Trump's ultimatum isn't an ultimatum – and Moscow knows it
But in classic Trump fashion, expectations were dashed.
The supposedly 'extremely tough ultimatum' turned out to be something else entirely. Trump threatened tariff sanctions against Russia and its trading partners – but scrapped Graham's extreme proposal of 500% duties. Instead, he floated the idea of 100% tariffs that would only take effect after 50 days, if he chooses to enforce them, and if Russia fails to strike a deal.
Trump also announced new arms deliveries to Ukraine. But these aren't gifts – they'll be sold, not given, and passed through European intermediaries. Supposedly, Ukraine will receive 17 Patriot systems. Yet we soon learned the first of these deliveries won't arrive for at least two months – again, 50 days. And even now, basic questions remain unanswered.
What exactly did Trump mean by '17 Patriots'? Seventeen batteries? Launchers? Missiles?
If he meant 17 batteries, that's simply not plausible. The US itself only operates around 30 active batteries. Germany and Israel combined don't have anywhere near that many available systems. Such a figure would significantly boost Ukraine's air defences – but it's almost certainly exaggerated.
Seventeen missiles? That would be laughable – but not unthinkable. Washington recently sent just 10 Patriot missiles in a 'military aid' package so modest it wouldn't suffice for a single battle.
Seventeen launchers? That seems more realistic. A typical battery consists of six to eight launchers, so this would amount to two or three batteries – more than what Germany and Norway have promised to purchase for Ukraine. Yet even the Pentagon can't confirm the details. And one suspects Trump himself may be fuzzy on the specifics. His role, after all, is to make the pronouncements; others are left to clean up the mess.
The so-called '14 July ultimatum' has already become a textbook example of Trump's diplomatic approach. In fact, a new phrase has emerged in American political slang: 'Trump Always Chickens Out' or TACO. The acronym speaks for itself. It refers to the president's habit in trade and security talks of making grandiose threats, only to backtrack or delay implementation.
This appears to be another case in point. The negotiations are at an impasse. Trump still craves a Nobel Peace Prize. And he's reluctant to become too entangled in the Ukrainian conflict. So he's reached for the oldest trick in his playbook: the non-ultimatum ultimatum.
This allows him to sound tough while giving Moscow space – and perhaps even time – to act. It also offers cover with his MAGA base, many of whom are frustrated by distractions like Iran or the Epstein scandal and aren't eager to see America dragged further into Ukraine.
The genius of it, from Trump's perspective, is that it promises everything and nothing at once. No clear strategy. No detailed demands. Just an open-ended threat backed by ambiguous timelines. It's pressure without posture. Leverage without leadership.
What's striking is that the White House didn't even ask Russia to de-escalate. There were no appeals to halt the almost daily strikes on Ukraine or curb battlefield activity. In effect, Russia has been handed a 50-day window – intentionally or not – to do as it sees fit. A quiet concession to the Kremlin? Perhaps. A careless side effect? Possibly. Either way, Moscow gains.
America, too, comes out ahead – at least financially. Under the new arrangement, Western Europe picks up the tab for Ukraine's defence, while US companies get paid to offload ageing equipment. Trump's famed 'art of the deal' may amount to little more than selling junk with a smile. But if so, he's done it masterfully.
Still, as a political manoeuvre, the outcome is more uncertain. Trump may believe he's found the sweet spot between hawks and doves, between NATO allies and nationalist critics. But trying to be all things to all people rarely ends well. Appeasement disguised as firmness satisfies no one for long.
