Trump expects 'constructive conversation' with Putin
"I'm going to speak to Vladimir Putin and I'm going to be telling him 'you've got to end this war,'" Trump said at a White House press conference, adding he'd "like to see a ceasefire very, very quickly."
Trump said he would call Zelensky and other European leaders right after the meeting with Putin, set for Friday in the far northern US state of Alaska.
"The next meeting will be with Zelensky and Putin, or Zelensky, Putin and me. I'll be there if they need," he said.
Trump said he was a "little bothered" by Zelensky saying he needed constitutional approval for any territorial concessions.
"I mean, he's got approval to go into war and kill everybody. But he needs approval to do a land swap?" he said. "Because there'll be some land swapping going on."
Vice President JD Vance said that the United States was working to "schedule" a meeting between Trump and his Russian and Ukrainian counterparts.
"One of the most important logjams is that Vladimir Putin said that he would never sit down with [Volodymyr] Zelensky, the head of Ukraine, and the president has now got that to change," Vance said during an interview on Fox News program "Sunday Morning Futures."
"We're at a point now where we're trying to figure out, frankly, scheduling and things like that around when these three leaders could sit down and discuss an end to this conflict," Vance said when asked about his expectations for the Alaska summit on August 15.
The vice president, in an interview conducted ahead of last week's announcement that the US and Russian presidents would meet this Friday, said the United States was going to "try to find some negotiated settlement that the Ukrainians and Russians can live with."
Vance added: "It's not going to make anybody super happy, both the Russians and the Ukrainians probably at the end of the day are going to be unhappy with it."
The planned US-Russia summit in Alaska without Zelensky had raised concerns that a deal would require Kyiv to cede territory, which the European Union has rejected.
US Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker suggested on CNN that Zelensky could attend the summit.
He was asked whether Zelensky might join Trump and Putin on Friday.
"Yes, I certainly think it's possible," he said. "Certainly, there can't be a deal that everybody that's involved in it doesn't agree to. And, I mean, obviously, it's a high priority to get this war to end."
In a flurry of diplomacy, Zelensky held calls with 13 counterparts over three days including Kyiv's main backers Germany, Britain and France.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Sunday he hoped and assumed that Zelensky would attend the summit.
Whitaker said the decision would ultimately be Trump's to make.
"If he thinks that that is the best scenario to invite Zelensky, then he will do that," he said, adding that "no decision has been made to this point."
Tens of thousands of people have been killed since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, with millions forced to flee their homes.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Ammon
an hour ago
- Ammon
Trump may visit Israel, says White House
Ammon News - White House sources say that if the conditions are right, US President Donald Trump may visit Israel next month, before his planned visit to the United Kingdom. "The president is going to visit Britain in September, and it's possible he'll stop in Israel, but it's not certain and not yet certain," an American source told Ynet newspaper, noting: "It depends on developments, of course." An Israeli source confirmed his words, saying, "There are indeed speculations about a Trump visit, but there's nothing concrete yet. It's something that's up in the air." Trump is expected to visit Britain at the invitation of King Charles on September 17-19. The White House is currently exploring the possibility of the president visiting Israel before then – but that depends on developments in talks on a ceasefire and an end to the war in Gaza. Trump would like to visit Israel if the negotiations are successful.
