series, which was aired during Ramadan. Mohamed Henedy also commented on Eid's passing, extending his condolences to the deceased's family and relatives. Egyptian star Hussein Fahmy said the actor's death left the artistic landscape in deep sorrow and grief. 'I mourn the passing of the noble artist and dear friend, who left this world, leaving behind a good legacy and a beautiful memory among his family, friends, and loved ones.'