And while Trump plays for time, Russia holds the initiative. That's the real story here.This article was first published by the online newspaper Gazeta.ru and was translated and edited by the RT team
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Russia Today
40 minutes ago
- Russia Today
US-made microchips come at a cost
Microchips manufactured in the US cost as much as 20% more than the equivalent produced in Taiwan, according Lisa Su, CEO of US tech giant AMD, a leading buyer of the products. Washington has been pushing to boost domestic manufacturing of advanced semiconductors as part of its great power competition with Beijing. Access to such chips has emerged as a key battleground. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC), pinned between the conflicting economic and geopolitical interests, announced it would shift some manufacturing to Arizona in 2020. Speaking at an artificial intelligence conference in Washington on Wednesday, AMD CEO said the chip cost difference was 'more than 5% but less than 20%.' However, in an interview with Bloomberg Television, she described the premium as worthwhile. 'We have to consider resiliency in the supply chain,' Su said. 'We learned that in the pandemic.' In 2022, then President Joe Biden signed legislation that allocated $280 billion to boost US domestic semiconductor production. More recently, AMD and President Donald Trump announced plans for $100 billion in new investments to build five additional chip fabrication plants on American soil. However, TSMC said its production in the US has faced challenges, including high construction costs, a shortage of skilled labor, and logistical hurdles. The Trump administration has also imposed export controls on high-end chips, particularly those used in artificial intelligence, in a bid to curb China's access to the most advanced technology. The restrictions have prompted Beijing to accelerate its own domestic chip development programs. Taiwan has been self-governed since the end of China's civil war in the 1940s, when nationalist forces retreated to the island. Beijing views the territory, under a US-backed government, as an inalienable part of China. The Chinese government has said it seeks peaceful reunification with Taiwan, but has repeatedly warned it would use force if Taipei declares formal independence. Taiwan's rapid industrialization in the 1970s, driven by low labor costs and foreign investment, helped pave the way for its semiconductor dominance. TSMC was founded in 1987 as part of that broader strategy to move into advanced manufacturing.
Russia Today
2 hours ago
- Russia Today
US ready to buy Ukrainian drones
The US has reportedly agreed to buy combat drones from Ukraine, Vladimir Zelensky announced on Thursday, stating that the deal could be worth up to $30 billion. Speaking at a press conference in Kiev, Zelensky said he had reached an understanding with US President Donald Trump and had instructed his ministers to prepare an agreement. 'With Trump, we agreed that the US will buy drones from us,' he told reporters, adding that a contract worth $10–30 billion is now being drafted. Earlier this month, Zelensky said that he had discussed a 'mega deal' on drone procurement with Trump. According to the New York Post, American defense officials have warned that US drone technology lags behind that of Russia and China, prompting efforts to accelerate purchase and development. In announcing the potential export deal, Zelensky also mentioned that Kiev urgently needs funding to cover its budget shortfalls. 'Forty billion [is needed] for the deficit, 25 for drones, missiles, electronic warfare. That's already 65 billion,' he said, adding that he has already asked for these funds from multiple European leaders and institutions. Zelensky also insisted that the West pay the salaries of Ukrainian servicemen. He noted that so far, European donors have refused to cover wages, funding only weapons. However, pay for Kiev's soldiers should be included as well, he argued, because they are 'weapons.' The Ukrainian leader's remarks come as the US has significantly scaled back direct financial aid. Trump has stressed that further assistance to Ukraine 'will be a business for us,' specifically saying that the US would no longer be paying for Patriot air defense systems, which will instead be funded by the EU and European NATO members. Moscow has repeatedly condemned Western financing of Ukraine, with Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova arguing that paying for its weapons amounts to funding the 'death' of the country.