Al Bawaba
4 hours ago
- Al Bawaba
Russia's Economic Resilience: The Role of China, BRICS, and Strategic Partnerships in Sanctions Evasion
Dr. Gil Feiler Introduction Despite facing unprecedented Western sanctions following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russia's economy has demonstrated remarkable resilience. This resilience stems not merely from domestic adaptations but significantly from strategic partnerships with China, BRICS nations, and other sympathetic countries that have provided crucial economic lifelines. While Russia's economy has indeed faced challenges, including inflation, currency volatility, and restricted access to Western technology and markets, it has managed to maintain functionality through diversified trade relationships and sanctions circumvention mechanisms. The transformation of Russia's economic partnerships represents a fundamental shift in global trade patterns, with implications extending far beyond bilateral relationships. This article examines the multifaceted assistance Russia receives from China and BRICS countries, analyzes the factors contributing to Russian economic resilience, and provides forecasts for the sustainability of these trends. China: Russia's Primary Economic Lifeline Trade Volume and Growth Patterns Trade between China and Russia reached a record high last year in 2024, underscoring their deepening economic partnership despite Western sanctions. China's exports to Russia totaled US$115.28 billion during 2024, while China's imports from Russia reached US$129.88 billion, representing China's position as Russia's largest trading partner. However, recent August 2025 data reveals significant volatility in this relationship. Trade between Russia and China fell 9.1% year-on-year in the first half of 2025, totaling $106.48 billion. Despite this decline, overall trade remains substantial, though below 2024 levels, as China continues to sustain Russia's economy and war effort. This decline reflects multiple pressures including renewed concerns following the US Treasury's December 2023 announcement of potential secondary sanctions on entities assisting Russia's military-industrial base. The trade relationship shows unprecedented levels reflecting deepening economic ties amid shifting global geopolitics, growing from over $140 billion in 2021 to about $190 billion in 2022. Energy Cooperation and Strategic Imports China's assistance to Russia extends far beyond conventional trade relationships. The energy sector represents a cornerstone of their cooperation, with China becoming increasingly dependent on Russian oil, gas, and liquefied natural gas (LNG). Ambassador Zhang Hanhui stated that China plans to increase its imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) this year. He added that there is an increased demand from Chinese buyers. This commitment provides Russia with guaranteed revenue streams and helps offset losses from European market restrictions. The planned Power of Siberia-2 gas pipeline, designed to transport fifty billion cubic meters of natural gas annually from Siberia to China, represents a long-term strategic commitment that ensures Russia's energy export capabilities remain viable despite Western sanctions. Technology Transfer and Sanctions Circumvention Despite falling oil and car shipments dragging down headline trade figures, China remains central to sustaining Russia's economy and war effort in 2025. Russia's ability to sustain its war effort against Ukraine depends largely on Chinese support, especially in evading sanctions and accessing critical technology. Dual-use shipments from China to Russia exceeded USD 4 billion in 2024, showing the sophistication of this relationship. Exports fell sharply after February 2022 amid sanctions concerns, yet quickly recovered throughout 2022 and 2023. A renewed decline occurred following US Treasury's December 2023 secondary sanctions announcement, but Chinese exports rebounded in the second half of 2024, suggesting successful adjustments to circumvent restrictions. Chinese companies continue serving as crucial intermediaries, facilitating transactions and providing alternative supply chains for Russian businesses. However, this relationship involves calculated risks, as China remains cautious about transactions that might expose Chinese businesses to secondary sanctions. BRICS and Expanded Partnerships Evolution and Expansion of BRICS The BRICS bloc has experienced dramatic expansion, evolving from its original five members (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to become a 20-country organization comprising 10 full members and 10 partner countries as of 2025. This expansion now includes Ethiopia, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and most recently Vietnam as a partner country in July 2025, with Nigeria joining the partnership in January 2025. This expanded BRICS+ now represents extraordinary global influence: 44% of world GDP at purchasing power parity, 56% of the world's population, and 25% of the world's landmass. BRICS accounts for 40% of existing internet users and has over 1200 satellites in orbit. Intra-BRICS trade reached US$614.8 billion as of 2022, providing Russia with multiple partnership opportunities and alternative economic frameworks outside Western-dominated systems. India's Strategic Balancing Act India represents a particularly interesting case within BRICS regarding Russian relations. Russia remains India's most prominent defence supplier, accounting for 36 percent of total arms imports in 2023. Despite pressure from Western allies, India has maintained its defense cooperation with Russia while significantly increasing oil imports at discounted rates. India's position reflects broader BRICS sentiment toward sanctions, where Most BRICS members have sought a