
Hong Kong witnesses 17% rise in long-haul visitors to city for April
long-haul visitors coming to the city in April, with the level also increasing for the first four months of 2025 compared with last year, and is expected to continue growing in the coming months.
The Hong Kong Tourism Board said on Thursday that the number of visitors from long-haul markets reached 343,023 in April, a 17 per cent increase from the same period last year.
The figure also accounted for 8.91 per cent of the 3.84 million arrivals recorded for the month.
Overall, the city welcomed 13 per cent more visitors in April compared with a year ago.
The number of incoming travellers in the first four months of 2025 stood at 16.07 million, a 10 per cent increase from the same period in 2024.
The number of mainland Chinese visitors heading to the city for the month reached 2.81 million, accounting for 73.17 per cent of arrivals and representing a 13 per cent increase year on year.
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