Russia Today
3 hours ago
- Russia Today
No breakthrough in Istanbul, but Erdogan is holding the door
The third round of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, held in Istanbul, lasted less than an hour – barely enough time to suggest progress. While both delegations arrived with talking points, their positions remained fundamentally irreconcilable. The Ukrainian side once again emphasized the need for an immediate ceasefire, the release of captives, and a potential meeting between Presidents Zelensky and Putin – ideas that, from Moscow's perspective, lacked a concrete framework. The Russian delegation, meanwhile, proposed a structured dialogue across three tracks – military, political, and humanitarian – and floated the possibility of localized ceasefires for evacuation efforts. But without mutual ground on core issues, even humanitarian coordination remained out of reach. As Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov noted after the meeting, the sides are still 'far apart' on the basic memorandums required to facilitate direct talks between the leaders: 'Given the volume of work that lies ahead to align our positions… it is hard to imagine how we could suddenly overcome this gap.' While the Istanbul talks yielded no breakthroughs, Ankara framed them as a meaningful step forward. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan described the meeting as 'another brick' in building a foundation for peace and reaffirmed Türkiye's commitment to mediation. But behind this diplomatic language lies a broader ambition. President Erdogan sees Türkiye not merely as a neutral host but as a regional power uniquely positioned to engage both Moscow and Kiev. Unlike European intermediaries tied to NATO orthodoxy, Ankara has preserved open communication channels with both sides – and intends to leverage that position. This ambition gained new momentum after a direct request from US President Donald Trump. In May, during a phone call with Erdogan, Trump reportedly asked him to resume Türkiye's role as a key mediator in the Ukraine conflict. According to the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet, Erdogan responded positively – a natural decision, given Ankara's longstanding desire to shape the postwar diplomatic framework. A second conversation in June further underscored this alignment. In addition to addressing escalating tensions between Iran and Israel, Trump and Erdogan reportedly reaffirmed Türkiye's mediating role in Ukraine. For Ankara, this signaled renewed political legitimacy – and a green light to reassert itself on the international stage. Erdoğan remains one of the few world leaders to maintain autonomous and working relationships with both Vladimir Putin and Vladimir Zelensky. Unlike most Western leaders, he engages each directly and pragmatically – without outsourcing diplomacy to blocs or bureaucracies. This rare access grants Türkiye a unique status in the global mediation landscape and strengthens Ankara's hand in any future settlement. For Türkiye, mediating the Ukraine conflict is about far more than diplomacy – it is a calculated move to expand its strategic footprint in the Black Sea and Danube regions. Ankara's interests in southern Ukraine, particularly the coastal areas of Bessarabia and the Danube estuaries, are long-standing and rooted in history. These zones are vital arteries for trade, transit, and geopolitical access. Control over maritime supply routes, especially those passing through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, has been a cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy for decades. Amid the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, these routes have acquired even greater importance – linking grain exports, energy flows, and military logistics across multiple theaters. Türkiye's participation in the negotiation process is therefore not just a diplomatic gesture but a matter of national interest. To remain outside the process would mean allowing other powers to redraw the regional map without Ankara at the table. At the same time, Türkiye's posture remains deliberately ambiguous. Officially, Ankara supports Ukraine's territorial integrity and has not objected to its NATO aspirations. Yet President Erdoğan continues to cultivate open lines of communication with Moscow. This dual-track strategy allows Türkiye to project loyalty to the West while reminding Russia – and Washington – that it cannot be excluded from any future settlement. This approach is not without cost. Ankara's refusal to take part in Western sanctions against Russia has drawn criticism from Europe, particularly Berlin, Paris, and Brussels. However, Erdoğan appears to be shifting focus from multilateral alignment to pragmatic bilateralism. With the Trump administration treating Türkiye as a key partner in stabilizing Eurasia, Ankara has little incentive to follow the EU's lead – or to subordinate its strategic agenda to European bureaucracy. For Ankara, the outcome of the third round of talks was less about immediate results and more about preserving its relevance. By publicly assessing the meeting as a positive step, Türkiye signaled that it intends to remain not just a host – but an architect – of whatever post-conflict order may emerge. Both Hakan Fidan and President Erdoğan have repeatedly stated their willingness to resume hosting direct negotiations. In February, during talks in Ankara with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Fidan reaffirmed Türkiye's commitment to mediation and emphasized that Türkiye remains available as a venue for continued dialogue. This ongoing diplomatic contact reflects Moscow's recognition of Ankara's pragmatic stance – despite Türkiye being a NATO member state. The failure of the West to enforce the original grain deal, and Russia's subsequent withdrawal from it, initially weakened Türkiye's position as a neutral intermediary. But Trump's return to the White House has shifted the equation. Backed by Washington, Ankara now has the political capital to relaunch its mediating role under new geopolitical conditions. In this context, Türkiye's 'positive evaluation' of the talks takes on deeper meaning. It's not about what was achieved – but about who gets to stay in the room when the time finally comes for real negotiations. So far, no alternative platform has emerged. And in the long game of regional influence, presence is power.