middle ground, while other members have largely ignored Western sanctions. This middle-ground approach provides Russia with continued access to Indian markets while allowing India to maintain strategic autonomy. Brazil and South Africa's Measured Approach Brazil and South Africa have adopted more cautious positions, balancing their BRICS commitments with Western relationships. However, both countries have refrained from implementing unilateral sanctions against Russia and continue trade relationships within legal frameworks. Their positions demonstrate that even measured support from BRICS members provides Russia with economic breathing room. Iran and Sanctions-Evading Expertise Iran's inclusion in BRICS brings particular value to Russia, given Iran's decades of experience operating under international sanctions. The two countries have developed sophisticated mechanisms for sanctions evasion, including barter trade systems, alternative payment mechanisms, and joint technology development programs. Iran's expertise in maintaining economic functionality under sanctions provides a valuable blueprint for Russian adaptation strategies. Beyond BRICS: Additional Support Networks Middle Eastern Partnerships Several Middle Eastern countries have emerged as crucial partners for Russia. The United Arab Emirates has become a significant transshipment hub for Russian goods, while Saudi Arabia has coordinated with Russia through OPEC+ to maintain oil price stability. These partnerships provide Russia with alternative market access and financial mechanisms outside Western oversight. Central Asian and Former Soviet Republics Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and other former Soviet republics have maintained economic ties with Russia despite international pressure. These countries serve as intermediaries for trade flows and provide land-based transportation routes that bypass maritime restrictions. Their continued cooperation reflects both geographical necessity and historical economic integration. Turkey's Strategic Position Turkey has played a particularly important role as a NATO member that has maintained economic ties with Russia. Turkish businesses have served as intermediaries for various transactions, and Turkey's unique position allows it to facilitate trade flows while maintaining relationships with both Russia and Western allies. Factors Behind Russia's Economic Resilience Domestic Adaptations and Import Substitution Russia's economic resilience stems from multiple factors beyond external assistance. The country has accelerated import substitution programs, developing domestic capabilities in previously import-dependent sectors. Government-led initiatives have prioritized food security, pharmaceutical production, and basic manufacturing, reducing dependence on Western suppliers. Currency and Financial System Adaptations Russia has successfully adapted its financial systems to operate with reduced access to Western banking networks. The development of alternative payment systems, increased use of national currencies in bilateral trade, and expansion of gold and cryptocurrency reserves have provided financial flexibility. The Russian ruble, while experiencing volatility, has demonstrated surprising stability compared to initial post-sanctions predictions. Resource Wealth and Geographical Advantages Russia's vast natural resources provide inherent economic advantages that sanctions cannot easily eliminate. The country's position as a major supplier of energy, metals, and agricultural products ensures continued demand from countries unwilling or unable to source alternatives. Geographical proximity to Asian markets has become increasingly valuable as trade patterns shift eastward. Authoritarian Economic Management Russia's centralized political system has enabled rapid economic policy adjustments and resource reallocation. The government's ability to direct economic activity, control information flows, and mandate corporate behavior has facilitated adaptation to sanctions pressures more quickly than might be possible in more decentralized economies. Challenges and Vulnerabilities Technology Gap and Innovation Constraints Despite partnership assistance, Russia faces growing technology gaps in advanced semiconductors, sophisticated manufacturing equipment, and cutting-edge software. These limitations increasingly constrain productivity growth and technological competitiveness, creating long-term vulnerabilities that partnership arrangements cannot fully address. Demographic and Labor Market Pressures Military mobilization and emigration have created labor shortages in key sectors, while demographic decline poses long-term economic challenges. These internal pressures may limit Russia's ability to fully capitalize on alternative partnership opportunities. Financial System Limitations and War Costs While Russia has developed alternative payment mechanisms, the exclusion from major international financial networks creates ongoing costs and inefficiencies. Direct financial expenditure for waging the war was estimated at US$250 billion through June 2024, rising to over 20% of annual GDP. Additionally, Russia employed an off-budget financing mechanism with over US$200 billion from preferential bank loans made to defense contractors, compelled by the Russian government. The development of parallel financial systems requires significant resources and may limit transaction volumes compared to established networks. Russia's GDP is projected to remain relatively stable at $1.6 trillion by the end of 2025, but defense and security spending now accounts for a substantial portion of government expenditure, constraining other economic priorities. Future Forecast and Sustainability Analysis Short-term Outlook (2025-2027) The current pattern of China-BRICS assistance to Russia is likely to continue in the short term, though with some modifications. China's recent trade volume decline may represent a 'new normal' of more cautious but sustained engagement. BRICS expansion will provide Russia with additional partnership opportunities, though these may develop gradually as new members establish operational frameworks. The sustainability of current assistance levels depends heavily on three factors: the evolution of secondary sanctions enforcement by Western countries, China's assessment of costs versus benefits in supporting Russia, and the broader geopolitical climate including potential changes in the Ukraine conflict. Medium-term Trajectory (2027-2030) Medium-term sustainability faces greater uncertainties. Russia's partnerships provide current stability but may prove insufficient for long-term growth and technological advancement. The country risks falling further behind in technological innovation, potentially making it a less valuable partner for countries like China that prioritize technological leadership. However, if current partnerships deepen and institutionalize through formal agreements, alternative payment systems, and joint development projects, Russia could establish a more permanent alternative economic framework. The success of BRICS initiatives for alternative financial systems and de-dollarization efforts will significantly influence this trajectory. Long-term Implications (2030 and Beyond) Long-term sustainability depends on fundamental questions about global economic architecture. If BRICS countries successfully create alternative international institutions and payment systems, Russia could maintain economic functionality indefinitely outside Western-dominated frameworks. However, if technological gaps widen and partnership countries prioritize relationships with Western economies, Russia's position could become increasingly precarious. The demographic challenges facing Russia pose particular long-term concerns that external partnerships cannot easily address. Economic partnerships can provide trade opportunities and financial assistance, but they cannot resolve fundamental domestic constraints on growth and development. Conclusion Russia's economic resilience despite unprecedented Western sanctions demonstrates the effectiveness of strategic partnerships with China, BRICS nations, and other sympathetic countries. These relationships have provided crucial assistance through increased trade volumes, sanctions circumvention mechanisms, alternative financial frameworks, and technology transfers. China's role as Russia's primary economic partner has been particularly vital, though recent trade volume fluctuations suggest this relationship may be entering a more cautious phase. The expansion of BRICS and the development of alternative economic institutions provide Russia with growing opportunities to maintain economic functionality outside Western-dominated systems. Countries like India, Iran, and various Middle Eastern partners have contributed to Russia's sanctions resilience through continued trade relationships and specialized expertise in operating under international restrictions. However, this resilience faces significant challenges. Technology gaps, demographic pressures, and financial system limitations create vulnerabilities that external partnerships cannot fully address. The sustainability of current assistance patterns depends on evolving geopolitical circumstances, secondary sanctions enforcement, and the long-term strategic calculations of partner countries. The forecast suggests continued but potentially modified support in the short term, with medium and long-term sustainability depending on the success of alternative international institutions and Russia's ability to address domestic economic constraints. While Russia has demonstrated remarkable adaptability, the ultimate test of its economic resilience will be whether current partnership arrangements can support not just survival, but sustainable growth and technological advancement in an increasingly complex global environment. The Russian case illustrates both the possibilities and limitations of alternative economic partnerships in challenging established international systems. As this economic experiment continues, its outcomes will have profound implications for global trade patterns, international institutions, and the future architecture of the world economy.
Ammon
6 hours ago
- Ammon
Trump claims Washington's murder rate is higher than Bogotá or Mexico City
Ammon News - US President Donald Trump has stepped up his criticism of the security situation in Washington, DC, now claiming that the US capital has a homicide rate higher than some Latin American capitals such as Bogotá, Mexico City and Lima. During a press conference on Monday, Trump announced that he would place the Metropolitan Police Department 'under direct federal control' and deploy 800 National Guard troops in an effort to 'take back the city.' US military personnel walk outside the DC Armory after US President Donald Trump's announcement to deploy the National Guard and federalize the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, DC, on August 12. 'The murder rate in Washington today is higher than that of Bogotá, Colombia; Mexico City, or some of the places that you hear about as being the worst places on Earth. It's much higher,' Trump said. Trump said the move to 'liberate' Washington was part of a broader initiative to 'take back control' of cities he said were threatened by violence. 'All is double or triple, so you want to live in places like that? I don't think so,' the president said, referring to the fact that Washington surpasses Latin American cities like Brasilia, Panama City, and San José in homicide rates. CNN
